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For decades, sociologists have employed the concept of social
norms to explain how society shapes individual behavior.1 In recent
years, economists and rational choice theorists in philosophy and
political science have started to use individual behavior to explain
the origin and function of norms.2 For many in this group, the focus
1. See, e.g., DONALD BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF LAw (1976); EMILE DuRI<HEIM, THE
ELEMENTARY FORMS OF REUGIOUS LIFE (Karen E. Fields trans., The Free Press 1995)
(1965); TALCOTI PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM (1912); MAx WEBER, THE PROTESTANT
Ennc AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITAUSM 27 (Talcott Parsons trans., 1958); Judith Blake &
Kingsley Davis, Norms, Values and Sanctions, in HANDBOOK OF MODERN SOCIOLOGY 456
(Robert E.L. Faris ed., 1964); Alvin W. Gouldner, The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary
Statement, 25 AM. Soc. REv. 161 (1960). For an early example of norms discussion in social
psychology, see MUZAFER SHERIF, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL NORMS (1936).
2. For examples within the field of economics, see GARY S. BECKER, AccoUNTING FOR
TASTES 225-30 (1996); ROBERT SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF Rrmrrs, Co-OPERATION AND
WELFARE (1986); George A. Akerlof, A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment
May Be One Consequence, 94 QJ. EcoN. 749 (1980); B. Douglas Bernheim, A Theory of
Conformity, 102 J. Par.. ECON. 841 (1994); Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson, An
Economist's Perspective on the Evolution of Norms, 150 J. INST. & THEORETICAL EcoN. 45
(1994). For examples within philosophy, see EDNA ULLMANN·MARGAUT, TfIE EMERGENCE
OF N oRMs (1977); Philip Pettit, Virtus Normativa: Rational Choice Perspectives, 100 Ennes
725 (1990). A recent collection of economic and philosophical writings is THE DYNAMICS OF
NoRMs (Cristina Bicchieri et al. eds., 1997). For examples within political science, see
DENNIS CHONG, CoLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE CrVJL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1991); RUSSELL
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of study is the interaction of law and norms, of formal and informal
rules. Exemplified by Robert Ellickson's Order Without Law, 3 this
literature uses norms to develop more robust explanations of
behavior and to predict more accurately the effect of legal rules.
Norms turn out to matter in legal analysis for many reasons.
Sometimes norms govern behavior irrespective of the legal rule,
making the choice of a formal rule surprisingly unimportant.4
Sometimes legal rules facilitate or impede the enforcement of a
norm, and the selection of the formal rule matters in entirely new
ways, the exact consequence depending on whether the formal rule
strengthens or weakens a desirable or undesirable norm.5 Indeed,
in some cases, new norms arise in the presence of different legal
rules, making the relevant policy choice one between two or more
law-norm combinations.6
Roughly speaking, by norms this literature refers to informal
social regularities that individuals feel obligated to follow because
of an internalized sense of duty, because of a fear of external non
legal sanctions, or both.7 Law-and-norms scholars view these
informal rules as ubiquitous. Though relatively recent, the
economics literature uses norms to explain an incredible variety of
positive and normative issues: the informal resolution of property
disputes among rancher neighbors in Shasta County, California,s
the preference of the diamond industry for nonlegal means of
contract enforcement,9 the stability of racial discrimination in
competitive markets,10 the effectiveness of various anti-dueling
Robert Axelrod, An
(1986). In addition,
sociologists occasionally use a rational choice perspective to address nonns. See, e.g., JAMES
S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY chs. 10, 11, 30 (1990); Michael Hechter, The
Attainment of Solidarity in Intentional Communities, 2 RATIONALITY & SoCY. 142 (1990).
Political philosopher Jon Elster, on the other hand, uses rational choice concepts in many
respects but defines norms as motivations that are not outcome oriented. See JoN ELSTER,
THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY 98-100 (1989).

HARDIN, ONE FOR Au.: THE Loorc OF GROUP CoNFUcr (1995);
Evolutionary Approach to Norms, 80 AM. Pot.. So. REv. 1095

3. ROBERT c. E LLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETILE DISPUTES
(1991). Regarding other law and economics literature on nonns, see infra notes 19-38 and
accompanying text.
4.
5.
6.

See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 35, 40-43 and accompanying text.
See infra note 42.

7. Not everyone defines nonns in this way. Some count legal rules as nonns; others
exclude not only legal rules but the fonnal rules of private organizations. See infra notes 5459 and accompanying text.
.

See ELUCKSON, supra note 3, at 40-81.
See Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out ofthe Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations
in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).
10. See Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group
Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV 1003, 1064-71 (1995).
8.

9.

.
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statutes from the previous century and safe-sex education efforts
from this one,U the reason people vote,12 the transitional
difficulties in moving from a Marxist to a market economy,13 the
general efficiency of the common law,14 and the operation of the
elder share regime governing sumo wrestling in Japan.1s
One reasonably might wonder from even this incomplete list if a
single social science construct is actually capable of illuminating so
many different behaviors and legal rules. Because law-and
economics theorists use norms to address such different problems
- diamond selling and dueling, sexual customs and voting perhaps they are using the term

norms

to mean different things.16

And because these theorists offer norms to explain otherwise
puzzling phenomena, there is the related risk,

as

Cass Sunstein

warns, "that a reference to social norms will become a conclusory
response to any apparently anomalous results."17 If norms explain
too much, in other words, there is a danger they really explain
nothing.

I do not believe this risk has been realized, but there is a danger
that it will be. In this article, I advocate the use of norms in
economic analysis of law.

Norms are a vitally useful tool for

explaining behavior and predicting the effect of legal rules.
11. See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. Cm. L. REv. 943, 96872, 1019-25 (1995); see also Cass R.Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 CoL UM. L.
REV. 903 (1996) (using norms to explain changes in smoking behavior, recycling patterns, and
gender roles in America).
12. See Richard L. Hasen,
(1996).

Voting Without Law?, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2135, 2136, 2138-64

13. See Richard H.Pildes,
REV. 2055, 2062-63 (1996).

The Destruction ofSocial Capital Through Law, 144 U. PA

.

L.

14. See Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural
Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1643, 1690-94 (1996).
15. See Mark D. West, Legal Rules and Social Norms in Japan's Secret World of Sumo, 26
J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1997).
16. David Charny has already suggested as much: "[O]ne might question whether it is
useful to use the same tenn ('nonns') for comprehensive and relatively complex regimes as
for more infonnal and diffuse sanctioning systems. With the systems that Bernstein and
Ramseyer describe, we are quite far from the bucolic expanses of Shasta County ...." David
Charny, Illusions of a Spontaneous Order: "Norms" in Contractual Relationships, 144 U.PA.
L. REV. 1841, 1845 (1996). Charny is contrasting Ellickson's discussion of norms in Shasta
County, California, see ELUCKSON, supra note 3, with Lisa Bernstein's work on the business
norms enforced by the National Grain and Feed Association, see Bernstein, supra note 9, and
Mark Ramseyer's work on product liability norms enforced by Japan's Product Safety
Council, see J. Mark Ramseyer, Products Liability Through Private Ordering: Notes on a
Japanese Experiment, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1823 (1996). While Shasta County norms exist
without "a centralized agency for formulating or enforcing rules," the nonns addressed by
Bernstein and Ramseyer arise within a centralized '"state-like' agency." See Charny, supra,
at 1845. Charny's comment identifies a crucial distinction, one that I discuss below.
17. Sunstein,

supra note 11, at 945.
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Ellickson was right to have criticized law and economics in 1991 for
having largely ignored informal means of social control,18 and much
still remains to be done in applying economics to understanding the
complex mix of legal and norm-based rules. But because norms are
a relatively new subject for law and economics, there is as yet no
consensus about certain basic theoretical propositions, including,
most importantly, the meaning of norm. My goal is to remedy some
fundamental ambiguities in the term norm
ambiguities that give
this literature an unnecessarily ad hoc appearance and limit our
-

understanding of the connections between law and norms: Toward
this end, I offer a particular theory of the origin and growth of
norms, and I derive some implications the theory has for how law
can govern norms.
Part I introduces this new law-and-norms literature, by which I
mean the economic study of the interaction of formal (legal) and
informal (norm-based) rules. I provide a provisional definition of
norm and identify the puzzle of its origin. Part II offers a simple
model. In the theory I propose, the initial force behind norm
creation is the desire individuals have for respect or prestige, that is,
for the relative esteem of others. Withholding esteem is, under
certain conditions, a costless means of inflicting costs on others.
These costs are often extremely small; their insignificance
compared to material incentives is probably what explains the
tendency of economic theories to ignore them altogether. But Part
II demonstrates that dynamic forces can cause the weak desire for
esteem to produce powerful norms, sometimes because individuals
struggle to avoid deviance, sometimes because they compete to be
heroic. Identifying the stages in this process permits some
analytical clarity that is currently lacking, or so I argue in Part III,
where I use these stages of norm development to resolve some
troubling ambiguities in the literature over the meaning of norms.
The esteem ·model offers a way to unite what may appear to be
unrelated strands of the literature concerning internalized and non
internalized norms, broadly and narrowly defined norms, and group
and societal norms. Finally, in Part IV, I point out some of the
model's immediate implications for the legal regulation of norms.
Though norms can be either socially productive or unproductive,
the esteem theory identifies new situations in which norms reduce
18. Ellickson criticized both the extreme Jaw and society claim that norms determine
behavior to the exclusion of law ("legal peripheralism") and the extreme law and economics
claim that law determines behavior to the exclusion of norms ("legal centralism") and instead
focused on which "controller" is more powerful in particular contexts. See ELLICKSON, supra
note 3, at 137-55.

November

1997]

343

Norms

social welfare. The model also reveals how law can regulate norms:
strengthening norms through the expressive function of law and
impeding norms with legal protections of privacy.
I.

THE

ECONOMICS OF NORMS

AND

NORM

A. The New Economic Literature on Law

ORIGIN

&

Norms

In the 1980s, rational choice theorists in various disciplines be
gan to study norms.19 Within law and economics,20 Janet Landa
and Robert Cooter sought to explain why, in parts of Asia, ethnic
minorities tended to dominate the middleman position in many in
dustries.21 They concluded that these "ethnically homogenous mid
dlemen groups" succeed in natipns without reliable legal
enforcement of contracts because the groups' social connectedness
give their members a unique means of (informally) sanctioning con
tract breaches by other group members.22 About the same time,
Robert Ellickson began investigating how ranchers. in Shasta
County, California, settle property disputes. Ultimately, Ellickson
concluded that these ranchers enforce informal norm-based rules
for disputes involving cattle trespass and boundary fences and thus
resolve certain conflicts without the legal regime.23 In several arti19. Norms appeared both to challenge the idea of rational choice and to explain puzzling
amounts of cooperation and social order. See EI.STER, supra note 2; SUGDEN, supra note 2;
Axelrod, supra note 2. For a recent summary of the economic literature, see Eric Posner,
Efficient Norms, in 1 THE NEw PALGRAVE DICilONARY OF EcoNOMICS AND THE LAW (Peter
Newman ed., forthcoming 1998).
· 20. Steven Cheung may deserve credit for offering the first law and economics analysis of
a norm. See Steven N.S. Cheung, The Fable ofthe Bees: An Economic Investigation, 16 J.L.
& EcoN. 11 (1973). A decade before rational choice theorists began studying norms, Cheung
reported a custom governing beekeeping by apple orchard owners in rural Washington. Be
cause some bees will fly off one orchard and pollinate trees on another orchard, each farmer
has an incentive to keep fewer bees than is necessary for his orchard, with the expectation
that bees from surrounding farms will make up the shortfall. To prevent the overall shortage
of bees that would occur if everyone followed this strategy, an informally enforced custom
requires orchard owners to keep a proportionate share of bees during the pollination period.
See id. at 30. Another early example is Warren F. Schwartz et al., The Duel: Can These
Gentlemen Be Acting Efficiently?, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 321 (1984). Long before this belated
discovery of norms, law and society scholars discussed informal social sanctions and their
relationship to legal rules. See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Busi
ness: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 55 (1963).

21. See Robert Cooter & Janet T. Landa, Personal Versus Impersonal Trade: The Size of
Trading Groups and Contract Law, 4 INTL. REv. L. & EcoN. 15 (1984); Janet T. Landa, A
Theory of the Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group: An Institutional Alternative to
Contract Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 349 (1981); see also JANET TAI LANDA, TRUST, ETIIN1CITY,
AND IDENTITY (1994); Jack L. Carr & Janet T. Landa, The Economics of Symbols, Clan
Names, and Religion, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 135 (1983); Sumner J. La Croix, Homogenous Mid
dleman Groups: What Determines the Homogeneity?, 5 J.L. EcoN. & 0RG. 211 (1989).
22. See Cooter & Landa, supra note 21, at 21; Landa, supra note 21, at 355-57.
23. See ELUCKSON, supra note 3, at 40-81. On the other hand, where the conditions are
not appropriate for norms, legal rules still govern the relevant conduct. See id. at 82-103
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cles24 and in his book, Order Without Law, Ellickson generalizes
these results, explaining how law and norms are alternative means
of social control, each providing a mechanism for overcoming per
vasive problems of collective action.2s

Order Without Law created, or at least anticipated, a bur
geoning new subfield of legal studies.26 Much of the economic
work continues in contract law, which sometimes explicitly refer
ences business norms. Lisa Bernstein, for example, studies how
American merchants - from diamond sellers to grain distributors
- deter contract breaches and resolve disputes without resort to
the legal system.21 Robert Cooter proposes that courts enforce the
(discussing disputes regarding highway .collisions involving livestock). Ellickson also re
counts how whalers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries used nonns to resolve dis
putes over the ownership of whales. See id. at 191-206; see also id. at 218-19 (regarding a
similar discussion of Maine lobstermen, based on JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LoBSTER GANGS
OF MAINE (1988)).
24. See Robert Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in
Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REv. 623 (1986); Robert Ellickson, A Critique of Economic and
Sociological Theories of Social Control, 16 J. LEGAL Sruo. 67 (1987); Robert Ellickson, A
Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the Whaling Industry, 5 J.L. ECON.

& ORO. 83 (1989).

25. See ELUcKSON, supra note 3, at 123-36, 167-83. Collective action problems arise
when there is a disparity between the individual behavior that maximizes the welfare of the
group and the behavior that maximizes the welfare of an individual in the group. Given
some activity, a "group has a collective action problem if it is better for all if some do it than
if nobody does, but better for each not to do it." JoN EI.STER, NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE
SoCIAL SCIENCES 126 (1989). Examples may include voting, driving within the speed limit,
and conserving water in a time of scarcity. See RussELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 8-9,
16-22 (1982); MANcuR OLSON, JR., THE Loorc OF COLLECTIVE AcnoN 5-22 (1965).

26. The growing interest in norms is not limited to Jaw and economics. Recent work by a
variety of legal scholars focuses on norms. See, e.g., Anita Bernstein, Better Living Through
Crime and Tort, 76 B.U. L. REv. 169, 177-80 (1996); Herbert Jacob, The Elusive Shadow of
the Law, 26 L. & SoCY. REv. 565 (1992); William K. Jones, A Theory of Social Norms, 1994
U. Iu.. L. REv. 545; Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility ofDesert, 91 Nw. U. L.
REV. 453 (1997); Walter Otto Weyrauch & Maureen Anne Bell, Autonomous Lawmaking:
The Case of the "Gypsies," 103 YALE L.J. 323 (1993). Some scholars use norms as a means of
critiquing economic theories. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning and
Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REv. 349 (1997) (using social norms to criticize economic theories of
deterrence); Sunstein, supra note 11 (using norms to criticize the economic concept of a
preference).
27. In contrast to Landa's and Cooter's early work, which emphasized the importance of
norms in underdeveloped legal systems, Bernstein finds that norms govern commercial be
havior in the United States in industries where merchants sometimes shun the expensive
judicial machinery for enforcing contracts. See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant
Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv.1765
(1996); Bernstein, supra note 9. Robert Scott had made this point in an earlier and influen
tial article. See Robert Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 CAL. L.
REV. 2005, 2040-42 (1987); see also Robert Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for
Commercial Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL Sruo. 597, 613-15 (1990) (discussing norms of reciprocity
and their implications for selecting optional default rules). Other commentators also discuss
how norms govern commerical relationships. See, e.g., David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in
Commercial Relationships, 104 HARv. L. REv. 373 (1990); Jason Scott Johnston, The Statute
ofFrauds and Business Norms: A Testable Game-Theoretic Model, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1859
(1996); Jody S. Kraus, Legal Design and the Evolution of Commercial Norms, 26 J. LEGAL

November 1997]

Norms

345

otherwise underenforced norms of an industry by directly incorpo
rating them into the legal rules governing contracts in that industry,
at least where the structural circumstances make it likely the norm
is efficient.28
Outside the law of contracts, the literature continues to grow.w
Theorists have explored the relevance of norms to various public
law issues: whether weakened voting norms justify mandatory vot
ing laws,30 whether norms of reciprocity explain why government
must compensate for its takings,31 and whether the criminal prohi
bition of blackmail is efficient.32 More generally, Lawrence Les-

STUD. 377 (1997); Geoffrey P. Miller, Contracts of Genesis, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 15 (1993); Eric
A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on
Collective Action, 63 U. Cm. L. REv. 133, 159-60 (1996).
28. See Cooter, supra note 14. Cooter's proposal is in tension with the claim made by
Bernstein that industrial groups may prefer to preserve the exclusivity of private dispute
resolution mechanisms by forbidding lawsuits between members. See Bernstein, supra note
27, at 1788 ("[R]ational transactors might deliberately leave aspects of their contracting rela
tionship to be governed, in whole or in part, by extralegal commitments and sanctions.");
Bernstein, supra note 9, at 124-27, 134 (describing diamond bourse rule against the litigation
of disputes). Edward Rock and Michael Wachter similarly argue that courts should not at
tempt to enforce the norm of American labor markets that employees may be discharged
only "for cause," because they doubt that judges can gain the local knowledge necessary to
enforce the norm competently. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The Enforce
ability ofNorms and the Employment Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1913 (1996); see also
Richard Craswell, Do Trade Customs Exist?, in THE JurusPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LA W 24-25 (Jody Kraus & Steven Walt eds., forthcoming
1997) (arguing that trade customs take the form of general rules that require "judgment" and
case-by-case "balancing" of interests by those in the trade rather than "bright-line rules"
judges can discover and apply).

29. Judge Richard Posner recently joined the fray. See Richard A. Posner, Social Norms
and the Law: An Economic Approach, AM. EcoN. REV., May 1997, at 365. Ellickson contin
ues to study informal control of land use through neighborhood or "street" norms. See Rob
ert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: OfPanhandlers, Skid Rows,
and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165 (1996); see also Stephen R. Munzer, Ellickson
on "Chronic Misconduct" in Urban Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Bench Squatters, and Day La
borers, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (1997) (criticizing Ellickson's proposal to define

"chronic street nuisance" by reference to community norms). Informal regulation of land is
of considerable interest to many nonlegal scholars. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM ET AL., RULES,
GAMES, AND COMMON-POOL REsOURCES (1994).
30. See Hasen, supra note 12. Hasen's work, and many of those referred to in this sec
tion, see infra notes 31-35, were part of a recent symposium in the University of Pennsylvania
Law Review. See Symposium, Law, Economics, & Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1643 (1996).
31. See Pildes, supra note 13, at 2069-73. Saul Levmore also compares legal and norm
based rules governing anonymous communication in society and concludes that law is unable
to mirror the nuances of the norm-based rule. See Saul Levmore, The Anonymity Tool, 144
U. PA. L. REV. 2191 (1996) (suggesting that norms permit anonymity more frequently than
law because only norms can enforce complex obligations of "intermediation" that ameliorate
the harms of anonymity).
32. See Richard H. McAdams, Group Norms, Gossip, and Blackmail, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2237, 2266-91 (1996).
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sig33 and Cass -Sunstein34 have discussed government efforts to
"manage" social norms. Sunstein uses norms to explain the "ex
pressive" function of law: by "making a statement," law can
strengthen the norms it embodies and weaken those it condemns.
One might therefore justify government coercion as a means of im
peding unwanted norms or facilitating desirable norms.3s Lessig
emphasizes the need for the state to consider the "social meaning"
of behavior it seeks to regulate. ·Law can influence behavior by
changing the norms that determine the meaning ascribed to behav
ior; often one cannot predict the effect of law, he claims, without
considering this interpretive dimension.36
The value of this scholarship must be measured within each area
of law it addresses, but the literature does point strongly toward a
particular research agenda: those who study law should study
norms. Where norms govern individual behavior, one cannot cor
rectly assess the effect of formal, state-enforced rules without un
derstanding the informal rules also at work. In many ways, this
point is very old: legal scholars have always paid some attention,
33. See Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REY. 2181
(1996); Lessig, supra note 11.
34. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REY. 2021
(1996); Sunstein, supra note 11.
35. As Sunstein explains:
[L]aw might attempt to express a judgment about the underlying activity in such a way
as to alter social norms. . • . Through time, place, and manner restrictions or flat bans, for
example, the law might attempt to portray behavior like smoking, using drugs, or engag
ing in unsafe sex as a sign of individual weakness.
Sunstein, supra note 34, at 2034-35. Sunstein also uses norms to challenge the coherence of
the economic concept of a preference. See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 931-39. In contrast, my
theory of norm origin begins with the economic idea of a preference, namely the preference
for esteem. See infra text accompanying notes 78-83.

36. See Lessig, supra note 11. Lessig claims that one way law changes social meaning is
by "ambiguation," where law renders the meaning of an act less clear by providing an alter
native meaning. See id. at 1010-12. For example, if almost no one wears a seat belt, then
wearing a belt in another person's car means (signals) that one distrusts the driver's abilities;
because people wish to avoid giving offense, this meaning decreases seat belt use. See id. at
952. If the state mandates seat belt use, however, the meaning of this behavior becomes
more ambiguous because the seat belt user may now be acting solely to comply with the law.
By "ambiguating" the meaning, the law renders it less likely that wearing a seatbelt will give
offense and decreases the costs of the behavior. See id. at 1011-12.
Another technique is "tying," through which law may add meaning to one behavior by
connecting it to another. See Lessig, supra note 11, at 1009-10. Lessig uses Dan Kahan's
discussion of criminal fines as an example. See Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanc
tions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REY. 591 (1996). Kahan says that fines fail to express (ade
quately) condemnation of the behavior being fined. See id. at 620. A fine also looks like a
"price," and making one pay a price for an activity does not condemn the activity. See id. at
621. Kahan recommends combining criminal fines with a small prison term or a "shaming"
sanction, such as stigmatizing publicity. See id. at 649-52. Lessig concurs, claiming that "(b]y
tying the fine to some other unambiguously condemnatory punishment, one reduces on the
margin the ambiguity in fining . . . ." Lessig, supra note 33, at 2188.

November 1997]

Norms

347

sometimes enormous attention, to social or business customs, con
ventions, mores, and the like.37 But the new law and norms litera
ture re-states and sharpens the point. Norms matter to legal
analysis because (1) sometimes norms control individual behavior
to the exclusion of law, (2) sometimes norms and law together influ
ence behavior, and (3) sometimes norms and law influence each
other.38
Consider each possibility. First, a norm may govern behavior so
tightly that the choice between (plausible) legal rules is irrelevant.
Ellickson, for example, discovered that different property regimes
in Shasta County had no effect on the way neighbors resolved cer
tain disputes because the same norm governed regardless of the
legal rule.39 In these situations, any effort expended to refine the
legal rule is simply wasted. Second, norms frequently matter be
cause the legal and norm-based rules each independently influence
behavior. Law and norms frequently reinforce each other by obli
gating the same behavior - both, for example, obligate tax-

37. An obvious example is Karl Llewellyn's effort to model article 2 of the Uniform Com
mercial Code on business norms. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 27, at 1768 n.6 (listing
sources addressing Llewellyn's efforts to incorporate norms into the law). Tort rules also
incorporate community norms. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Path to the TJ. Hooper:
The Theory and History ofCustom in the Law of Tort, 21 J. LEGAL Sruo. 3, 4 (1992); Robert
C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort,
77 CAL. L REv. 957, 974-78 (1989) (arguing that the privacy tort enforces community norms
of "civility").
Criminal law scholars often have discussed the social norms or values legal rules enforce,
not just in the context of enforcing morality, see, e.g., P ATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT
OF MORALS (1965), but also in explaining fundamental doctrinal elements such as mens rea,
see, e.g., HERBERT L. P ACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANcnON 121-31 (1968);
Robinson & Darley, supra note 26, at 479-82. Conversely, various scholars observe the use of
criminal law to change norms. For example, Brian Simpson suggests that the 602 A.D. laws
of the English King Ethelbert, the "earliest set of written laws of any Germanic people in
Europe," were an attempt to displace the "feud," the customary duty one had to avenge the
death of a family member. See A.W.B. SIMPSON, The Laws of Ethelbert, in LEGAL THEORY
AND LEGAL HISTORY: ESSAYS ON THE COMMON LAW 1, 2, 12-13 (1987) ("What the laws of
Ethelbert were concerned to introduce into society was a new idea - that it was not wrong
to take money instead of blood."); cf. HARDIN, supra note 2, at 91-100 (discussing how the
prohibition of dueling contributed to the demise of the norms of honor and revenge that
obligated aristocrats to duel); A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, CANNIBALISM AND THE COMMON LAW
(1984) (discussing how the state used the case of Regina v. Dudley & Stephens to expand the
norm against killing by nullifying the custom allowing cannibalism by those lost at sea).
38. Thus, norms are irrelevant only in the fourth possible case, when the legal rule gov
erns individual behavior exclusively, because there is no preexisting norm governing such
behavior, no norm that arises as a consequence of the legal rule, and-no norm influencing
what legal rule is adopted.
39.

See ELucKSON, supra note 3, at 40-64.
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paying40 and forbid theft41 - and sometimes undermine each other
by obligating inconsistent behavior - as where law obligates one to
disclose the illegal activities of colleagues but the collegial norm ob
ligates silence.42 When laws and norms obligate different but con
sistent behaviors, the interaction can be quite interesting and
complex.43

40. See, e.g., Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, More Order Without More Law: A Theory
of Social Norms and Organizational Cultures, 10 J.L. EcoN. & ORO. 390, 401-02 (1994) (re
viewing studies on tax compliance).

41. See PAUL H. ROBINSON & JoHN M. DARLEY, Jl/STICE, LIABILITY & BLAME 16, 65,
191 (1995). But see THOMAS GABOR, 'EVERYBODY DOES IT!' CRIME BY THE PUBLIC 73-97
(1994) (discussing the frequency of and rationalizations for, amateur theft such as insurance
fraud, employee pilfering, tax evasion, shoplifting, and "hotel linen lifting").

42. See, e.g., JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAw: PoLICE AND THE
ExcESsIVE Us E OF FORCE 108-12 (1993) (describing the code of silence among police officers
that prevents one from "informing" on the misconduct of another); Report of the Mallen
Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption in New York City, in ANATOMY
A PATH FOR SucCESs 53-58 (1994) (finding a pervasive "code of silence" that is

OF FAILURE:

strongest in "crime-ridden precincts where officers most depend upon each other for their
safety each day"); Richard N. Pearson, The Role of Custom in Medical Malpractice Cases, 51
IND. LJ. 528 (1976) (describing doctors' unwillingness to testify against other doctors); Carl
R. Robinson, Why the Conspiracy of Silence Won't Die, M ED . EcoN., Feb. 20, 1984, at 180
(same); cf. West, supra note 15, at 166 (discussing the secrecy maintained by the Japan Sumo
Association).
Another obvious example is violence, where law forbids an assault required by norms of
honor. See, e.g., HARDIN, supra note 2, at 91-100; RICHARD E. NISBETT & Dov COHEN,
CuLTURE OF HONOR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF VIOLENCE IN THE SOUTH 13-22, 92-93 (1996);
Jon Elster, Norms ofRevenge, 100 ETHICS 862 (1990) (discussing norms of honor supporting
the practice of dueling and the blood feud).

43. For example, assume that a law obligates individuals to appear for jury duty when
called and a norm prevents lying. Without the law, a person wishing to avoid serving would
refuse to appear; without the norm, a person who appeared could avoid serving by telling
undetectable lies during voir dire about her inability to be impartial. The law and the norm
thus achieve a result together - inducing jury service - that neither could produce in
isolation.
As another example, consider the combination of common law larceny, which prohibits
the taking of another's property only when accompanied by the intent to permanently de
prive the owner thereof, see MoDEL PENAL CODE § 223.2 cmt. 6 (1980), with a norm among
many neighbors and co-workers not to take property of another without permission, even
temporarily. Because neighbors and coworkers might be the only people who could convince
a jury they took someone's property with the intent to return it, and because these individu
als are the ones subject to the norm, the combination of the legal and norm-based rule may
provide reasonable security of personal property even though each rule alone seems inade
quate. The criminal rule permits temporary taking, while the norm may simply be too weak
to prevent lucrative permanent taking even by neighbors. Of course, the criminal rule could
be - and in some jurisdictions has been - expanded so that the legal prohibition, including
the tort of conversion that already applies to temporary taking, would by itself deter tempo
rary taking. But if one wishes to conserve criminal law only for those wrongs for which
punishment is strictly necessary, then norms may help explain why the common law of lar
ceny did not ban temporary taking.
For a third example, see McAdams, supra note 32, at 2266-91 (defending the prohibition
of blackmail based on its interactive effect with privacy norms).
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Perhaps of greatest interest, the law can influence the norm.44
Some theorists advocate using law intentionally to govern or shape
norms. Cooter, for example, advocates "decentralizing law" by in
corporating business norms directly into contract rules governing
the industry in which the norm arises.45 Various scholars claim that
legally restricting public smoking may strengthen an antismoking
norm,46 that Title V II impedes enforcement of undesirable norms
of race discrimination,47 and that bans on dueling worked to end
norms obligating the duel.48 In general, if legal rules sometimes
change or create norms, one cannot adequately compare an existing
legal rule with its alternatives without considering how a change in
the legal rule may affect the relevant norms.
The literature also identifies the danger that law may uninten
tionally change norms. Some express concern that courts will un
dermine the very norms they seek to enforce, given that judges lack
the local knowledge to understand the norm properly.49 More
often, the effect on norms arises from the state's attempt to regulate
something else. Eric Posner, for example, suggests that legal rules
often have indirect and unintended effects on the power that groups
have over their members, which in turn affects the power of such
groups to enforce their norms.50 Other scholars make similar
claims.51
44. This third category also includes the influence of norms on the production of legal
rules. I will focus on the effect noted in the text, but of course judicial norms affect the
production of legal opinions, and lobbying-legislative norms affect the production of statutes.
See, e.g., Erin O'Hara, Social Constraint or Implicit Collusion?: Toward a Game Theoretic
Analysis of Stare Decisis, 24 SETON HALL L. REv. 736 (1993); Posner, supra note 29, at 365.
45. Cooter limits his proposition to situations in which the norm passes a "structural" test
for efficiency. See Cooter, supra note 14, at 1694.
46.
47.
48.
49.

See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 34, at 2033-36.
See McAdams, supra note 10, at 1074-82.
See Lessig, supra note 11, at 968-72.
See Bernstein, supra note 27, at 1796-1807 (asserting that grain merchants may prefer

that courts enforce formal rules rather than attempt to ascertain and enforce the norms of the
grain merchants); Pildes, supra note 13, at 2073-76 (noting that inherent differences in group
and state enforcement of a rule often suggest that state enforcement of the norm would be
counterproductive); Rock & Wachter, supra note 28, at 1932-40 (arguing courts could not
enforce norm of "for-cause" firing).

50. See Posner. supra note 27, at 147-48.
51. Richard Pildes warns of the unintended destruction of social capital through law. See
Pildes, supra note 13. He suggests, for example, that modern urban planning created build
ings that destroyed the conditions for "street" norms vital to urban welfare. See id. at 206769 (relying on JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN Crrms (1961)).
Jacobs's and Pildes's argument is that urban planning produced buildings that intentionally
avoided attracting people to the streets, ignoring the fact that populated streets were an es
sential condition for norms regulating street behavior.
I have argued previously that the criminal prohibition of blackmail unintentionally facili
tates the ability of close-knit groups to sanction violators in the public manner necessary to
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In sum,

formal and informal rules form a complex web of incen
tives that influence behavior; a new economics literature has begun
to view norms as central to the study of law.
B.

The Meaning of "Norms" in the New Literature

In

other disciplines, considerable effort has gone into defining
exactly what constitutes a norm.52 The economic literature contin
ues to struggle over the issue.53 Although my use of the term will
become clearer as I develop a theory of how such influences arise, I
state here a few preliminary points concerning definition.
To begin, the economic literature distinguishes norms from legal
rules.54 Although law may affect the strength of norm enforcement,
norms are enforced by some means other than legal sanctions. If
recycling were a norm, for example, we would not mean that - or
at least not merely mean that - the state punishes the failure to
recycle but rather that the obligation to recycle is enforced by a
nongovernmental sanction - as when individuals internalize the
duty and feel guilt from failing to recycle or when individuals pri
vately punish those who do not recycle.
Second, I follow the literature that views norms as obligations.
Robert Cooter excludes, for example, the statistical notion of a
norm as merely a central tendency of behavior. Many regularities
exist - even intentionally - without being obligatory.ss As
Cooter puts it: "[M]en take off their hats when they enter a furnace
room or a church. Taking off your hat to escape the heat is differ
ent from taking off your hat to satisfy an obligation. The former is
[merely] a regularity and the latter is a norm."56
further norm internalization, and to generate the norm criticism necessary to "repeal" dys
functional norms. See McAdams, supra note 32, at 2243-64; see also Wendy J. Gordon,
Norms of Communication and Commodification, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2321, 2329-34 (1996)
(critiquing these claims).
52. See, e.g., EI.STER, supra note 2, at 97-151; Blake & Davis, supra note 1.
53. See Posner, supra note 19 (summarizing several recent theories).
54. But see Jones, supra note 26, at 546 {defining norms to include "all rules and stan
dards, without regard to their origins or means of enforcement").
55. Individuals may intentionally adhere to a regularity for reasons other than its being an
obligation. For example, those who wish to hitchhike hold up their hand with the thumb
extended not because the failure to do so is sanctioned by guilt or condemnation, but because
they will otherwise fail to communicate to motorists their desire for a ride. People with
imperfect information often follow the majority behavior, not from fear of sanctions, but
because they assume the majority is less likely to be mistaken. In both examples, following
the regularity is prudent; deviating from it carries risks, though not the risk of sanction.
Hence, the intentional regularity or "convention" is not an obligation and not, in my use of
the term, a norm. Elster makes this distinction. See EI.STER, supra note 2, at 101-02.
56. Cooter, supra note 14, at 1656 {footnote omitted). Tue removal of a hat in a furnace
room is not a duty the individual owes to other members of the community. Tue regularity is
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Third, nonlegal obligations may be created and enforced in a
centralized or decentralized manner. Centralized private organiza
tions, such as a diamond bourse, enforce relatively formal, usually
written, rules,57 while groups and entire societies often enforce
highly informal rules, such as the property norms ranchers follow in
Shasta County.58 The distinction is important because some theo
rists prefer to use the term norms to refer only to decentralized
rules and regard organizational rules as a set of obligations falling
between centralized law and decentralized norms.59 However the
terminological matter is resolved, this article focuses on informal,
decentralized obligations. Such obligations describe virtually all the
norms arising at a societal level60 and within informal groups,61 and
some of the norms arising informally within highly structured
groups.62 These are also the norms for which the meaning is most
obscure - a function of their informality - and for which a theory
of origin is therefore likely to have the greatest payoff.63
merely the result of a common disposition to feel uncomfortably hot wearing a hat in a fur
nace room. But church members regard hat-removal as a duty that men owe to the church.
One who violates an obligation is sanctioned for that reason by human agency - the violator
either receives an internal self-sanction, such as guilt, or others punish the violation.
57.
58.

See Bernstein, supra note 9, at 119-32.
See ELLICKSON, supra note 3, at 40-81.

59. Ellickson divides social control into first-party (involving one's personal ethics), sec
ond-party (involving self-help by an aggrieved party), and third-party control. See id. at 13031. He then notes three sources of third-party control: governments provide legal rules,
organizations provide organizational rules, and "social forces" provide norm-based rules. See
id. at 131. In this taxonomy, organizational rules therefore are not "norms." See id. This
distinction has not, however, generally been observed, a point that David Charny has re
cently criticized. See supra note 16.
As long as the distinction between formal and informal norms is observed, I would prefer
to use norms to refer to any nonstate obligation. The whole literature has in common the
claim that legal analysis should reflect the existence of nonlegal obligations. A single term is
useful for making this point: "Remember norms" is easier than "Remember norms and also
organizational rules."
60. For example, social norms defining gender roles, obligating voting, and proscribing
rudeness are enforced informally.
61. For example, the Shasta County ranchers Ellickson studied are a close-knit group
without a formal structure. See ELLICKSON, supra note 3, at 52-64. Neighbors are often
groups in this sense, as are students at a particular high school, workers in a firm, city dwell
ers who share a religious faith, and professors of a given discipline.
62. Bernstein, for example, notes that some trading rules within formal organizations re
main informal. See Bernstein, supra note 27, at 1775 n.32, 1777-78 n.43; see also Craswell,
supra note 28, at 25-26.
63. Informal norms are, in a sense, more fundamental. Once an organization arises, the
origin of its rules is explained simply by the formal processes of rule creation within the
organization - perhaps aided by borrowing from public choice analysis of governmental
rulemaking, see Charny, supra note 16, at 1848. The difficult question is how the organization
originated. My model of the origin of decentralized norms may bear on this question, in that
the processes creating informal norms within groups may, over time, produce a centralized
structure to the group which can then promulgate formal rules. F urther, if one thinks of
organizational rules as a hybrid of centralized law and decentralized norms, the initial ques-
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The Puzzle of Norm Origin and Its Relevance for Law

Despite the fact that norms govern behavior throughout society,
the origin of norms is, for economists, something of a puzzle. 'fypi
cally, the new literature simply sets the issue aside. The decision to
concentrate on the operation of extant norms is certainly defensi
ble: we gain much by empirical studies of particular norms.64
Nonetheless, I believe it is fruitful for legal theory to focus on the
more elemental question: How do norms initially arise?
For economics, this question poses some difficulty. If one takes
for granted that individuals enforce norms, it is easy to see why they
persist. A norm exists as long as the sanctions imposed on violators
create an expected cost for noncompliance that exceeds the ex
pected cost of compliance. But if sanctioning is costly, as most anal
yses assume, the puzzle is to explain why individuals will ever begin
to sanction violators or why threats of sanctions are ever credible.65
It is not sufficient to answer that individuals enforce the norm be
cause they perceive that it benefits the group. Even when the norm
benefits the group, a second-order collective action problem66 re
mains: if others enforce the norm, the individual can gain the
norm's benefits without bearing enforcement costs; if others do not
enforce the norm, the individual's solo enforcement efforts are
wasted. The individual gains only in the rare case where her contri
bution to enforcement by. itself will "make or break" the norm. 67
tion is how to explain the origin and function of the two pure cases; one can then explain the
hybrid case in terms of these cases.
64. The fact of a norm's existence is entirely sufficient to establish many propositions
important to legal analysis. Moreover, had the early work on norms not been rigorously
empirical, many rational choice scholars might have found the idea of norm-based behavior
easy to dismiss as theoretically improbable or insignificant. Fmally, any theory of origin must
ultimately be tested against empirical data concerning particular norms.

65. Sanctioning is not necessary if threats to sanction are credible. But given the collec
tive action problem described in the paragraph, it is not clear why anyone should take such
threats seriously.
66. Regarding collective action generally, see HARDIN, supra note 25; OtsoN, supra note
25.

67. More precisely, the individual will bear the costs of enforcement only when (1) she
perceives that her decision to sanction a violator would, given other events, create a norm
and her failure to sanction would prevent the norm, and (2) her benefit from having the norm
would exceed her cost from enforcing it. Given uncertainty, one might instead say that the
individual perceives the gain from enforcing the norm to be the probability of being the
"make or break" actor multiplied by the gain she receives from having the norm. Outside of
very small groups, the probability of being the "make or break" actor is very low. See Et.
STER, supra note 2, at 44.
One could try to answer this analysis by asserting that there are secondary norms obligat
ing enforcement of primary norms. But this merely pushes the second-order collective action
problem back to a third level, begging the question of why anyone would bear the costs to
sanction those who failed to sanction primary norm violators. See id.
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Otherwise, the individual is better off not bearing enforcement
costs.68
To illustrate, imagine a behavior with negative externalities that is, effects that impose nonconsensual costs on others.69 Litter
ing, for example, imposes costs on those who encounter the litter in
any way they r�gard as unpleasant. Suppose that the total gains
derived from a given act of littering are worth twenty-five cents the value the litterer places on not holding the garbage until she
finds a receptacle for it - and the total average costs are one dol
lar, based on a one-cent cost incurred by the litterer and each of, on
average, ninety-nine others who encounter the litter. Even though
littering is socially costly, it is common because a litterer gains all
the benefits but incurs only a fraction of the costs. One might ex
pect a no-littering norm in this context: given the costs the behav
ior imposes on everyone, the group would benefit if it spent the
costs necessary to sanction litterers effectively.10 But the dynamic
that causes the littering problem is likely to prevent a solution. The
most any one individual will spend to deter an act of littering is one
cent, which is quite probably not sufficient by itself to raise the ex
pected costs of littering above twenty-five cents.71 Thus, a norm
68. The problem is not solved by positing universal altruism. If everyone were highly
altruistic, there would be no collective action problems recognized as such. Anyone who has
observed traffic gridlock, littering, or water shortages should admit that selfishness is suffi
ciently strong to cause such problems. The question is, given that selfish individuals often fail
to generate nonns, how is it that they sometimes do?
One answer is that there are varying degrees of altruism in individuals and varying distri
butions of individuals among groups, so that one group, but not another, may produce a
norm requiring a certain level of sacrifice, and one group may produce some nonns but not
others that require even more sacrifice. This solution would resolve the puzzle but without
explaining much of what we observe about nonns. For example, if nonns depended entirely
on altruism, we would not observe strong norms within criminal groups nor guilt among
those who have internalized a norm they intellectually understand is no longer beneficial to
the group. Nor does an altruism model yield much new insight into norms - for example, it
does not predict the existence of Uimecessary and inefficient norms, nor the expressive value
of law, each of which is explained in Part IV.
69. This is precisely where James Coleman expects norms to arise, given other conditions
that he identifies. See COLEMAN, supra note 2, at 251 ("[T]he genesis of a norm is based in
externalities of an action which cannot be overcome by simple transactions that would put
control of the action in the hands of those experiencing the externalities.").
70. Because the group loses 75 cents from each act of littering, the group would benefit if
it could deter an act of littering for anything less than 75 cents. This seems highly probable,
given that the litterer gains only 25 cents.
71. I say only "quite probably" because there is no necessary connection between the
costs borne by the one who imposes a sanction and the costs borne by the one receiving the
sanction. As others have noted, the former cost is often less than the latter, as where a
vandal bears little cost to inflict substantial damage to an automobile. See HARDIN, supra
note 2, at 52-53. Sanctioning is made more effective by this potential multiplier effect, which,
in theory, could support a norm even in the textual example. For example, if the 1¢ cost
borne by the sanctioner inflicted a 24¢ loss on the litterer, then this 24¢ loss, combined with
the 1¢ loss the litterer already bears, would offset any benefit from the act. For costly sane-
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can arise only if many individuals sanction litterers. But when an
effective sanction requires the action of many individuals, each one
reasons that her sanctioning decision will neither make nor break
the norm, so she is better off not bearing sanctioning costs. The
second-order collective action problem persists.
This is the puzzle that any rational choice theory of norm origin
must solve. I do not suggest that the puzzle has, up to now, re
mained unsolvable. Various theorists have made considerable pro
gress in explaining the formation of norms;n in all likelihood, there
is no single appropriate theory, but different explanations appropri
ate to different norms.73 Thus, after I present my "esteem" theory
of norm origin, I explain how it may be synthesized with Robert
Cooter's theory of norm "intemalization."74 I then demonstrate
the usefulness of the esteem theory, so conceived, in two ways. Part
III contends that the esteem theory of norm formation can resolve
troubling ambiguities over the meaning of the term norm and pro
vide a basis for unifying the growing body of literature on the sub
ject. Second, as explained above, arguably the most important
relationship between law and norms is the ability of law to shape
norms. Yet if we do not know how norms first arise, it would seem
implausible to think we could predict how legal rules might change
a particular norm. Part IV contends that an esteem theory of norm
origin is useful to understand both when norm shaping is desirable
and how it can be achieved.
tions, I doubt the real world multipliers are often so great, especially because many cases
where the multiples would be greatest - for example, vandalism and physical assaults - are
themselves subject to criminal and tort sanctions which reduce the multiplier. Finally, when
the multiplier effect is sufficiently great, there still may remain a holdout problem: Sanction
ing now generates positive returns, but the returns are even greater for those who do not
sanction but who enjoy the benefits of someone else sanctioning the litterer.
In the end, it may still be possible for norms to arise from costly sanctioning aided by a
multiplier effect. My thesis, however, is not that the esteem theory of norm origin is strictly
necessary to explain any norm, but that the esteem model solves the origin puzzle in a way
that explains more of what we observe about norms.
72. Within law and economics, the first is Robert Cooter. See Robert D. Cooter, Law
and Unified Social Theory, 22 J.L. & SoCY. 50 (1995) [hereinafter Cooter, Unified Theory];
Robert D. Cooter, Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model of Decen
tralized Law, 14 INTI.. REv. L. & EcoN. 215 (1994) [hereinafter Cooter, Structural Adjudica
tion]; Cooter, supra note 14. I discuss his theory infra section III.A, contrasting and
synthesizing it with my own. See also BECKER, supra note 2 (presenting an internalization
theory); Kraus, supra note 27 (presenting an evolutionary theory); Eric Posner, Symbols,
Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 1998)
(presenting a signaling model of norms). See generally Posner, supra note 19 (reviewing ex
isting economic theories of origin).

73. See Posner, supra note 19, at 5.
74. See infra section III.A.
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AN ESTEEM THEORY OF NORMS·

.

This Part presents the "esteem" theory of norms. Section II.A
presents the initial conditions under which the desire for esteem
creates a norm. People can solve the second-order collective action
problem because, at the earliest level, they can costlessly punish
norm violators by withholding from them the esteem they seek. If
many people agree that a behavior deserves disapproval, if there is
an inherent risk the behavior will be detected, and if this agreement
and risk are well-known, then the pattern of disapproval itself cre
ates costs to the behavior. When sufficiently large, these costs pro
duce a norm against the behavior.75 Though esteem forces may be
weak, Section II.B notes several reasons why the resulting norms
may be strong: conformity is self-reinforcing because the esteem
sanction for deviance increases as conformity increases, individuals
compete for "hero" status by leading the group to more demanding
norms, and esteem competition can produce secondary norms re
quiring material enforcement of primary norms. I organize the dis
cussion temporally, emphasizing the developmental stages of a
norm.
A.

An Esteem Theory of Norm Origin

My thesis is that norms arise because people seek the esteem of
others.76 In this section, I describe what I mean by the preference
for esteem and explain the conditions under which this preference
will produce a norm.

1.

The Preference for Esteem

Suppose people seek esteem: the good opinion or respect of
others. Assume, in other words, that an individual's utility depends
in part on the opinion that she perceives others to hold of her.77 In
75. As I explain infra text accompanying notes 119-23, the same analysis applies to ex
plain how approval of behavior produces a norm obligating that behavior.
76. I made this claim briefly in a previous article, see McAdams, supra note 10, at 1028,
though without any detail concerning the conditions necessary for norms to arise or for es
teem sanctions to develop into material sanctions. Since that time I discovered an earlier
publication by philosopher Philip Pettit making the same point. See Pettit, supra note 2, at
739-40 (claiming that people value approval and that disapproval is a costless means of sanc
tioning that can produce norms). Pettit's article is part of a 1990 ETHICS symposium. See
Symposium on Norms in Moral and Social Theory, 100 ETHICS 725 (1990). My model relies
on his approach, though I rely on a "relative" component to esteem seeking to explain vari
ous developmental stages of a norm: how esteem competition can increase the standard
required by the norm, produce secondary enforcement norms, and leverage purely esteem
sanctions into material sanctions.
77. It is obvious that people sometimes seek the good opinion of others as a means to an
end. Achieving a material end - for example, making a sale or getting a pay raise - often
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prior articles, I· have reviewed social science :findings and anecdotal
evidence supporting this claim. This evidence shows that people
pay for status goods to signal their wealth or "good taste,"78 that
people incur material costs to cooperate in situations where their
only reward is the respect and admiration of their peers,79 and that
individuals conform their behavior or judgment to the unanimous
view of those around them in order to avoid the disesteem accorded
"deviants."Bo Here, I will not review further evidence but merely
assume that individuals value esteem.81 The norms literature pro
vides substantial evidence that norms influence behavior and, if the
esteem theory usefully explains norms, this will be justification
enough for the assumption.sz Indeed, though I believe people
sometimes value esteem quite highly, for the purpose of explaining
norms it is sufficient to assume that people place only a small value
on the opinion of others.s3
requires first obtaining the good opinion of the person who has the power to confer the
material end. But my assumption is that individuals also value esteem as an end.

78. See Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1, 38-44, 48 (1992); see
also id. at 31-37 (reviewing social psychology evidence supporting theories of social compari
son and relative deprivation); id. at 44-48 (reviewing economic data supporting relative in
come theories of savings, wages, and risk-taking).

79. See McAdams, supra note 10, at 1009-19 (reviewing evidence of cooperation in exper
imental prisoner's dilemmas and real world collective action problems).
80. See McAdams, supra note 32, at 2250 nn.40-41 (describing findings of conformity ex
periments); see also Kahan, supra note 26, at 352, 353-56 (reviewing social psychology evi
dence of "social influence" - that is, the fact "that individuals tend to conform their conduct
to that of other individuals").
81. This assumption is intentionally rec;luctive and possibly unrealistic in that it collapses
many plausible distinctions between the kinds of esteem individuals seek. For example, I
assume throughout this article that an individual will care more about certain kinds of opin
ions than others - for example, that one cares more about what others think of her intellect
than integrity, or vice versa - and will care about the opinions of certain people more than
others - that is, one cares more about her friend's opinion of her than a stranger's opinion
of her. But my assumption is that there is a single preference for esteem and that these
different sources of esteem are substitutes for one another. This simplifying assumption
could be discarded in favor of a mqre complex view of esteem, but I do not believe it would
affect the main conclusions of this article.
82. One might object on sociobiological grounds that humans, as animals, would not in
dependently value nonmaterial ends. To the contrary, however, the material and reproduc
tive rewards for being of high status are sufficiently great that it is perfectly consistent with
evolutionary theory that animals would instinctually seek status as an end in itself, rather
than rely on complex calculations to determine exactly how much status seeking will maxi
mize reproduction. See, e.g., Amy Wax, Against Nature - On Robert Wright's The Moral
Animal, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 307, 318-22 (1996); see also FRANS DE WAAL, GooD NATURED:
THE ORIGINS OF RIGHT AND WRONG IN H UMANS AND 011-IER ANIMALS 92 (1996) ("Respect
for rules and norms can develop only when the opinions and reactions of others matter.").

83. I place less weight than Pettit on the magnitude of the desire for esteem. See Pettit,
supra note 2, at 745 (assuming "that people are moved in great part, though not exclusively,
by a concern that others not think badly of them and, if possible, that they think well of
them." (emphasis added)). As I claim in the next paragraph, people desire relative esteem,
and as I explain infra section II.B.l, competition for relative esteem can produce powerful
norms even if the desire for esteem is not strong.
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A crucial feature of esteem seeking is that individuals care how
they are evaluated in comparison to others. This relative element
can arise because the preference for esteem is inherently relative;
that is, because the taste itself is relative - for example, "I want to
be thought of as the best." But even if the desire for: esteem were a
conventional, absolute preference - for example, "I want to be
thought of as principled" - a person will care how others evaluate
her in comparison to others if esteem is scarce. In other words, if A
wishes B to "think well" of her but B, for whatever reason, only
grants such esteem to a few individuals, A will have to compete
with others for B's esteem. For example, assuming that no one is
completely principled, being thought of as "principled" actually
means being relatively principled, as compared with some average.
In either event, one frequently gains prestige or admiration only by.
being somehow better than most. One often avoids dishonor or
embarrassment only by being at least as good as some, and possibly
as good as the average.84
The remainder of thiS Part demonstrates how the esteem
seeking assumption is useful in explaining norms origin. The essen
tial point is that denying esteem is a costless means of punishing
norm violators.85 But several conditions are still necessary for
norms to emerge.

84. Thus, an individual's utility is a function of this relative esteem (e), and the material
goods (g) she trades off with esteem: U; f(g;, e;).
85. Other norm theorists note the obvious fact that disapproval is used as a norm sanc
tion. See, e.g., Axelrod, supra note 2, at 1096, 1105-06; Jones, supra note 26, at 566-67 ("[T]he
individual's concern about her standing among her peers is the means by which the group's
norms are enforced."). But except for Pettit, supra note 2, at 733, they do not claim that
esteem is costless and therefore the source of norm origin. See, e.g., ELSTER, supra note 2, at
133 (arguing that expressing disapproval "requires energy and attention that might be used
for other purposes" and that "[o]ne may alienate or provoke the target individual, at some
cost or risk to oneselr'). I respond below to this point by noting circumstances where expres
sion is costless and where esteem judgments are inferred without expression. See infra sec
tion II.B.2.
One may object that esteeming others, even without expression, is costly because it inter
feres with one's self-esteem. If individuals care how they rate in comparison to others, which
is my claim, approving others might mean less room for approving oneself. Perhaps one
maximizes utility by disapproving everyone but oneself. To state these points is nearly suffi
cient to refute them, but I raise them to point out the special effect of esteem: unlike mate
rial wealth, there is no benefit to "hording" all of one's approval. As an empirical matter, I
deny that an individual who grants all human beings the same disapproval enjoys greater
utility than one who especially approves certain others. Up to some point, individuals do not
lose and may even gain utility by finding others worthy of their approval. There may be a
limit to how much esteem one can "hand out" without starting to suffer diminished self
approval, but there is some positive level of approval that is costless to provide. See McAd
ams, supra note 10, at 1024-26. That will suffice, I argue below, to produce norms.
=
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The Conditions for Esteem-Based Norms

Under the right conditions, the desire for esteem produces a
norm. For some behavior X in some population of individuals, a
norm may arise if (1) there is a consensus about the positive or
negative esteem worthiness of engaging in X (that is, either most
individuals in the relevant population grant, or most withhold, es
teem from those who engage in X);86 (2) there is some risk that
others will detect whether one engages in X;87 and (3) the existence
of this consensus and risk of detection is well-known within the rel
evant population.88 When these conditions exist, the desire for es
teem necessarily creates costs of or benefits from engaging in X If
the consensus is that X deserves esteem, a norm will arise if the
esteem benefits exceed, for most people, the costs of engaging in X
Conversely, if the consensus condemns X, a norm will arise if, for
most people, the esteem costs exceed the benefits of engaging in X
Consider each condition in greater detail.
Consensus. The first condition is a consensus within the popula
tion about the esteem worthiness of certain behavior. Let me first
emphasize that I am not assuming my conclusion. The existence of
a consensus does not mean that the norm already exists. Instead, I
assume that - independent ofand prior to any norm - individuals
have some evaluative opinions about others; they are not utterly
indifferent to all traits and behaviors. All that is necessary is that
people are opinionated, some of their opinions are directed at the
behavior of others, and sometimes most members of a population
share the same opinion. Indeed, it is not strictly necessary that the
consensus include a majority. For example, suppose a large minor
ity of the population strongly disapproves certain behavior and the
majority is indifferent. Without an offsetting set of people who ap
prove the behavior, there would be a net cost to violating the mi
nority view, assuming the other norm conditions exist. All that is
required is that the majority of those who hold an opinion share the
same opinion.s9
86. I modify this assumption below, where I suggest that something less than a majority
consensus can also p�oduce an esteem nonn. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
f!Jl. This condition includes the case where the risk of detection is zero, but only because
the individual engaging in X bears positive costs of concealment.
88. This condition can be relaxed to include the case where the consensus is not publi
cized but the cost of communicating one's esteem or disesteem after X occurs is zero.

89. With a more complex model, even a majority of those who hold an opinion would not
be necessary. Individuals value differently the esteem of different people and approve and
disapprove with differing levels of intensity. Thus, the net cost of a behavior depends not
only on the number of people who approve or disapprove it, but how much the actor values
the esteem of these people and how intensely they react to the conduct. In theory, a truly
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Consider how easily a consensus may arise. Even if evaluative
beliefs about behavior or traits were randomly distributed, there
would be some occasions where most individuals held the same be
lief about a particular behavior. But there are at least three forces
that sometimes cause individuals to converge on a common belief
about a behavior. Philip Pettit suggests the first mechanism, which
I label "selfish esteem allocation." He says that individuals typi
cally "approve[ ] of nearly everyone who benefits him in some re
spect through performing a collectively beneficial action and
disapprove[ ] of nearly everyone who harms him through perform
ing a collectively nonbeneficial action."9° In other words, because
granting esteem is costless, an individual may as well grant esteem
in ways that reinforce behaviors that benefit the individual and pun
ish those that harm him. A homeowner esteems neighbors who
maintain their house and yard and thereby raise area property val
ues and disapproves those who operate loud machinery at night and
thereby disturb her sleep. When everyone, or a substantial major
ity, perceives that a behavior generates positive or negative exter
nalities, selfish esteem allocation produces a consensus. Thus,
because all homeowners perceive the benefit they receive from be4tg surrounded by well-kept houses, the neighborhood consensus
favors house and yard maintenance. Because most homeowners
find loud nighttime noise disruptive, the consensus condemns such
behavior.91
minority view might produce a norm. For example, 20% of a group or society might produce
a norm against a behavior, despite the fact that 60% approve the behavior and the remainder
are indifferent, if the 20% made more intense esteem judgments than the 60% or if most
individuals care more about gaining the approval of the members of the 20% than the ap
proval of members of the 60%. I explore the matter further infra text accompanying notes

109-10, 165-76.
90. Pettit, supra note 2, at 744.
91. One may raise the following objection: People perceive the actions of others as being

harmful or not, in part, based on norms. If so, perceptions determined by norms cannot
explain how norms arise. For example, an individual may enjoy the look of roses. But if the
local norm says that a homeowner gets to plant on her property whatever flowers she wants,
A may not perceive herself as being "harmed" by her neighbor's decision to plant poppies.
At the same time, she may perceive herself aggrieved by her neighbor's decision to display
lawn ornaments because the norm forbids them - that is, the consensus is that they are
gaudy. The argument suggests that a consensus based on perceived self-interest cannot arise
before, and thereby explain, a norm.
The problem, however, is not with the esteem theory. The general problem for any the
ory of origin is that we live in a world so thoroughly pervaded by norms that it is difficult to
even imagine a normless world in which the theory can then explain how the first norms
arise. All the interesting real world examples involve new norms arising against the back
ground of existing norms. Thus, the esteem theory may be viewed in two ways. First, in a
hypothetical normless world, norms would arise under the conditions I identify. Even if
some subtle forms of harm would not be recognized as such without norms defining rights
and responsibilities, it is likely that an individual would perceive that some behaviors physical violence against her, the involuntary taking of food she has gathered, and so on -
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Second, group discussion may produce (and publicize) a consen
sus. This process may simply be selfish esteem allocation at the col
lective level, if some individuals convince enough others of the fact
that a behavior benefits or harms the members of the group. It may
be more complex, as when some members of a group that already
shares a morality or aesthetic convince enough others that a specific
behavior is required or prohibited by the common ethic. Individu
als may "convince" others because they provide new information or
argument that effectively changes beliefs about such matters, or be
cause the others, fearing loss of esteem, feel pressure to conform to
what is apparently the dominant view.92 Whether described as gos
sip,93 "voice,"94 or signaling,9s individuals thus influence each other
in the creation of consensus.

A final process that creates consensus is exit. Once selfish es
teem allocation produces some minimal consensus within a group,
individuals who wish to act contrary to the consensus may leave the
group, possibly to join groups of like-minded individuals. This
mechanism only applies to groups one can readily leave - not, for
example, a prison or, for most people, the very large group that
constitutes a society. For smaller groups, however, exit may be pos
sible, albeit costly, and can cause such groups to become quite ho
mogenous, as people sort themselves according to shared beliefs,
values, and commitments.96
harm her. Second, in the real world, given a rich baseline of nonns that may have arisen by
esteem or other processes, new nonns arise when the conditions I identify exist. Even if
preexisting nonns influence the perception of a new hann, the esteem theory explains how
this perception produces a new nonn. As to this latter point, see infra text accompanying
notes 150-61.
92.

See Kahan, supra note 26, at 352-56; McAdams, supra note 32, at 2250 nn.40-41.

93. See, e.g., McAdams, supra note 32, at 2244, 2256-58 (discussing the role of gossip in
the fonnation of norms); Barbara Yngvesson, The Reasonable Man and the Unreasonable
Gossip: On the Flexibility of (Legal) Concepts and the Elasticity of (Legal) Time, in CRoss
EXAMINATIONS: EssAYS IN MEMORY OF MAx GLUCKMAN 133, 153-54 (P.H. Gulliver ed.,
1978).
94. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, Exrr, VOICE, AND LoYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE
IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 4 (1970) (describing "voice" as an alternative means
to "exit" by which individuals influence finns); McAdams, supra note 32, at 2258 (discussing
"voice"

as

means by which individuals in a group affect its nonns).

95. See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 14, at 1666. The means of producing a consensus are
highly relevant to predicting whether nonns are likely to be efficient. Selfish esteem alloca
tion, with or without discussion, may appear to produce efficient nonns because it will ap
prove behaviors with positive externalities and disapprove behaviors with negative
externalities. But given infonnational and strategic problems, the process can produce ineffi
cient nonns. See infra section IV.C.
96. Exit is therefore relevant to predicting whether nonns are likely to be efficient. One
might think individuals are more likely to exit groups with norms that retard group welfare.
Thus, groups with norms that benefit the group would gain in size while groups with ineffi-
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The second condition is an inherent

risk that anyone who engages in the behavior at issue will be de
tected. I say "inherent" to emphasize that this risk exists without
anyone bearing a cost to create the risk of discovery, at least not for
the purpose of creating or enforcing a norm. One may object that
there will always be costs, at least opportunity costs, to gaining such
information;97

if so,

one cannot costlessly sanction another because

one must first invest in determining who merits disesteem. But a
norm may still arise without anyone bearing a cost to enforce it
the necessary information is acquired

as

if

a byproduct of some other

activity. Because this is often the case, there is frequently no margi

nal

cost to using such information for esteem judgments.

In the course of pursuing various interests, we often accidentally
acquire information about others, especially about their more pub
lic behavior.98 Without making any effort to do so, an individual
may observe one neighbor throwing litter on the sidewalk and an
other raising money door-to-door for charity, one coworker or
ganizing office car pools and another crossing a picket line.99
Moreover, independent of any norm, an individual

will

sometimes

intentionally invest in detecting the behavior of those who harm her
interests. For obvious reasons, an employer will invest in determin
ing which employee is stealing from the firm. Similarly, an apart
ment dweller will seek to discover the source of disturbingly loud
music

if

she believes it is sufficiently likely that she can cause the

stereo owner to lower the volume by threats or bribes. In general,
when an individual suffers from another's behavior that she may be
able to change, she has a reason to invest in detecting it. Accidental
or not, once she acquires the information, an individual can then
costlessly withhold esteem from one whose conduct she
disapproves.
cient norms would shrink. But the evolutionary process is complex and may still produce
inefficient norms. See infra section IV .C.
97. As Avery Katz observes, norms "embody and convey information" - information
about what behavior is obligatory and what punishment is appropriate for contrary behavior.
See Avery Katz, Taking Private Ordering Seriously, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1745, 1749 (1996).
Norm enforcement also requires information about who has violated the norm. See id. But
because "information is a classic public good," inevitably enjoyed by those who have not
contributed to its creation, there are inadequate incentives for optimal investment in creating
or distributing such information. See id.
98. See Pettit, supra note 2, at 739, 743-44 ("[P]eople do not have to identify violators
intentionally; they just have to be around in sufficient numbers to make it likely that violators
will be noticed.").
99. Similarly, an employer may monitor employees for productivity and discover sub
stance abuse or audit expense accounts and discover coworkers having an adulterous affair.
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In some circumstances, detection by an individual will affect the
esteem judgment of only that individual. But when individuals
share a consensus, some of them will enjoy passing on information
about violations of the consensus. The conversation we call "gos
sip" is often experienced as a benefit, not a cost,1 00 and it usually
consists of information about how others have deviated from ordi
nary behavior. As long as there is a sufficient supply of "gossips"
within the relevant population, the risk that another will discover
one's deviant behavior creates an almost equal risk that a great
many individuals will learn of that discovery. In sum, when individ
uals can detect violations of the consensus only by making invest
ments for that purpose, esteem concerns will not produce a norm;
but for various behaviors, (marginal) monitoring costs are zero.
Publicity. The third condition is that the first two conditions consensus and risk of detection - are well known within the rele
vant population.101 If an individual is ignorant of the consensus, or
incorrectly believes there is no risk of detection, then she could act
contrary to the consensus without, to her knowledge, risking any
disapproval. If most people were ignorant, then the consensus
could not produce a norm. Quite possibly, mass ignorance is not an
equilibrium, because if individuals express their disapproval (or ap
proval), it will soon become clear what the consensus is, as well as
the fact that the behavior (or its absence) is detectable. But where
a consensus exists against a behavior, expression of disapproval is
not inevitable. Where there is doubt about what the consensus is,
there are esteem risks to expressing what may turn out to be a mi100. The esteem theory helps to explain the benefit. Of course, people who collect infor
mation through gossip will sometimes be able to trade that information for something they
value. But also, because individuals seek relative esteem, the spread of discrediting informa
tion serves another end: lowering the esteem of others makes one look better by compari
son. See McAdams, supra note 32, at 2279 (describing gossip as a means of acquiring relative
position for oneself or one's family); id. at 2244 & n.20 (noting that gossip is pervasive in
many societies).
101. The best example of a consensus being well known is where its existence is "common
knowledge" within the group, so that there is not only a consensus about X but also a consen
sus that this consensus exists, a consensus that the consensus about the consensus exists, and
so forth, infinitely. See, e.g., ERIC RAsMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUC
TION TO GAME THEORY 44 (2d ed. 1994). Common knowledge is not, however, necessary for
norms to arise. If A believes (1) that the majority of individuals disapprove littering, and (2)
that there is a risk that littering will be detected, then she will perceive a cost to littering even
if no one else is aware the consensus exists. Common knowledge may intensify the norm,
however, in what might be termed the "you-know-better" effect: if it is common knowledge
that most people disapprove of littering, then the disapproval when A is detected littering is
greater because A's decision to litter, contrary to a known consensus, signals A's disregard
for the opinion of those in the majority. Such disregard is insulting; members of the majority
will likely disapprove of A more intensely when they know she previously knew of their
opinion (and knew they knew, and so on).
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nority opinion.102 These costs may prevent the communication nec
essary to publicize the consensus and produce a norm.103
Indeed, the sensitivity of norms to information scarcity yields
some interesting implications explored below. The risks of speak
ing out against an apparent consensus and the possibility that the
true consensus is unknown or misunderstood are quite relevant to
explaining rapid norm change, rules protecting dissent, and the ex
pressive function of law. But for now, note only that the publicity
condition is attainable. First, communication of approval is rarely
costly and is often pleasurable. Thus, people are not likely to re
main ignorant of a consensus favoring conduct. Second, some be
havior is so socially destructive - random violence, for example that most people may just assume that disapproval is virtually uni
versal.104 Third, when there is doubt about what opinions other
participants in a conversation hold because they have ilot revealed
their views by words or deeds, communicating one's views may
carry as much chance of approval as disapproval. If expressing
one's opinions generates utility merely because people like conver
sation - and surely some do - then the expected benefits from
speaking out will often be positive.105 Fourth, there are gossip strat
egies that sometimes work to eliminate the risks of expression. By
beginning with literally nonevaluative statements or questions, 106
perhaps with cryptic tones or facial expressions, an individual can
imply evaluations without committing to them. Or one can provi
sionally and equivocally criticize behavior merely by withholding
statements of approval, while praising contrasting behavior. Each
participant thereby "tests the waters" and gains inf9rmation about
102. See TIMUR KuRAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PuBuc LIES (1995); Eric A. Posner, Law,
Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1697, 1716-17 (1996). On the other
hand, once the consensus is well known, expressions of disapproval are not necessary.
103. This problem is particularly acute when the risk of disapprovil deters people from
expressing criticism of existing nonns, which is unfortunate when the norm is inefficient. See
Lessig, supra note 11, at 997-99; McAdams, supra note 32, at 2259 ("Be,cause the probability
that any one member's criticism will change the norm is very low, public criticism of norms is
a public good apt to be undersupplied."); Posner, supra note 102, at 1718 ("For fear that
others will incorrectly sanction the person who makes the first move, everyone has an incen
tive not to act.").
104. Even if others say nothing, "[w]e know what [others] know of us and, ascribing simi
lar standards to them, we know whether they are likely to think well or badly . . . ." Pettit,
supra note 2, at 740.
105. In other words, if the risk of gaining approval from stating one's views equals, or is
almost as great as, the risk of losing approval, then the positive utility from the act of expres
sion will tip the balance in favor of expressing one's views.
106. For example: "Did you hear that A was asked to leave the party because he brought
a male date?" The statement could express disapproval of A or disapproval of the ones who
asked A to leave (or neither).

364

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 96:338

what others probably believe before stating a position.1°7 In the
end, the publicity condition will not always exist, but the barriers
are neither necessary nor probable.108
The Esteem Norm. If individuals desire esteem, and if these
three conditions exist, it necessarily follows that one who violates a
consensus incurs a cost. If the consensus is that behavior X is com
mendable and the absence of X is deplorable, and the consensus is
well known, then A will deduce that others will think less of her if
they detect her failure to do X. The esteem cost is the probability
that a violation of the consensus will be detected multiplied by the
value of the esteem that would then be lost. A norm arises when,
for most individuals in the population, this esteem cost exceeds the
cost of following the consensus. Thus, if most group members pre
fer bearing the cost of doing X to the esteem cost of failing to do X,
most members will do X. Under these circumstances, we can say
there is an esteem-based norm obligating individuals to do X.
Note how the desire for esteem makes it possible, though not
inevitable, that the group will solve the second-order collective ac
tion problem identified above. The barrier to norm formation
arises from the assumption that any sanction must be costly to im
pose. If one can costlessly impose a small loss on others by with
holding esteem, or costlessly impose a small gain by granting
esteem, there is no incentive to free ride. One may as well allocate
esteem selfishly to discourage behavior from which one suffers, like
littering, or encourage behavior from which one benefits, like re
cycling. There is no guarantee that this esteem allocation will pro
duce a norm; the outcome also depends on the exact value
individuals place on esteem, the strength of the consensus, the pub107. Those studying lynch mobs and wildcat strikes, for example, have noted that the
early stages consist of very subtle, noncommittal signals between group members of their
intentions. See ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 754-56 (1965) (describing the "mill
ing" phase of a lynch mob); RICK FANTASIA, CULTURES OF SOLIDARITY 82-85 (1988)
(describing the hesitant beginnings of a wildcat strike). See generally CHONG, supra note 2, at
103-40 (discussing how individuals in such groups use noncommittal signals to solve their
coordination problems). Thus, gossip at least sometimes can produce the publicized consen
sus necessary to esteem-based norms. For a more general discussion of gossip and norms, see
McAdams, supra note 32.
108. Consider two more reasons. First, one gains some information about the opinions of
others simply from observing their conduct - for example, that an individual does not litter
and picks up others' litter probably means they disapprove of littering, and that a person
always wears clothes in public makes it more likely that she thinks that being nude in public
is inappropriate or does not have an opinion on the matter. Minimal information may be
enough to make the expected benefits of expressing one's opinion exceed the expected costs.
Second, rebuking a person of whom one disapproves may be pleasurable except for the repri
sal or disapproval one receives in return, but that cost may be avoided by censuring anony
moilsly or by gossiping in such a way as to prevent the target from holding one accountable
as the source of the gossip.
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licity of these latter two facts, and the cost of complying with the
consensus - for example, by recycling or not littering.
To illustrate, recall the facts of the littering hypothetica1.109 A

no-littering norm would arise, for example, if the average litterer
values the esteem lost from each neighbor at five cents, she believes
she will lose esteem from twenty neighbors if her littering is de
tected, and the probability of such detection is twenty-five percent.
At this point, the expected cost of littering is twenty-five cents,
equal to the expected benefit. Note that the neighbors who disap
prove of littering need not be a majority. As long as there are no
neighbors who approve littering, we can ignore what fraction of the
neighborhood population the twenty represent. My use of littering
as an example, and the numbers I have arbitrarily assigned - a few
cents for esteem, a few more as the private i:eturn for littering may suggest that esteem can produce only the weakest of norms,
curtailing only the most trivial of behaviors. In the section that fol
lows, I explain how esteem competition can leverage a weak con
cern for esteem into powerful norms. For now, however, the
example demonstrates the power of aggregation: even a meager
concern for esteem can affect behavior, when multiplied by a large
number of people whose esteem is contingent on that behavior.110
B.

The Power of Esteem Sanctions

To summarize the model thus far: The key feature of esteem is
that individuals do not always bear a cost by granting different
levels of esteem to others. Because the cost is often zero, esteem
sanctions are not necessarily subject to the second-order collective
action problem that makes the explanation of norms difficult. An
individual maximizes her utility neither by hording all her esteem
nor by granting equal esteem to everyone.

In this section I elaborate the model by identifying certain
mechanisms that magnify the power of esteem sanctions. All of
these arise from the fact that esteem is a relative good. First, I ex
plain the feedback effect. People competing to be "well thought of'
compared to others discover that the cost of their noncompliance
109. See supra text accompanying note 70.
110. For simplicity, the example assumes that the litterer values the esteem of each neigh
bor equally. Obviously, people value the esteem of some individuals more than others. See
infra notes 174-76. Also, even if A does not distinguish between neighbors per se, there
might be a declining marginal return to esteem, so that A incurs more marginal disutility
from the first disapproving neighbor than from the twentieth. These complications do not
affect the example, however, as long as the total loss incurred from all the neighbors' disap
proval is one dollar.
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- the status loss from deviance - increases as compliance in
creases. The status gain from compliance also decreases as compli
ance increases, but individuals can achieve or maintain high - or
"hero" - status by leading the way to new and higher levels of
norm compliance. Second, I explain how esteem sanctioning can
produce material sanctioning. When people disapprove of those
who approve norm violators, they produce secondary norms obli
gating enforcement of primary norms by disapproving primary
norm violators. The pursuit of "hero" status and the feedback ef
fect generally can cause individuals to incur costs inflicting material
sanctions on norm violators. In the end, competition for relative
esteem can transform a weak behavioral standard into a very de
manding one.
1.

Esteem Competition and the Feedback Effect: Compliance
Raises the Costs of Noncompliance

Consider first how esteem, by itself, can produce an increasingly
powerful norm. Because the desire for esteem is relative, competi
tion for esteem can progressively raise the standard the norm im
poses. I first consider the simple case where a norm arises after
there is already a behavioral regularity consistent with the consen
sus. I then address the "hero" who creates a norm with no prior
regularity.
a. Norms from Regularities: Competition to Avoid Deviance. · A
behavioral regularity often exists without a norm. For example,
most people in a community may refrain from smoking tobacco or
wearing fur before there arises any consensus disapproving these
behaviors. Once a consensus is known, however, it creates new
costs to these behaviors. At this point, esteem competition can pro
duce a strong norm.
Because esteem is relative, the intensity of disesteem directed at
those who engage in a disapproved behavior is partly a function of
the total number of people who are thought to engage in that be
havior. If twenty percent of the population is thought to violate the
initial norm against smoking or fur, then violating that norm will
place one in the bottom quintile of the group with respect to that
criterion of esteem.111 But if only two percent are believed to be
smokers or fur wearers, then one falls to the bottom two percent for
111. If following norm X were the only criterion, then the violation would by itself place
one in the bottom quintile; if there are multiple criteria, then the effect is more complicated.
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that criteria.112 Other things being equal, the latter represents a
greater esteem cost than the former; the more deviant the violation,
the more it appalls group sentiment.113
Thus, because individuals value esteem relatively, the more a
behavior negatively distinguishes them from others, the more costly
it is.114 The result is that one individual's decision to refrain from
engaging in X has the extemality of raising the price that others
must then pay for engaging in that behavior. I call this extemality

112. This assumes people have a generally accurate idea of how much X occurs. That
would be the case if the activity were public or produced publicly observable negative exter
nalities, as does littering or overconsumption of resources in times of scarcity.
113. Huang and Wu make a similar point in the context of corruption norms: "[T]he
more prevalent corruption is, the less intense is the remorse suffered from corrupt behavior;
and conversely, the less corruption there is, the more regret from violating a social norm not
to be corrupt." Huang & Wu, supra note 40, at 393. But there is an important difference in
the feedback effects we are discussing. Huang and Wu assume that individuals already have
internalized a norm against the behavior - corruption - and their model then explains only
how the degree of remorse depends on the perceived number of violators. My claim is that
the initial norm can arise prior to internalization merely from the risk of disapproval and that
the intensity of disapproval any individual feels will depend on the perceived number of
violators. This distinction reveals an ambiguity in Huang and Wu's model. They cannot
mean that an individual feels remorse for engaging in any behavior in which most people do
not engage - for example, sky diving. They most likely mean that individuals feel more
remorse for behavior that is disapproved when less people engage in the behavior. Yet, even
without remorse, this disapproval may produce a norm. Indeed, I argue below that esteem
norms sometimes must precede internalization. See infra text accompanying notes 140-43.
114. Empirical evidence suggests, for example, that individuals are more likely to comply
with laws when they believe others comply. Huang and Wu review studies finding this effect
in tax compliance: an individual's willingness to comply depends on whether he thinks others
pay their taxes. See Huang & Wu, supra note 40, at 401-02. Another study sought to mea
sure social disapproval as one component of criminal deterrence by asking subjects whether
they had committed certain categories of crime - including littering, illegal gambling, theft,
drunk driving, and battery - and how many of the five adults they knew best had committed
such crimes. See Harold G. Grasmick & Donald E. Green, Legal Punishment, Social Disap
proval and Internalization as Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CruM!NoLOGY
325, 330 (1980). The study found that the subject's perception of the certainty and severity of
punishment and the immorality of the conduct each affected compliance, but not as much as
the perception that peers did not commit the offense. See id. at 331, 334.
More generally, considerable evidence supports the importance of peer disapproval to
deterrence. See Donna M. Bishop, Legal and Extralegal Barriers to Delinquency: A Panel
Analysis, 22 CR!MINoLOGY 403 (1984); Herbert Jacob, Deterrent Effects ofFormal and Infor
mal Sanctions, in PouCY IMPLEMENTATION 69 (John Brigham & Don W. Brown eds., 1980);
Kirk R. Williams & Richard Hawkings, Perceptual Research on General Deterrence: A Criti
cal Review, 20 L. & SoCY. REv. 545, 565-66 (1986). But see Harold G. Grasmick et al.,

Reduction in Drunk Driving as a Response to Increased Threats of Shame, Embarrassment,
and Legal Sanctions, 31 CR!MINOLOGY 41 (1993) (finding that internalized norms enforced by

guilt or remorse explain the decline in drunk driving but that the threat of social disapproval
does not). At one point in his well-known study, Tom Tyler appears to minimize the impor
tance of peer disapproval as compared to moral commitments or certainty of punishment.
See ToM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 44 (1990). But, as 1)'ler reports, his data
shows that peer disapproval significantly affects "self-reported behavioral compliance with
the law." Id. at 45 (reporting correlations "for morality, r = .42; for peer disapproval, r = .34;
for certainty of punishment, r = .28"); see also id. at 63-64; 238-39 n.2.
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the feedback effect of norm compliance.115 For example, if the ini
tial discovery of a consensus against X produces an expected es
teem cost of one dollar for engaging in X, that will cause individuals
who value the activity less than one dollar to cease doing X or to
exit the group. But once that subset drops out, compliance rises
and the disesteem for engaging in X is concentrated on fewer indi
viduals; because fewer smoke or wear fur, one is now more (nega
tively) distinguished by smoking or fur wearing. The expected
esteem cost necessarily rises above one dollar, and there may be an
additional subset of individuals who no longer value X sufficiently
to bear the esteem costs of doing it. Each subset that ceases the
disapproved behavior raises the costs of that behavior for those
who remain.
This process can produce the discontinuous effect Thomas
Schelling calls "tipping."11 6 Suppose an initial equilibrium in which
twenty percent of a population wears fur despite disapproval by
many of the remaining eighty percent. This means that those in the
twenty percent receive enough pleasure from fur to outweigh the
resulting censure. But if fur consumption for any reason falls below
twenty percent - because, for example, the price of fur storage
rises or the consensus gains greater publicity - the disesteem costs
would rise. For a simple example, imagine that for all fur wearers,
the disesteem costs would exceed their consumer surplus once the
consumption rate fell to fifteen percent. Thus, while small increases
in the cost of fur usually produce only small decreases in consump
tion, a cost increase that reduces consumption from sixteen percent
to (initially) fifteen percent would have a dramatic effect. Once the
fifteen percent tipping point is reached, the more concentrated dis
approval cost now deters all remaining consumption.117 The feed
back effect can also produce such discontinuous results in the
opposite direction: small increases in norm violations may cause
per-person disesteem costs to fall sufficiently to produce a dramatic
rise in norm violations. Thus, the feedback effect can rapidly
strengthen or weaken a norm.118 But the former consequence is
115. See Kahan, supra note 26, at 352-61 (discussing this effect in the context of criminal
deterrence).
116.
(1978).

See THOMAS

c.

SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES

AND

MACROBEHAVIOR 92-94, 98-99

117. A more complex but realistic case would follow the stages described above, in which
only a few consumers at a time cease wearing fur, in each case causing the per-person dises
teem costs to rise and prompting another round of norm compliance.
118. This point is important in explaining the fragility of norms. See infra section IV.A.
It is also the point emphasized by Kahan with respect to criminal deterrence: an increase in
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most relevant here: even if the concern for esteem is weak, once it
begins to drive behavior, it can produce a powerful norm.
·

The same is true where the norm favors a behavior. Again, im

agine there is a behavioral regularity prior to there being a norm.
For example, many neighbors may have "well-groomed" yards to
satisfy their selfish aesthetic preferences prior to the emergence of a
neighborhood norm obligating yard care. Or many alumni may do
nate to their alma mater out of altruism before a norm arises obli
gating such conduct. Once the neighbors or alumni discover the
consensus exists favoring such behavior, those who contribute more
than average (time to yard care or money to their school) gain es
teem and those who contribute less than average lose esteem. Eve
ryone can now produce esteem benefits - gaining approval or
avoiding disapproval - by contributing more. The new incentives
will raise the average contribution. The feedback effect is that one
person's new norm compliance raises the average and lowers every
one else's relativ� position. One individual's contribution thus pro
vides an incentive for others to contribute. Obviously, the
contributions do not rise infinitely, but they stop only when no one
can gaiil by additional contributions, when the opportunity costs of
one's time or money exceed any esteem return.

b. Regularities from Norms: Competition to Be Heroic. In

the

previous examples, many people already behave in conformity with
the consensus before the norm arises. But esteem competition can
also produce a norm without a preexisting regularity. Suppose that
there is a newly expressed, idealistic consensus in favor of some
behavior that no one has yet been willing to undertake, because,
while it benefits the group, it is costly for the individual. For exam
ple, assume that no one is yet willing to bear the costs of recycling,
but discussion has produced a societal consensus that recycling ben
efits future generations and is therefore commendable.119 Alterna
tively, suppose that recent events cause neighbors to recognize the
need for a neighborhood crime watch patrol or to organize park
maintenance work, though initially no one offers to contribute.
Thus, individuals recognize that certain behavior is worthy of es
teem before anyone engages in the behavior.
The esteem theory can explain how norms arise in this setting.
The first few members to bear the cost of the idealized behavior X
crime lowers the effect of informal sanctioning, thus producing a further increase in crime.
See Kahan, supra note 26, at 361.
119. Perhaps the members of society think it will contribute to the welfare of future gen
erations or that it shows respect for the deity that created the earth.
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may capture the status of "hero. "120 The few who act in conformity
with the publicly expressed consensus each may earn very high
esteem. Of course, "first movers" take the risk that no one will
follow. If very few individuals contribute labor to patrol the neigh
borhood or to recycle, the joint return may be negligible, and the
sacrifice by these individuals may seem senseless and naive. Foolish
idealism is often not esteemed. But part of the reason first movers
gain esteem when others do follow their lead is the understanding
that they risked losing esteem if others did not. 121
Others will follow the lead of first movers if the esteem benefits
outweigh the material costs of undertaking the idealized behavior.
Admittedly, the esteem return falls as it becomes more common;
ordinary behavior cannot be heroic. But despite this decline, the
esteem benefits may exceed the costs. The benefits of being, for
example, one of the ten percent or twenty-five percent who patrol
the neighborhood or recycle, while not as great as the initial hero
status, may nonetheless be larger for some individuals than the
value of the labor sacrificed. More important, an individual's deci
sion to engage in X has the externality of raising the price others
must now pay for refusing to engage in that behavior. In other
words, when everyone refused to undertake X, the esteem loss from
that decision was zero. But where some engage in the idealized
activity, those who do not are negatively distinguished and now
bear some loss of esteem.
The combination of these two forces may produce a norm. To
demonstrate, consider a highly stylized recycling scenario. Imagine
that A, B, and C initially esteem each other equally and no one
recycles. Through discussion, they discover that they share a con
sensus that recycling is an activity worthy of esteem. Assume that
recycling costs three dollars per person per time period, and that
each values the esteem ranks per time period as follows:122
120. See W1LUAM J. GoooE, THE CELEBRATION OF HEROES:
CoNTROL SYSTEM 344-45 (1978).

PRESTIGE

As A SOCIAL

121. See CHONG, supra note 2, at 125-30 (discussing this problem in context of the civil
rights movement, where leaders risked appearing foolish but those who motivated mass ac
tion won respect).
122. That the esteem return is zero when all recycle would follow if the entire society
consists of A, B, and C. In that case, recycling earns no relative esteem. On the other hand,
if A, B, and C are merely three members of a social group whose members care particularly
about the esteem of each other - for example, a group of friends - then they might esteem
each other more highly relative to their esteem for the rest ofsociety if all recycled than if none
recycled. Also, others in society might esteem them more for all recycling. In either case, if
the expected return when all recycle becomes positive, then the outcome predicted in the
text, universal recycling, becomes even more likely.
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Esteem from being the only recycler:

+$4

Esteem from being one of two recyclers:

+$2

Esteem when all or none recycle:

$0

Esteem from being one of two non-recyclers:

-$2

Esteem from being the only non-recycler:

-$4

The structure of these incentives will cause all three individuals
to recycle, even though that outcome costs each three dollars and
ultimately produces for each no status gain.
terms, recycling is

dominant

In game-theoretic

because it is the best move for each

individual no matter what move the others make. Consider A's de
cision.

If both B

and

C recycle in the next time

period, A is better

off recycling for three dollars and avoiding the four-dollar loss of
being the least esteemed.

If neither B nor C recycle, A is better off

recycling and gaining the four-dollar benefit of being the most es
teemed.

If only one of the others recycles, A is better off recycling,

which provides a four-dollar benefit by moving her from an esteem
position she values at minus two dollars to an esteem position she
values at plus two dollars. Because the same logic applies to the
decisions of

B

and

C, all

three

will recycle.

Thus, even though an individual cannot gain relative status by
engaging in the same behavior as everyone else, the desire for rela
tive status can lead everyone in a group to feel obligated to engage
in a behavior. Indeed,

if recycling were not thought to be desirable,

the individuals would benefit from a state-enforced contract with
each other to refrain from recycling. Then they could circumvent
what might be viewed as an unfortunate "prisoner's dilemma,"

avoid the three-dollar cost of recycling, and wind up in the same
(equal) esteem position they are in when everyone recycles. But
the norm arose because there was a consensus that recycling was
worthy of esteem. If recycling is esteemed because individuals gen
erally believe it produces net benefits to the group despite net costs
to recyclers, then they will welcome the dynamic created by esteem
competition because it solves the collective action problem that
otherwise prevented recycling.123
123. That they welcome it, however, does not mean that the level of recycling produced
by esteem competition is efficient. To the contrary, the three-dollar contribution produced in
this example could still be less or more than the optimal amount. Cf. Eric A. Posner, Altru
ism, Status, and Trust in the Law ofGifts and Gratuitous Promises, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 567, 589
(noting that status competition may cause gratuitous contributions to public goods that are
higher or lower than the optimal amount); see also discussion infra section IV.C.
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The crucial point for norms theory is that esteem competition
can cause a norm to arise without a preexisting behavioral regular
ity, or more accurately, when the regularity is precisely the opposite
of the norm ultimately produced.

2. Material Enforcement of Esteem-Based Norms
Though esteem norms initially arise because third parties can
costlessly sanction one who acts contrary to the consensus, esteem
can also explain why third parties sometimes do bear costs to en
force norms. The initial step is that a primary norm, an obligation
to do or not do X, may produce a subsidiary enforcement norm. A
secondary norm arises when individuals lower their opinion of
those who fail to censure primary norm violators. Once that occurs,
the dynamic described in the previous subsection then can cause
individuals to bear material costs to comply with secondary en
forcement norms. In other words, esteem can cause people to bear
costs to inflict material costs on norm violators.

a. The Emergence of Secondary Enforcement Norms. Assume
A violates a norm. At first, B may continue to have and express
esteem for A for various reasons, including that B does not share in
the consensus. But when individuals genuinely believe A has acted
badly, they will usually think badly of anyone who expressly con
dones A's violation or who continues to think as highly of A as she
did before A's norm violation. Where most people disapprove of
racism or abortion, for example, they are likely to also disapprove
of those who fail ever to condemn such things.124 The primary con
sensus that behavior X merits disapproval is therefore likely to lead
to a secondary consensus that those who expressly approve, or fail
to disapprove, of the perpetrators of X merit disapproval. One rea
son is selfish norm production: if the first approval patterns arise
because behavior X harms the society or group, the secondary ap
proval patterns arise because failing to enforce the norm by con
demning violators also harms the society or group. The voice or
exit that produced the primary consensus could produce the secon
dary consensus as well.
The secondary consensus - that condoning norm violations de
serves disapproval - will become a secondary enforcement norm if
124. Obviously, there are counterexamples: People may accept that an individual does
not express disapproval of a family member; most people may even approve of such familial
loyalty. But the general point remains: Absent such an exception, where arguably other
norms have come into play, the general tendency is to disapprove those who approve of norm
violators.

November 1997]

Norms

the other conditions of norm creation exist:

373
(1)

that ,there is some

risk that one's condoning of norm violators will be discovered with
out others bearing monitoring costs, and (2) that this risk and the
secondary consensus are sufficiently well known. The existence of
the secondary consensus will often be easily inferred from the exist
ence of the primary consensus.
One might raise the following objection: It is easy to conceal
from third parties the fact that one still esteems a norm violator.
What is not easy, however, is to pretend publicly to disapprove of A
without actually harming A. Third parties may employ the familiar
political strategy of calling for an individual to "take a stand," pub
licly asking B if she agrees with the consensus and disapproves A's
violation. Asking such questions makes it costly to avoid condemn
ing the violator. A refusal to answer is taken to mean the individual
condones the violation. There are countless examples where this
occurs - where individuals ask others to make statements, adopt
resolutions, sign petitions, and participate in other symbolic actions,
in order to prove that they do not condone someone else's con
duct.125 Even if the responders only feign disapproval, they still
convey disapproval and create a secondary enforcement norm that is, the fear of disapproval obligates individuals to condemn the
violation of a primary norm.

b. From Esteem Sanctions to Material Sanctions.

For some

norms, individuals incur material costs to inflict a material sanction
125. In many cases, one set of individuals calls upon another set to criticize or disavow a
third group that the first considers to be racist. See, e.g., Hiawatha Bray, America Online
Rapped for Allowing Pro-Klan Site, THE BosroN GLOBE, Apr. 9, 1997, at Al, A14 (reporting
that the Anti-Defamation League criticized America Online for allowing one of its subscrib
ers to create a Ku Klux Klan site); David A. Paterson, White Outrage, Black Suspicion, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 20, 1994, at E17 (discussing white demands that blacks condemn Louis Far
rakhan for racism and noting that "[f]or generations, whites have called on black leaders to
denounce other blacks' offensive or radical ideas"); Editorial, Undo Damage in the 4th, AT
LANTA J.-CONST., Oct. 17, 1996 (calling on the incumbent congresswoman to "repudiate[ ]"
her father and end his role in her campaign because he called her opponent "a racist Jew"
and reporting that the opponent criticized the incumbent for her refusal to vote for a con
gressional resolution condemning an aide to Louis Farrakhan).
Consider also the responses to a 1995 National Rifle Association's (NRA) fundraising
letter that referred to agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms as "jack
booted thugs." Life-long NRA member George Bush resigned his membership in protest,
see Whose Thugs, Whose Jack-Boots?, EcoNOMIST, May 20, 1995, at 27, thereby preempting
any possible criticism for appearing to join or condone the statement. The NRA eventually
apologized. See id. at 28. President Clinton responded by stating that the NRA should prove
the sincerity of its apology by giving the money raised by the letter to the family survivors of
slain peace officers. See Martin Kasindorf, Truly Sorry? Clinton to NRA: Donate Your 'Ill
Gotten' Funding, NEWSDAY, May 20, 1995, at A07. This tactic illustrates the difficulty of
disavowing one's own actions: Because "talk is cheap," third parties may not believe self
serving statements unless they are made convincing by costly action. See infra text accompa
nying notes 126-27.
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on norm violators. Boycotts, for example, require individuals to
forgo advantageous transactions with the boycott target. Here is
where the secondary collective action problem seems most pro
nounced. Even if one concedes my argument up to this point, one
might object that esteem is a trivial matter compared to such mate
rial enforcement. But esteem explains these sanctions. Material
sanctions are merely the logical culmination of the prior two stages
of norm development: just as competition for relative esteem may
increase the material cost that members are willing to bear to com
ply with a primary norm, esteem competition may increase the cost
that members are willing to assume to comply with the secondary
obligation to enforce the primary norm.
As a simple example, consider a norm involving dichotomous
behavior - for example, a norm forbidding divorce, litigation
against a group member, or marriage to someone outside the group.
When a publicized consensus first arises, a group member can gain
heightened esteem by publicly bearing greater-than-average costs
to comply with the consensus. But once virtually everyone com
plies, compliance is necessary merely to avoid disesteem. Also, a
group member loses esteem not only by violating the norm, but to a
lesser extent, by failing to disapprove of others who violate the
norm.
At this point, a member can gain elevated esteem by publicly
incurring greater-than-average costs to express disapproval of norm
violators. If average costs are zero, because initially the only sanc
tion is disesteem, one may earn high esteem by conspicuously un
dertaking some material costs to sanction a norm violator. As
before, the first mover - the first to shoulder a material burden to
sanction a violator - may gain a "hero" status. Competition for
esteem then may induce others to incur material costs to sanction
norm violators or to exit the group. In either case, esteem competi
tion may increase the average expenditure on norm enforcement,
potentially to the point where members must incur some material
costs enforcing norms merely to maintain an average level of
esteem.
To illustrate how esteem sanctions can be leveraged into mate
rial sanctions, consider the following example: A trades with five
individuals - the Bs - and all Bs interact socially with A, with one
another, and with another large group of people - the Cs. When
A violates the norm, all the Bs and Cs know they must condemn A
in order to avoid social disapproval. Each individual can discharge
her obligation to enforce the norm by expressing disapproval of A.
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But by virtue of their trading relationship, the Bs have a special
opportunity. To gain "hero" status, one of the five Bs might take
the added step of reducing her trades .with A, to .the material detri
ment of both A and the B. The first move in this direction may
sacrifice only a trivial, symbolic amount.126 But a tiny reduction in
trade may be sufficient when others refuse to make any material
sacrifice. The point is that an individual may "purchase" substantial
status for being the only one to bear a tangible, if initially minus
cule, cost to enforce the norm.121
Once the move to material sanctions is made - once esteem is
leveraged to produce nonesteem punishments - the same competi
tive dynamics described above in the recycling example can ratchet
up the level of material sanctions.128 After one B sanctions A by a
minor and temporary reduction in trade, the competition for es

teem may cause all the Bs to make the same reduction in trade. If
the initial reduction in trade is trivial, one of the Bs may attempt to
recapture the first-mover hero status by reducing trade more than
the others. Indeed, even though the Cs lack a trading relationship
with A, they may join in the esteem competition by looking for
other means of sanctioning A materially, such as boycotting Bs who
fail to boycott A. As above, the outcome of this process depends
on a number of variables, including the value each individual places
on esteem and the other opportunities that she has for producing
esteem. But esteem is itself capable of explaining the imposition of
nonesteem sanctions including substantial material sanctions.

126. To make this transition to material sanctions even smoother, imagine that the first
time it happens, the material cost to the trader B is nonexistent because she was already
planning to reduce trade with A for other reasons known only to her. But because the Cs
and other Bs believe - and reward with esteem - B's false claim that she reduced trade to
punish A for her norm violation, the effect is the same. The next time the violation occurs,
the same reaction will be expected.
127. For example, in the Jim Crow South, social norms obligating whites to subordinate
blacks in various ways were enforced by threats of economic sanctions against whites who
violated these norms. See JoHN DOLLARD, CAslE AND CLASS IN A SOUTHERN ToWN 48-49
(3d ed. reprint with new introduction, The University of Wisconsin Press 1988) (1937); AR
TIIUR F. RAPER, THE TRAGEDY OF LYNCHING 20, 244-46 (1933). The above analysis suggests
that the material boycotts were in tum enforced by threats of social sanctions - that is,
ostracism and shaming. See, e.g., DoLLARD, supra at 46-48, 349-50, 354 (1937). See generally
McAdams, supra note 10, at 1039-42, 1046-48, 1050-51 (discussing racial norms applicable to
whites in the Jim Crow South).
128. Note also that once the norm arises, this analysis can explain why individuals might
bear costs to acquire information for the purpose of detecting norm violations.
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USING THE ESTEEM MODEL TO CLARIFY AND UNIFY THE
NEW NORMS LITERATURE

Notwithstanding the considerable attention to law and norms,
indeed, partly because of so much recent and diverse writing, the
economics literature remains ambiguous. Explicitly or implicitly,
theorists employ different concepts of what norms are and how they
arise. As noted in Part I, norms are defined in much of the litera
ture as informal, nonlegal obligations, sometimes with the addition
of organizational rules. Yet the term remains obscure in at least
three ways:

norm

is used to refer to nonlegal obligations (1) en

forced by different kinds of sanctions, (2) described at different
levels of generality, and

(3) arising in different kinds of populations.

In this Part, I address each issue. I suggest that the esteem theory
can provide some valuable clarification, uniting what might seem to
be unrelated strands of the new literature. First, I demonstrate that
esteem processes can lead to norm

internalization.

In so doing, I

contrast and reconcile the esteem theory with the alternative inter
nalization model of norm origin. Second, the distinction between
esteem-enforced and internalized norms reveals a relationship be
tween norms that arise at different levels of generality: narrow
esteem-based norms often

implement or give meaning

to broad in

ternalized norms. The theory thus reconciles the norms literature
with Lawrence Lessig's insistence on the importance of social
meaning. Third, because the conditions for esteem-based norms
can arise among small groups or an entire society, the esteem the
ory explains both group and societal norms and predicts certain dif
ferences between them.
A.

Contrasting and Reconciling Esteem Processes with
Internalization of Norms

Previously, I alluded to the possibility of several economic reso
lutions of the puzzle of norm origin. One alternative explanation is
internalization. Internalization theories posit that an individual ac
quires a preference for conformity to a behavioral standard and suf
fers some psychological cost - guilt is an appropriate term - when
she fails to conform, whether or not others are aware of her viola
tion.129 Robert Cooter's internalization theory is the first explana129. See, e.g., BECKER, supra note 2, at 225 ("Norms are those common values of a group
which influence an individual's behavior through being internalized as preferences."); see
also ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WmnN REASON 152-61 (1988); Robert C. Ellickson,

Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and
Economics, 65 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 23, 45-46 (1989); Huang & Wu, supra note 40, at 392-96.
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tion of norm origin in the law and economics literature.130 This
kind of explanation appears to be in tension with those - like the
esteem model - that emphasize external enforcement sanctions.131
In this section, I contrast Cooter's model with the esteem model,
point out how esteem can explain many norms internalization can
not explain, and then present a way of uniting the two theories into
a common framework.
According to Cooter, "a social norm is ineffective in a commu
nity and does not exist unless people internalize it."132 The crucial
question for any internalization theory is how this process - a form
of preference change - occurs. The question is difficult.

In partic

ular, if preference change is too common, it makes economic analy
sis of preference satisfaction quite difficult.133 Cooter's answer
avoids the problem by predicting internalization only under restric
tive circumstances. He says a "unanimous endorsement" of certain
conduct "will convince some members of the community to inter
nalize the obligation, and to inculcate it in the young."134
The internalization thesis is probably also the most common explanation of norm origin
outside of economics. See, e.g., DURKHEIM, supra note 1; Mark Granovetter, Economic Ac
tion and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. Soc. 481 (1985).

130. See Cooter, supra note 14; Cooter, Structural Adjudication, supra note 72. Ellickson
speculates about norm origin but does not offer an account. See ELLICKSON, supra note 3, at
237-38 (suggesting that "[p]erhaps . . . a few virtuous leaders" are willing to selflessly bear
costs to enforce norms); Ellickson, supra note 129, at 45-46 (briefly discussing norm internal
ization). Huang and Wu discuss "remorse" as the internal cost individuals bear for violating
norms, but they do not attempt to explain the initial internalization process by which one
becomes potentially remorseful. See Huang & Wu, supra note 40, at 404 ("[W]e did not
study the origin of emotions or norms."). For more recent theories, see Kraus, supra note 27
(presenting an evolutionary theory); Posner, supra note 19 (reviewing economic theories of
norms); Posner, supra note 72 (presenting a signaling theory). I do not review all these alter
native theories. Rather, I argue for the esteem theory on the grounds provided in Parts III
and IV, infra.
131. I am not the first to emphasize reputational sanctions as the crucial means of norm
enforcement. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 11, at 914-21. Sunstein also takes note of inter
nal enforcement, particularly to enforce social roles. See id. at 922. But his extended discus
sion of norm change makes clear that he relies on external enforcement in a way Cooter does
not. See id. at 921 (observing that norms "tax and subsidize" behavior with reputational
effects). In the end, however, Sunstein explicitly avoids offering a theory of norm origin. See
id. at 915 n.38.
132. Cooter, supra note 14, at 1665.
133. Economists generally assume stable preferences. See generally BECKER, supra note
2, at 3-4; George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, AM. EcoN.
REV., March 1977, at 76, 76. One of the few exceptions prior to Cooter is Kenneth G. Dau
Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990
DUKE L.J. 1. In general, Cooter advocates a more complex economic description of individu

als, replacing the "thin self' with a "thick self." See Cooter, Structural Adjudication, supra
note 72, at 221-22; see also Robert D. Cooter, Lapses, Conflict, and Akrasia in Torts and
Crimes: Towards an Economic Theory of the Will, 11 INTL. REv. L. & EcoN. 149 (1991).

134. Cooter, Structural Adjudication, supra note 72, at 224.
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When will 'af. group signal unanimous agreement on anything?
Cooter says unanimous expression will occur when group members
face a collective action problem in which there is, for everyone, one
optimal signal.135 Regarding lying, for example, no one will advo
cate that everyone be permitted to lie, nor would anyone planning
to lie advocate an exception for herself for fear of revealing and
thereby defeating her strategy. Thus, there is likely to be a univer
sally expressed consensus against lying and a no-lying norm will be
internalized.136 Not only do individuals who internalize an obliga
tion automatically incur a cost if they violate the norm, whether or
not others detect their violation, but Cooter says that those who
internalize the norm are willing to bear small costs to enforce it
against others.137
I agree that internalization has a role to play in norm enforce
ment and I welcome Cooter's efforts to bring the challenging sub
ject of preference change into law and economics. But I believe
internalization is neither necessary nor sufficient to explain many
norms.

First, internalization is not necessary to explain norms. I think
Cooter is wrong when he says that a social norm "does not exist"
absent internalization.138 As prior sections demonstrate, external
sanctions - initially, the simple denial of esteem - can generate
norms.139
135. See Cooter, supra note 14, at 1666; Cooter, Unified Social Theory, supra note 72, at
64.

136. Cooter's example is not lying but rather an "agency game" in which the player who
moves first - the principal - can invest or not invest, and the party who moves second the agent - can then cooperate or appropriate (steal). See Cooter, supra note 14, at 1657-77.
Once the principal invests, the agent is best off appropriating the investment. See id. at 1658.
Foreseeing this result, the principal will not invest and both parties forgo an economic trade
that could serve to their mutual benefit. See id. But if the game is repeated, Cooter observes
that the equilibrium result may be a stable level of cooperation and defection. See id. at
1660. At this point Cooter introduces norms:
[E]very agent has an incentive to provide signals that induce principals to invest. Every
agent will signal 'cooperation,' regardless of whether his real strategy is cooperation or
appropriation. Consequently, a consensus will arise in the community about how agents
ought to act. Such a consensus will convince some members of the community to inter
nalize the norm and to ingrain it in the young. Thus a new norm will emerge in the
community.
Cooter, supra note 14, at 1666; see also Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex
Economy, 23 Sw. U. L. REv. 443, 448-49 (1994) (discussing an agency game that has a "pure
signaling equilibrium"
in which "everyone has an incentive to signal the same strategy"
(emphasis added)).
137. See Cooter, supra note 14, at 1668.
138. Id. at 1665; see also BECKER, supra note 2, at 225 (defining norms as "those common
values of a group which influence an individual's behavior through being internalized as
preferences").
139. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that my model explains norms by positing
only one internalized desire - the preference for esteem - rather than claiming that an
• . .
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Second, internalization is not sufficient to explain the many
norms that arise without a unanimous consensus.140 Some norms,
for example, apply to and burden only one subset of the population
in which they arise, often for the benefit of a subset to which they
do not apply. Thus, norms obligate women to change their surname
on marriage, care for children, and tolerate physical abuse. Norms
against public smoking constrain smokers to the benefit of non
smokers and norms obligating heterosexuality, while technically ap
plying to everyone, restrict the freedom of homosexuals only. None
of these matters could plausibly have commanded a unanimous
consensus before the norm existed; the many who would be better
off without the norm would have said so.141 Nor can a prior unani
mous agreement explain all norms that do apply equally to every
one in a population. Societal norms at least weakly condemn overt
individual must internalize a preference for each behavior a norm requires. In this sense, the
model makes the conventional, though not inevitable, economic assumption that preferences
are exogenous to the model (of norms) under discussion. Given a preference for esteem,
under certain circumstances, norms will arise, including powerful norms enforced by material
sanctions.
140. Cooter appears to concede this much at one point where he limits his theory of
norms to "business norms" arising within "business communit[ies]." See Cooter, Structural
Adjudication, supra note 72, at 224; cf. id. ("[M]any acts are private in the sense that they do
not affect others. The regulation of private acts by social norms is extensive in some kinds of
communities, especially churches."). In another article, Cooter states: "My theory predicts
that community norms will emerge when signaling and public goods converge, whereas diver
gence between them will yield a stew of public opinion." Cooter, supra note 14, at 1676. This
appears to state a general point that something like a unanimous expression of consensus is
necessary for norms, but in the next sentence he limits the prediction to "business norms."
See id. at 1676.
141. For these norms, women, smokers, and homosexuals would not just be better off
from being able to free ride off the enforcement efforts of others, but would be better off if
no one enforced the norm. After the norm exists, there may be costs to criticizing it, see infra
text accompanying note 192, but before the norm arises, there would be no such costs.
Indeed, Cooter expresses puzzlement specifically about gender norms. See Cooter, supra
note 14, at 1685. He says that he suspects that where discriminatory norms arise, "the injur
ers must have power over the means of representation," enabling the "dominant group to
frame the public debate by which norms evolve." Id. But he does not explain the impor
tance of "representation" and "public debate," which are not explicitly a part of his internal
ization theory. See id. (stating that "[!]imitations of space" prevent his developing the point
more fully).
Elsewhere, Cooter states that "domination" of one group by another "typically requires
support from internalized social norms, rather than being based upon pure power. For exam
ple, the domination of women by men probably requires most men and some women to
believe in the rightness of patriarchy." Cooter, Unified Social Theory, supra note 72, at 65.
Cooter's point seems right to me, , but internalization still does not explain how the norms
defining gender roles first arose, given that half the population had no reason to signal their
approval. Indeed, Cooter makes another claim that exacerbates this deficiency. Analogizing
men and other dominant groups to cartels, Cooter says that such norms tend to be unstable
ab:;ent legal enforcement "The signaling equilibrium loses its purity when someone gains an
advantage by signalling defection from the norm. Once [this occurs], the norm may decay
and the cartel may unwind." Id. If the signalling equilibrium is so delicate, then the ability to
produce internalized norms with a nontrivial number of dissenters seems doomed. The ori
gin of these dominance norms requires some other explanation.
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race discrimination, consumption of pornography, and use of mari
juana; yet there have always been some who conspicuously de
fended these things. Their d�ssent did not prevent a norm from
arising.
The esteem model can explain the origin of these norms. As
stated above, nothing like unanimity is necessary; a simple consen
sus may be sufficient.142 Indeed, in Part IV, I suggest that one dan
ger every society faces is a number of "unnecessary" norms by
which one group constrains the freedom of another.143
Although I believe internalization is neither necessary for norms
nor sufficient to explain certain norms, internalization of norms ob
viously occurs and sometimes provides the only explanation for be
havior. Thus, I believe we should recognize both processes in the
creation and enforcement of norms. We might use shame to desig
nate the disesteem an individual receives from those who believe
she has violated a norm, regardless of whether she has actually vio
lated the norm, and guilt to designate the psychological discomfort
a violation causes one who has internalized the norm, regardless of
whether others think she has violated the norm.144
But rather than think of esteem competition and internalization
as each creating a separate sphere of norms, I propose synthesizing
the theories as follows: Imagine a process in which esteem fre
quently produces the norm and internalization operates as a later
reinforcing mechanism.145 In Cooter's model, norms are internal142. Indeed, as I explain supra note 89 and accompanying text, under some circumstances
even a minority of the population could produce a norm.
143. Also, in Part IV, I suggest that esteem theories can better explain why norm criti
cism can produce rapid change in norms, what Sunstein calls "norm cascades." See Sunstein,
supra note 11, at 912.
144. The distinction I make between esteem concerns and internalization follows a dis
tinction recognized by some sociologists and social psychologists who study deterrence. At
least since Dennis H. Wrong, The Oversocialized Conception ofMan in Modern Sociology, 26
AM. Soc. .REv. 183 (1961), researchers measuring deterrence have distinguished between
internalized moral commitments and social disapproval as sources of deterrence - with the
threat of legal punishments providing a third source of deterrence. See also TYLER, supra
note 114, at 44-45, 57 & 238-39 n.2, 63-64 (noting a three-part distinction in the source of
legal compliance among moral commitment to law, peer disapproval, and fear of legal pun
ishment); Robinson & Darley, supra note 26, at 468 (noting nonlegal sanctions include the
fear of disapproval by one's social group and internalized moral standards). On the other
hand, emotion theorists have described and distinguished "guilt" and "shame" in much richer
terms than I do here. See, e.g., June Price Tangney, Recent Advances in the Empirical Study
ofShame and Guilt, 38 AM. BEHAv. SCIENTisr 1132 (1995).
145. Note that internalization is plausible only if many people already act in accordance
with the expressed consensus. The contrary case is one of widespread hypocrisy, where eve
ryone advocates a course of action they do not follow, or everyone says they disapprove of
certain conduct in which they continue to engage. I doubt that anyone would internalize a
consensus no one follows. But the "hero" status available in such circumstances means that
esteem competition can produce norms, despite the absence of a preexisting regularity. See
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ized because there is a "pure signalling equilibrium'1 when everyone
agrees on what is the appropriate behavior.146 For reasons stated in
Part II, this consensus, as well as a nonunanimous consensus, can
cause the immediate emergence of esteem-based norms, without or
before the additional step of internalization. While internalization
takes time,147 there will be an esteem cost to acting contrary to a
consensus as soon as it, and the inherent risk of detection, becomes
well-known. If, for most people, the cost is higher than the benefit
of acting against the consensus, a norm will quickly emerge. This
ordering - shame before guilt - conforms with those psychologi
cal theories that imagine that shaming and disapproval - external
sanctions - are precisely what produce internalization.148
Thus, though I emphasize the importance of esteem, let me reit
erate that, by norm I mean a decentralized behavioral standard that
individuals feel obligated to follow, and generally do follow, for the
esteem reasons described above, or because the obligation is inter
nalized, or both.149 Without internalization, one obeys the norm to
avoid external sanctions made possible by the desire for esteem,
though the sanctions may in fact include material punishments. Af
ter internalization, there is yet another cost to violating a norm:
guilt. The individual feels psychological discomfort whether or not
others detect her violation. Internalization can occur as the first
step in norm production, but I suggest that it frequently follows the
creation of the norm by esteem processes.

supra text accompanying notes 119-23. Thus, where selfish strategies in evolutionary equilib

rium would otherwise fail to produce a regularity in accord with the consensus, esteem com
petition can create the regularity, which, over time, is internalized.
146. See Cooter, Structural Adjudication, supra note 71, at 224.

147. An individual does not change preferences overnight. Indeed, Cooter imagines that
much norm internalization occurs in childhood, so the process might take a considerable
number of years and, for new norms, might require a generation to complete. See Cooter,
supra note 14, at 1661-62.
148. See JoHN BRAITiiWAITE, CRIME, SHAME, AND REINTEGRATION 75-78 (1989)
("[S]haming and repentance build consciences which internally deter criminal behavior even
in the absence of any shaming associated with an offense."); JEROME KAGAN, THE NATURE
OF THE CmLD 145-49 (1984) (discussing how violations of standards result in emotional ex
periences that may create internal standards within the child); Robinson & Darley, supra
note 26, at 469 ("Children are trained by a powerful socialization process into internalizing
the beliefs represented in the social norms of the culture to which they belong.").
149. For clarity of discussion, one should specify whether or not a significant proportion
of individuals have internalized the norm at issue.
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Explaining Norm Generality and Social Meaning: Concrete
Esteem Norms Implement Abstract Internalized Norms

Another ambiguity in the literature is the proper level of gener
ality to use in defining a norm. Is a norm appropriately described in
narrow behavioral terms - "In public places, clean up after your
dog" - or more abstractly - "Don't litter" - or even more ab
stractly .- "Be a good neighbor"? Is the right description that
"friends should be loyal" - a general one - or that a person is
obligated to perform specific acts: to listen attentively to a friend's
troubles, to water her plants when she is away, to drive her home
when she is intoxicated, and so on? Theorists employ arbitrarily
different levels of generality, sometimes describing norms narrowly
and sometimes broadly, without acknowledging the definitional
choices being made.1so
Sometimes - perhaps most of the time - broad norms are sim
ply collections of narrow norms. Thus, there is no ambiguity; the
relationship is simply one of set to subset. Within the broad cate
gory of neighbor norms is a subcategory of no-littering norms, one
of which is "clean up after your dog." When this is true, little is lost
by ignoring the broad norm and focusing only on the norm that
most directly governs behavior. In this section, however, I argue
that the relationship between narrow and broad norms can be more

150. Narrowly described nonns include, for example, the obligation to pay a certain pro
portion of boundary fence costs, see ELUCKSON, supra note 3, at 65-81, to refrain from suing
other members of the industrial group, see Bernstein, supra note 9, at 148-51, or to clean up
after one's dog, see Cooter, supra note 14, at 1675; Sunstein, supra note 11, at 955-59.
Broadly described nonns include, for example, the duty to "do one's share," see McAdams,
supra note 32, at 2252-53, to treat others with a reciprocal fairness, see Pildes, supra note 13,
at 2063-64, and to follow one's role as a neighbor, friend, or wife, see Sunstein, supra note 11,
at 921-22.
To illustrate the definitional choice more clearly, consider the custom in the Jim Crow
South by which whites refused to address blacks by their last names or with the titles - Mr.,
Miss, Mrs. - they used for each other and that blacks used for whites. See McAdams, supra
note 10, at 1040-41 nn.142, 146. How should this nonn be described? One could narrowly
define the nonn as requiring exactly this behavior - an obligation to call blacks by their first
names - or one could describe the behavior as part of a broader nonn - a duty of "good"
white southerners to contribute to racial hierarchy. In some sense, both descriptions are cor
rect, but the two descriptions exist at different levels of generality, and ambiguity is created
by using the tenn "nonn" without distinguishing between these levels. In this section, I pro
pose that narrow "concrete" nonns often implement broad "abstract" nonns. The broader
nonn defines the social meaning of the behavior the narrow nonn requires. Thus, in the Jim
Crow South, there was an abstract nonn among whites to contribute to racial hierarchy and a
set of concrete nonns implementing this end, including the obligation to call blacks by their
first name. As I explain in the text, it is important to use both the broad and narrow descrip
tions, and to identify their relationship, when the broad nonn is internalized but the narrow
nonn is not.
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complicated and that it is sometimes important to consider broad
and narrow norms in combination.1s1
My thesis is that an abstract norm can be internalized while the

concrete behavioral norms implementing the abstract norm are not

internalized. Where this occurs, one cannot understand or predict

behavior subject to norms without considering both the concrete
and abstract norms

and

the relation between them. Narrow, con

crete norms based solely on esteem - which are not internalized often define the

meaning of a specific behavior by defining that be

havior as complying with or violating an internalized abstract norm.

Thus, an antilittering norm may work because a consensus arises

that littering violates the internalized norm to be a "good neigh
bor"; after the littering norm is internalized, a clean-up-after-your
dog norm may arise because of a consensus that to do otherwise is

littering. If this is right, the distinction matters because the esteem

norm, enforced by external sanctions, could determine compliance

with an internalized norm, enforced by guilt.

The point here is one of timing: If internalization occurs at all, it

is likely to occur first at the abstract level and only later at a con

crete level. The more abstract the norm, the more likely it is that it

embodies the kind of sentiment - like be "a loyal friend" or "a

good neighbor" - that commands immediate unanimous agree
ment. Such unanimity, Cooter claims, produces internalization.1 52
Moreover, the norms that persist iong enough to be internalized
will be those that are least sensitive to changes in the conditions

that create norms - the least sensitive, for example, to changes in

what others perceive is in their interest to esteem. Old and stable
norms

is, the

will tend to be abstract because the more concrete the norm
more likely it will change as conditions change. Reciprocal

obligations like "do one's share" and fundamental social-role duties

like "be a good neighbor" can survive from generation to genera

tion, from place to place. Specific behaviors that define doing one's

share or that constitute being a good neighbor change more read
ily.153 Thus, a person may feel obligated to perform a certain act
151. Indeed, the problem of norm generality underlies Lessig's complaint about the eco
nomic literature on norms: that understanding norms requires the consideration of "social
meaning." See Lessig, supra note 33, at 2182-84.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 132-37.
153. When neighbors enjoy large private yards and public spaces, for example, the failure
to clean up after one's dog may hardly register. In an urban area with crowded sidewalk
space and infrequent public cleanings, the same failure quickly becomes a reason for denying
esteem.
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because a concrete, esteem-based norm defines the act as necessary
to comply with an abstract internalized norm.154

If an esteem norm defines what counts as a violation of the ab
stract norm, an individual will feel guilt when she violates the norm,
but only so long as the esteem-based norm defines her conduct as a
violation of the abstract norm. Tipping provides an example. As
sume an American leaves a bartender a tip in the United States
because a norm requires such behavior and she would feel guilt
otherwise. Yet, quite possibly, she feels no guilt for failing to tip a
bartender when visiting Australia, a country where such tipping is
not customary. In the United States, the tipping norm implements
an abstract norm against stealing, but because the American has not
internalized the concrete obligation, she has a clean conscience
when leaving no tip in a country where no one expects her to that is, where the concrete norms implementing the no-stealing
norm do not include an obligation to tip bartenders.155 The pecu
liar feature of this abstract-concrete norm combination is that the
individual feels guilt if she violates a concrete norm she has not
internalized. But she feels guilt only to the extent that her violation
of the concrete norm operates as a violation of the abstract norm.156

If this hybrid of internalized abstract norm and noninternalized
concrete norm is possible, one must study and describe norms using
both levels of generality. I believe the combination is common.
Many people internalize obligations like "do one's share" or "be
respectful of others," but not the specific behaviors necessary to
fulfill those obligations. Social roles often exist in this manner: in154. In other words, when people internalize a norm like "be a good neighbor," the obli
gation is too vague to compel any particular behavior. One feels an obligation to do some
thing to prove one is a "good neighbor" and will feel guilt otherwise, but the specific action
one must take is not internalized. An esteem-based norm then supplies the means of proving
oneself to comply with the abstract norm.
155. Lessig would say that in the United States, but not in Australia, failing to tip in this
context "means" one is stealing. See Lessig, supra note 11.
156. Religious dietary norms provide another example. Assume that prior to 1962, when
Vatican II abandoned the requirement that Catholics abstain from meat consumption on
Fridays, three Catholics, A, B, and C, generally followed this Catholic norm. A, however, ate
meat on Fridays and violated other obligations whenever she was confident her violation
would not be detected by other Catholics; she suffered no guilt because she had not internal
ized Catholic norms. B and C abstained from eating meat even when they knew their con
sumption would not be detected and felt guilt on a few occasions when they violated the edict
by accident. But immediately after Vatican II, B began eating meat on Fridays while C (my
mother-in-law) did not; indeed, C still felt guilt if she accidentally violated this repealed rule.
C had internalized the abstract obligation to be a "good Catholic" and the concrete obliga
tion to abstain from meat on Fridays. B, on the other hand, had internalized the general duty
to be a good Catholic but not the concrete duty regarding meat consumption. She felt guilt
only when, prior to Vatican II, most Catholics believed that good Catholics did not engage in
this concrete behavior.
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dividuals internalize societal norms such as "be a loyal friend," "be

a good wife," or "be a man," and occupational norms, setting the
standard of a "fair judge," "good union man," or "cutting edge art
ist." 157 It is possible to internalize some specific behavioral stan
dards associated with these higher level obligations. But frequently

the norms that implement the abstract norms are not internalized.

The "loyal friend" defends the right of his friend to drink, even
when driving, and feels guilt if he does not, until the esteem-based
norm changes to "friends don't let friends drive drunk."1 58
Thus, while guilt arises only from violating an obligation one has

internalized, when the obligation is vaguely defined, what counts as
a violation may depend on what others think is a violation. The
result is that esteem-based norms matter even more; though esteem

is an external sanction, esteem-based expectations can invoke inter
nal sanctions. Moreover, while an internalized duty cannot change

overnight, there can be sudden changes in when people feel guilt

for a particular behavior.

As I explain below, these abstract

concrete norm combinations are useful to explain norm change and

the role of law in norm change.

This approach to describing norms facilitates a synthesis of the

esteem theory with Lawrence Lessig's discussion of social mean
ing.1 59 Lessig observes that the costs and benefits of an act depend

in part on its social meaning. The passenger who buckles her
seatbelt bears a cost in a society in which her act signals an insulting
mistrust of the driver, but no such cost and perhaps a benefit where
her act signals good judgment. The person who drives while intoxi

cated bears a cost in a society in which his act signals social irre

sponsibility, but no cost and perhaps a benefit where his act signals
a fun-loving attitude. In each case, what an act "signals" depends

on the norms that define the a�t's social meaning. Lessig has criti
cized the existing norms literature for failing to account for the sig
nificance of social meaning.160
In the esteem theory, social meaning refers to the relationship

between a specific behavioral norm and the abstract internalized
157. See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 921-25.
158. For simplicity, all of my examples have assumed that there are only two levels of
generality - concrete or abstract. It is more likely that there is a continuum. The "don't
litter" norm is a good example. It implements the abstract norm "be a good neighbor," but it
is also somewhat abstract itself, leaving open the question of exactly what constitutes litter
ing. Thus, a more concrete norm, "clean up after your dog," gives additional meaning to the
"don't litter" norm.

159. See Lessig, supra note 11; Lessig, supra note 33.
160. See Lessig, supra note 33.
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norm it implements. The social meaning of an abstract norm is de
fined by the set of specific behavioral norms one is obligated to
follow to be considered in compliance with the abstract norm.
Thus, in some neighborhoods, failing to clean up after one's dog has
no particular meaning; in others, the omission "means" one is a bad
neighbor. In some neighborhoods, asking lots of questions shows a
friendly interest and means one is a good neighbor; in other neigh
borhoods, asking unnecessary questions is nosy and means that one
is a poor neighbor. In general, esteem-enforced concrete norms
provide meaning to internalized abstract norms.161
C.

A

Unified Theory of Group and Societal Norms

The norms literature is divided between those who discuss
group norms - mostly private law scholars162 - and those who
discuss societal norms - mostly public law scholars.163 Sometimes
theorists speak of "norms" without clearly identifying the kind of
population in which the norms arise. But even when they do iden
tify the population, it is not clear from the literature how group
norms and societal norms164 are related: if generalizations can be
made about both or if they are essentially distinct phenomena. In
deed, many group norms are exactly contrary to societal norms Christian Scientist norms, for example, oppose the use of medical
161. Sometimes concrete norms affect the meaning of a behavior merely by determining
its frequency. For example, where there is no norm obligating seat belt use and very few
people "buckle up, " such conduct will inevitably signal the passenger's unusually high fear of
the situation including a mistrust of the driver. But where the average passenger follows a
norm requiring seat belt use, drivers will make no such inference. Indeed, the average driver
will also wear a seat belt.
162. The property norms Ellickson found in Shasta County, for example, govern what he
describes as a "close-knit " group. See ELUCKSON, supra note 3, at 181; see also Bernstein,
supra note 9, at 119-21; Cooter, supra note 14, at 1646; McAdams, supra note 32, at 2241-42.
163. Sunstein discusses norms defining various "social roles, " such as that of waiter, wife,
or friend. See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 921-22 (listing also the roles of doctor, employee,
law school dean, colleague, and student). He says these roles are "accompanied by a remark
ably complex network of appropriate norms. " Id. at 921. One could conceivably read Sun
stein as envisioning only group norms because he recognizes that "subcultures " have their
own norms. See id. at 918-20. But his primary level of analysis clearly remains a norm that
arises at the societal level. He observes, for example, that rapid norm changes ("cascades ")
occurred with "the election of Ronald Reagan, the use of the term 'liberal' as one of oppro
brium, the rise of the feminist movement, and the current assault on affirmative action." Id.
at 912. These are obviously broad social changes, not merely changes within a close-knit
group.
164. I say "societal " norm rather than "social " because I think the term "social norm" is
already widely used to refer to any kind of informal norm, including group norms. In other
words, many distinguish social norms from legal norms. I suggest that we clearly subdivide
social norms into group norms - including the formal norms of organizations - and societal
norms.
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technology that society obligates parents to use for their children,165
"skinheads" express a code of racial supremacy rejected by Ameri
can society,166 and some police forces enforce a "code of silence" to
conceal their members' wrongdoing from society's legal sanc
tions.167 For some groups, this connection is intentional; the group
obligates conduct because it violates a societal norm.16s Teenage
norms, for example, often obligate rejection of the societal norms of
adults.169 Can a single theory explain both societal norms and also
such contrary group norms?
The esteem theory can explain norms arising within groups and
societies, even where the group and societal norms stand in opposi
tion to each other. If both norm types arise from the same
processes, the esteem theory unifies the public and private law liter
ature on norms, showing that they share more than a common ter
minology. Recall that the conditions necessary for esteem-based
norms are: (1) a consensus about the esteem-worthiness of engag
ing in X, (2) an inherent risk that others will detect whether one
engages in X, and (3) that the existence of the first two conditions is
well known within the population.170 The first point is that there is
no necessary barrier to these conditions arising within an entire so165. See CATiiERINE L. ALBANESE, AMERICA: REumoNs AND REuomN £37 (2d ed.
1992); Nathan A. Talbot, The Position of the Christian Science Church, 309 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1641 (1983).
166. See Michael Janofsky, Skinhead Violence Is Worldwide and Growing, a Report Finds,
N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1995, at Al (citing ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, THE S KINHEAD INTER
NATIONAL: A WORLDWIDE SURVEY OF NEW-NAZI SKINHEADS (1995)).
167. See supra note 42. These norms are enforced primarily by esteem processes. Skol
nick and Fyfe characterize the police code of silence as merely "an extreme version of a
phenomenon that exists in all human groups":
[W]e know of no other cases [other than one where the authors actually reject the pur
ported link between informing and being shot] in which police have punished those who
betrayed the code of silence with anything as extreme as a shooting. Instead, the code
• . . typically is enforced by the threat of shunning, by fear that informing will lead to
exposure of one's own derelictions, and by fear that colleagues' assistance may be with
held in emergencies.
SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 42, at 110, 112. The latter two punishments are merely to
withhold from the informer the benefits of other group norms - those who inform on a "rat"
or fail to aid a "rat" will not be punished for violating norms prohibiting informing and
obligating assistance. See Rick Bragg, Blue Wall of Silence: Graft Shielded Behind Old Code,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1994, at Bl (describing the use of ostracism to enforce the code of
silence).

168. As Sunstein says, "some people like to incur the disapproval that follows norm viola
tion, and hence some people like to 'flout convention' by rejecting prevailing norms by, for
example, smoking, playing loud music in public, or wearing unusual clothes." Sunstein, supra
note 11, at 918.
169. See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 2, at 257-58 (discussing teen dress codes as a means
of differentiating and declaring subgroup identity both to other members and to
nonmembers).
170. See supra text ac:Companying notes 86-110.
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ciety, so that the same theory explains group and societal norms.
Second, a different consensus can arise in a society and in the
groups within the society, so that different populations can have dif
ferent and conflicting norms. The norm conditions identify why
group norms are often so much stronger than societal norms that
the group can openly defy social norms and withstand and possibly
enjoy the resulting disapproval.
None of the norm conditions are as likely for a society as a
closely knit or even loosely knit group, but all may occur. A major
ity of individuals in an entire society may come to regard certain
behavior as praiseworthy or blameworthy. If nothing else, selfish
esteem allocation may cause most people to disapprove behaviors
with obvious external costs - such as cutting in line or failing to
wait one's turn - and to approve behaviors with obvious external
benefits - such as pausing to hold open a door one has just passed
through for the person walking immediately behind. Additionally,
some behaviors are sufficiently public, such as the examples just
given, that the risk of detection is quite high. Finally, the prior two
conditions will sometimes be well known throughout a society.
When the external costs are obvious and the behavior is public,
people may simply and correctly assume the conduct is generally
disapproved. In less obvious cases, formal education or mass media
may publicize the consensus against a behavior. Thus, the esteem
processes identified above can produce a societal as well as a group
norm.
Of the three conditions, the third - publicity - presents the
most significant potential barrier to a societal norm creation. When
the existence of the consensus or the risk of detection is less than
obvious, even a strong consensus may never produce a norm. In
particular, those who do not share the consensus may doubt its
existence and thereby remain uninfluenced by the risk of societal
disapproval. In Part IV, I claim that this potential publicity barrier
is crucial to understanding the "expressive" function of law: the
esteem model implies that legislation creates and strengthens socie
tal norms by publicizing a social consensus. 171
Esteem can also explain the stability of group norms that con
flict with societal norms. That conflict arises is no surprise: all that
is required is that a group consist predominantly of people who op
pose the societal consensus. Random forces could produce this re171. See infra text accompanying notes 206-27. Conversely, I also suggest that privacy
rights may be viewed as a means of preventing or weakening societal norms. See infra text
'
accompanying notes 285-96.
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sult. More obviously, individuals who share an unconventional
view or a generally unconventional outlook may seek one another's
company. The question then is not why group and societal norms
ever conflict, but how - if societal norms have any force - groups
can openly and persistently flout such norms.
The simple answer is that group norms are frequently much
stronger than societal norms.

People "like" to violate societal

norms when their group norms obligate such violations and when
they gain more from the group than they lose from society. The
esteem model identifies why one frequently gains more from fol
lowing group norms than societal norms. For several reasons,
groups usually have stronger norms than societies. First, groups
tend to be more homogenous than society and therefore tend to
enjoy a stronger consensus.172 Ninety percent of society might con
demn racism or cocaine consumption, but a small group may be
composed entirely of members of the contrary ten percent. Second,
any consensus that exists

will

be easier to publicize within a small

group than a large one.173 Third, the interaction that defines group
members but not strangers raises the likelihood that a group mem
ber will detect - without bearing costs for purposes of monitoring
- whether another member has violated a consensus.
Finally, even.when all three conditions exist, a norm arises only

if the value of esteem is sufficiently great in comparison to the costs
of complying with the consensus. Societal norms exploit the advan
tage of aggregation: a small concern for each stranger's opinion
multiplied by a large number of strangers who may detect a viola
tion. But groups obviously enjoy the advantage that their members
value the esteem of fellow members more highly than that of stran
gers. On average, the smaller the group, the more intensely esteem
is valued. There are many reasons for this obvious fact, but con
sider just two. First, other things equal, an individual cares more
about well-informed opinions than less-informed opinions. The
more that one individual knows about another, the harder it is for
the latter to discount the opinion of the former as possibly mis-

172. Like·minded people often form groups on the basis of shared views. Conversely,
dissension causes exit from a small group more easily than exit from an entire society. Even
if random forces produce the evaluative beliefs of group members, small groups will exhibit
more deviation than larger groups.
173. Very small groups can gather in one place and discuss an issue. Even for larger
groups, gossip may be sufficient to permit each member to learn the common view of a
particular behavior. The more interaction between members, the closer-knit the group, and
the more opportunity for gossip. See McAdams, supra note 32, at 2244 n.21, 2288 n.133.
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taken. 114 By definition, members of an individual's group have
more information about the individual than do strangers, and thus
the esteem of group members tends to matter a great deal more.
Second, other things equal, the more an individual esteems another,
the more she values the opinion the other holds of her.17s Because
people generally seek to interact with those they esteem, and often
form groups because of common interests, an individual will value
her group members' esteem more than the esteem of strangers. 176

Thus, the relative advantages that small, close-knit groups enjoy
in enforcing norms make it possible for them to enforce norms that
run contrary to the norms of society. Given the differences, groups
should succeed more often than societies in enforcing their norms
with material sanctions; societal norms will frequently reach equi
librium without material sanctions and enforcement will consist of a
relatively weak esteem loss. The focus on esteem, however, pro
vides a unified theory of group and societal norms, even where the
norms exist in conflict.
*

*

*

By explaining how norms first arise, the esteem model clarifies
the meaning and function of norms. The model unifies what ap
pears to be disparate scholarship on group and societal norms, il
luminates the relationship between concrete and abstract norms,
and integrates the separate notions of internal and external sanc
tions. If the model succeeds, the primary gain should be to future
174. For two people A and B, let vN8 be the value that A places on B's opinion of A and
let r81A be the relative rank that B accords to A. A's utility from B's esteem of A is a function
of the product of these variables, vNB(rBIAl· The text points out that vNn is likely to vary
directly with the amount of information A believes that B has about A.
175. In the terminology of the preceding note, vNB is likely to vary directly with vwA·
176. More generally, even though individuals seek high esteem in comparison to others,
esteem is frequently a positive-sum and not zero-sum good. In other words, the total utility
derived from esteem in society is not fixed; individuals can often produce more esteem utility
for themselves than they take away from others. For example, individuals who value A's
opinion highly will invest more to gain her approval than those who value A's opinion less.
Those who invest less will lose relative standing in A's judgment, but they will not care as
much about the decrease as those who gained standing. As a second example, individuals
who expect A to rank them highly, or who know that she already does, will interact more
with A so that she will know them better and they will place greater value on her opinion of
them - given the assumptions stated supra note 174 and accompanying text. Raising the
value one places on A's opinion benefits these individuals without affecting the esteem A
grants other individuals or the value they place on her opinion. Social groups exploit both
mechanisms for creating esteem: individuals seek to join groups with those they expect will
grant them high esteem, and group interaction causes members to value the esteem of fellow
members more highly, Thus, social groups might be analogized to firms for the production of
esteem, a power that allows them to enforce powerful norms. For a description of when
esteem competition is zero-sum, see McAdams, supra note 78, at 48-59.
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research on particular law and norm interactions. There are, how
ever, some immediate implications for law.

IV.

REGULATING NORMS

Those who study law should study norms; one reason for this is
that an important function of law is to shape or regulate norms.
Understanding norm origin should provide insight into both how
and why law might perform this function. Much of the new norms
literature discusses how law might change norms, yet without a the
ory of origin - of the conditions that produce norms - it seems
unlikely one could predict the effect of legal change on a given
norm. Moreover, any justification for changing a norm is likely to
be at least somewhat controversial. A theory of origin should help
identify the conditions under which dysfunctional norms are likely
to arise, conditions which may signal the need for legal
intervention.
This Part addresses these matters in the following order. Sec
tion IV.A applies the esteem theory of origin to the general issue of
norm change and in particular seeks to explain how

criticism

can

produce norm change. Given this understanding, section IV.B ex
plains in some detail how the state may strengthen norms through
what is conventionally known as the "expressive" function of law.
Because of inherent difficulties in publicizing a consensus across an
entire society, the theory predicts the importance of symbolic legis
lation. The final two sections explore the "dark side" of norms.
Section IV.C explains why esteem competition will produce previ
ously unappreciated forms of norm inefficiency: unnecessary and
"zealous" norms. Section IV.D suggests how law can impede such
undesirable norms by protecting privacy.

A.

The Esteem Model and Norm Change

Not so long ago in the United States, people smoked cigarettes
virtually anywhere and disposed of their ashes and butts on the
floors of public buildings.177 Public mores condemned unmarried
cohabitation, women expected and received the titles "Miss" and
"Mrs." according to their marital status,11s and, at . least in the
177. See William P. Nelson, Risk Talk, Rights Talk and the Social Production of Second
hand Smoke 12 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) ("From the end of the [Second
World] war through the early 1970s, American public space was undeniably smoking
space.").
178. In 1973, eighty-two percent of women and sixty-eight percent of men expressed a
preference for these titles over the title "Ms." 6 The Roper Center for Public Opinion Re
search, People, Opinions & Polls: American Popular Culture, Pun. PERSP., Aug./Sept. 1995, at
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South, custom demanded that whites call blacks by their first names
and accord them no titles of respect. 179 Today public opinion
largely tolerates unmarried cohabitation,180 restricts smoking and
cigarette litter, and condemns those who overtly discriminate on the
basis of race, 181 and many young women expect and receive the title
"Ms." whether married or not.182 Such changes are common
place. 183 That norms can rise and fall in such a relatively short
timespan is quite important to legal theory. At the least, legal anal
ysis is more complex if one cannot assume the permanence of the
background norms that influence individual behavior in combina
tion with, or to the exclusion of, law. At most, legal innovation
contributes - intentionally or not - to norm change.
The question is, once a norm has evolved to the point where
there are secondary enforcement norms obligating individuals to
enforce the primary norm, how does a group or society ever aban
don the norm for a new behavioral standard? In this section I ar
gue that sudden norm shifts are predicted by the esteem model of
norms. I discuss two agents of change: fluctuations in enforcement
costs and norm criticism.
37, 41 (1995) [hereinafter Roper Center]. Similarly, at one time, married women invariably
took their husband's surname. See Esther Suarez, A Woman's Freedom to Choose Her Sur
name: ls It Really a Matter ofChoice?, 18 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 233, 234 (1997) (reporting
that Lucy Stone in 1855 was the first American woman to keep her name after marriage and
that courts frequently refused to recognize such efforts).
179. In other words, whites did not use titles such as "Mr.," "Mrs.," or "Reverend." See
JoHN Dou.ARD, CASTE AND CLASS IN A SOUTHERN ToWN 181, 187, 346 (3d ed. 1957); NEIL
R. McMILLEN, DARK JOURNEY: BLACK MISSISSIPPIANS IN THE AGE OF JIM CROW 23-24

(1989).
180. See IRVING J. SLOAN, LIVING TOGETHER: UNMARRIEDS AND THE LAW at v-vi (1980)
(reporting "increased social acceptance"); Matthew J. Smith, The Wages of Living in Sin:
Discrimination in Housing Against Unmarried Couples, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1055, 1057-58
(1992) (noting sharp increase in numbers of unmarried cohabitants between 1960 and 1989).
181. See Lawrence Bobo, Group Conflict, Prejudice, and the Paradox of Contemporary
Racial Attitudes, in ELIMINATING RACISM 85, 88 (Phyllis A. Katz & Dalmas A. Taylor eds.,

1988) ("A substantial majority of white Americans in 1942 approved of the blatantly discrim
inatory proposition that 'white people should have the first chance at any kind of job,'
whereas in 1972 nearly 100% of whites in a national survey rejected that statement."). See
generally HOWARD SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL ATI1TUDES IN AMERICA 71-138 {1985) (dis
cussing trends in white racial attitudes between 1942 and 1983).
182. By 1993, the percentage of women preferring the terms "Mrs." and "Miss" fell to
52%, down from 82% 20 years earlier. The percentage for men fell from 68% to 46%. See
Roper Center, supra note 178, at 41. Similarly, the number of women keeping their surname
after marriage is rising. See Karen S. Peterson, Married Moniker is a Matter ofChoice, USA
TODAY, Aug. 28, 1990, at SD; Suzanne Schlosberg, Commitments in the Name of Love, L.A.
TIMES, May 22, 1995, at E3.
183. These large-scale social changes are matched by equally significant shifts within
smaller groups such as neighborhoods, churches, and industrial organizations, not to mention
entirely new collections such as internet newsgroups.

November

1997]

Norms

393

1. Changes In Enforcement Costs
If a norm is internalized by virtually everyone in the group or
society, the possibility for rapid change is quite limited.184 Cooter
explains how sudden change can occur if many have internalized
the norm but a large minority or small majority have not; all that is
necessary is an abrupt change in the costs of enforcing the norm.185
Where esteem competition produces a secondary enforcement
norm with material sanctions, the same fluctuation can explain
abandonment of such norms. Indeed, enforcement costs matter
more directly to norms when all of the costs of violation are, for
everyone, entirely external. If enforcement costs rise above the
value of the esteem one loses by refusing to enforce the primary
norm, the secondary enforcement norm will unravel. There may
still be a weak primary norm if everyone knows they will be less
esteemed for behaving contrary to the norm; but the norm may be
dramatically weaker.
For example, a community may enforce a norm against abor
tion. For many in the community, the norm is internalized. But
assume that external enforcement is still necessary because some
women have not internalized the norm and others who have inter
nalized it would get an abortion - despite the attendant guilt under certain circumstances that may arise.186 To deter these
women, the community informally monitors who visits a local fam
ily planning clinic and sanctions those suspected of abortion. The
external sanctions work and the abortion rate is nearly zero.
Now suppose the availability of a new drug like RU-486 allows
women to obtain abortions with visits to their regular doctor rather
than a clinic, which in tum, raises substantially the cost of detecting
184. Where guilt afflicts everyone, there may be virtually no need for external sanctions,
and thus changes in the level of external sanctions will not produce any immediate change in
behavior. If a norm originally arose as a result of external sanctions, and over the genera
tions the norm is internalized by virtually everyone, it is possible that a sharp rise in enforce
ment costs would eventually eliminate the norm. This might happen because the few who
had not internalized the norm now find they can violate it with impunity. Their impunity
may gradually lower the psychological commitment others feel for the norm. But because
internalization takes time, such an unraveling would also take considerable time.
185. See Cooter, supra note 14, at 1669-75. In Cooter's model, an individual who has
internalized a norm is willing to bear small, but only small, costs to enforce it against those
who have not internalized the norm. Thus, if a norm is internalized when enforcement costs
are low, external shocks may raise the cost of enforcement above the point some people are
willing to bear. They will cease enforcing the norm. With fewer enforcing the norm, the per
person costs of enforcement rise again, possibly causing more individuals to drop out of en
forcement efforts. A rapid and significant change in enforcement costs could then produce a
rapid abandonment of the norm.
186. The fact that people have internalized a norm does not mean they never violate it,
but only that they bear an internal cost when they do.
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an abortion.187 The expected loss of esteem would fall, potentially
to the point where it no longer deterred anyone from seeking a pill
induced abortion. If the community generally coin.es to believe that
many unidentified women have used a pill to secure an abortion,
the disesteem given to women who are known to have aborted a
pregnancy (because they go to an abortion clinic) will then be
spread over a larger group. The feedback effect of decreased com
pliance will lower even the esteem sanction for women whose abor
tions become publicly known. The group's anti-abortion norm
might entirely unraveJ.188

2. Norm Criticism
Criticism seems to play an important role in norm change. Sun
stein, for example, observes the existence of sudden and dramatic
norm changes - "cascades" - brought about by "norm entrepre
neurs," opinion leaders who explicitly aim to shape norms. He cites
as examples the sudden "use of the term 'liberal' as one of oppro
brium," the abrupt abandonment of affirmative action, and "the
rise of the feminist movement. " 18? If norms were enforced only by
those who have internalized them, as Cooter claims, criticism of
norms should not have this effect. Those who accept a norm to the
point where violating it makes them feel guilt are not likely to be
receptive to norm criticism. Even if they were, the change should
187. As used to induce an abortion, RU486 consists of "three 200 mg. tablets of mifepris
tone . . . followed two days later by an injection or suppository of progesterone," the combi
nation of which causes "the lining of the uterus to dissolve, resulting in an aborting
menstruation." Adele Clarke & Theresa Mantini, The Many Faces of RU486: Tales ofSitu
ated Knowledges and Technological Contestations, 18 SCI. TECH. & HuM. VALUES 42, 46
(1993). I say "suppose" RU486 raises the cost of detecting abortions because there are many
uncertainties about the actual effect of the drug. First, as currently contemplated, the use of
RU486 requires as many medical visits as a surgical abortion. See id. at 46-47. Thus, any
privacy advantage would have to come from the fact that visiting a doctor's office instead of a
clinic provides far more ambiguous evidence of one's purpose. Second, RU486 is "claimed to
be safe for abortion only if used up to about the eighth week of pregnancy." Id. at 46. Thus,
in the United States, about half of current abortions could be performed by RU486. See M.
Klitsch, Antiprogestins and the Abortion Controversy: A Progress Report, 23 FAM. PLAN.
PERSP. 275, 277 (1991). Notwithstanding these limitations, antiabortion groups appear to
fear RU486, in part, for its ability to make abortions more private. See Clarke & Mantini,
supra, at 57 ("[T]he Vatican is reported to have said that 'a way of killing with no risk for the
assassin has finally been found."').
188. The example suggests other ways in which monitoring costs affect norms. For exam
ple, the fewer the sites for obtaining an abortion in a given area, the easier it is to monitor all
abortions. Thus, an increase in the number of abortion clinics or the availability (including
affordability) of abortions in general hospitals could also raise the costs of enforcing anti
abortion norms.
189. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 912; see also Posner, supra note 72, at 6-9 (discussing
norm entrepreneurs and norm change). Note that Sunstein seems to imagine norms arising
without a unanimously expressed view, as is required by Cooler's model. See supra text ac
companying note 146.
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occur only gradually, as criticism slowly loosens the emotional hold
the norm has on those who have internalized it.190 Some other
mechanism is needed to explain how norms rise and fall in response
to criticism.
The esteem model explains two ways that criticism can produce
rapid norm change. Most simply, criticism may provide new infor
mation that changes the underlying consensus. A person may es
teem behavior X because she believes certain facts about X;
perhaps she believes she benefits as a consequence of others engag
ing in X If so, demonstrating the falsity of her factual beliefs will
undermine the consensus and the norm.191 If the new information
circulates quickly, it will lead to very sudden changes in esteem
based norms.
The distinction between abstract norms, which are often inter
nalized, and concrete norms, which are often not internalized, fur
ther illuminates the point. Individuals commonly understand and
justify concrete norms by reference to abstract norms: "I keep my
mouth shut because I am a 'loyal friend"'; "I piled sand bags on the
flood wall because I wanted to do 'my share."' When that is the
case, there is a built-in standard for evaluating the concrete norm:
Does it genuinely serve the abstract norm? If the critic can show
that it does not - that despite the concrete norm, recycling actually
harms future generations, or that enabling friends to drive while
intoxicated endangers the friend to whom one is loyal (and by en
dangering others in the community, undermines a commitment to
be a "good citizen") - then her criticism will change the norm.
Here the "information" the critic supplies need not be factual data,
190. People do not develop internal guilt-driven commitments overnight. The same is
presumably true of disinternalization, the process by which people abandon their emotional
commitment to a norm. Beliefs can change instantly, but guilt inclinations cannot. If so,
norm criticism should not have any rapid effect on the willingness of those who have internal
ized the norm to follow or enforce it
As previously stated, Cooter's internalization model can account for rapid norm change
based on abrupt exogenous changes in enforcement costs. See supra note 185. He notes that
among the costs of enforcing a norm is the fact that "[t]he person who spontaneously pun
ishes someone
usually runs some risk of confrontation or revenge." Cooter, supra note
14, at 1670. The risk of confrontation depends on the number of people who have internal
ized the norm; the risk "fall[s] as the proportion of people willing to act as punishers in
creases." Id. But if the norm is enforced only by those who have internalized it, there is no
obvious reason why criticism should affect the number of people enforcing the norm, and
thus the costs of enforcement. At least, there is no reason for criticism to work quickly.
•

• . .

191. This is not to say that criticism will easily change people's views even when they are
false. When possible, people tend to interpret information in a manner that sustains their
existing beliefs. See infra note 210. But if the contrary evidence is sufficiently powerful or
dramatic, people cannot interpret it away, and the norm will change.
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but may be a more powerful analysis of the relationship between
concrete behavior and the abstract norm.
Second, criticism can cause rapid norm change by revealing new
information about what the consensus actually is. This point fol
lows from the distinction between two norm conditions: the exist
ence of a consensus and knowledge of the consensus. If there were
perfect information about a consensus, then sudden norm change
could occur only with a sudden change in the consensus. But given
the possible disparity between the actual and the perceived consen
sus, there can be rapid norm change even if the actual consensus
remains constant. For example, suppose the consensus tolerates be
havior X - most individuals neither approve nor disapprove X
but most people falsely believe the consensus condemns X This
norm is highly unstable, depending on continued misperception of
the true consensus. Criticism may induce a new discussion of the
behavior that provides that information, quickly revealing the true
nature of the consensus.
-

Of course, if criticism were always immediately forthcoming, the
resultant norm change would not be very dramatic because there
would never be a significant gap between the actual and perceived
consensus. But criticism is not always readily provided. The prob
lem is that a norm critic often incurs costs by challenging the pre
vailing view. Hence, when individuals privately disagree with a
norm, they often publicly pretend to support it.192 The norm may
grow increasingly unstable, until criticism supplies the occasion for
large numbers of people to admit their true beliefs and discover
that the actual consensus is not what they had thought.193
192. See Lessig, supra note 11, at 997-99; McAdams, supra note 32, at 2259; Posner, supra
102, at 1718.
193. This analysis is substantially clarified, however, by distinguishing between group and

note

societal nonns. The too-little-criticism story fits best with group, not societal, nonns. Close
knit groups enjoy various advantages over societies in enforcing nonns, see supra text accom
panying notes 172-76, and are therefore more likely to be accompanied by powerful secon
dary enforcement nonns. Under these circumstances, one who disagrees with her group's
norm has a real reason to withhold her criticism.
Societal nonns, however, tend to be weaker, allowing groups to sustain nonns contrary to
societal nonns. See supra text accompanying notes 172-76. Accordingly, there is usually
some group willing to criticize openly and vigorously any societal nonn. In this setting, "too
much" criticism can produce the same nonn instability as "too little," creating the same po
tential for rapid change. That nearly every nonn has critics makes it easy for individuals to
discount criticism as that of a small, noisy, and radical group - the "extremist element."
Nonn supporters often succeed at portraying critics as unrepresentative of the "mainstream,"
even when support for the nonn is genuinely eroding. Thus, individuals who oppose the
nonn may continue to feign support for it. The disparity between the consensus and the
perceived consensus may make the norm highly unstable, subject to significant change should
the error in perception be corrected.
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I defer discussing examples until later, when I address ways in
which the law can exploit norm instability. For now, note how the
analysis supports the liberal value of tolerance. The First Amend
ment restricts the state's ability to punish dissent. To some degree,
norms of tolerance similarly obligate private actors to withhold
punishment from those who speak against, but do not violate, a
norm.194 This tolerance is not only important in the political arena
to facilitate an open debate about governmental decisions. Toler
ance is also important to allow criticism to influence group and soci
etal norms. First, criticism may point out new facts or perspectives
that persuade individuals to change their evaluative assessments
and thereby change the consensus underlying a norm. Second, criti
cism may reveal that the perceived consensus differs from the ac
tual consensus, thereby changing the norm to fit the consensus.
Tolerance norms, both legal and social, make it possible for critics
to challenge existing norms continuously; by putting subjects on the
"public agenda," the consensus is measured and remeasured. Tol
erating dissent thus increases the odds that any poorly informed or
improperly perceived consensus will be detected and eliminated.

In

sum, esteem-based norms are less stable than internalized

norms. Sunstein's claim that norm criticism can cause "norm cas
cades" is not in tension with Cooter's claim that norms are internal
ized:

it is simply the nonintemalized esteem-based norms that

criticism can change quickly.
B.

Facilitating Efficient Norms: The Expressive Function of Law

By whatever normative criteria one uses, some group and socie
tal norms are desirable and some are not. Sometimes norms are the
cure; sometimes the disease.

In the next sections I

discuss how es

teem competition produces inefficient norms and what the law can
do to weaken such norms. For now, assume we identify a "good"
norm. One important question is what the state might do to
strengthen such a norm. The obvious answer is that the law can
strengthen a norm by imposing sanctions on those who violate it.
Less obviously, however, the law can strengthen a norm merely by
194. A strong tolerance norm might permit individuals to criticize but not violate the
norm. A weak tolerance norm might still permit an individual to question the norm without
disapproval, as long as she relents and endorses the norm if her criticism fails to persuade
others. Even this limited privilege of dissent would work to moderate norm enforcement if
most people already secretly believed the norm was dysfunctional and if the criticism spread
quickly enough. But sometimes secondary enforcement norms obligate intolerance of norm
critics. Some groups will punish any criticism of their norms and virtually all groups have
some norms - taboos - for which they tolerate no criticism.
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"expressing" it, without providing any enforcement. In this section
I follow other theorists in contending that law can strengthen es
teem norms by expressing them and, further, that norms help to
explain how the "expressive" function of law works. In particular,
the esteem model of norm origin clarifies how legal expression
matters.
That law has an "expressive" or symbolic function is an old
idea.195 This view resists the simple claim that law directs behavior
only because the state inflicts a cost on violators. Of course, law
alters behavior when the state threatens to enforce its rules, at least
ultimately, by force. But law also expresses normative principles
and symbolizes societal values, and these moralizing features may
affect behavior. Under this view, for example, criminal punish
ments do not merely state prices for prohibited behaviors. Rather,
as sanctions, punishments express society's condemnation of the be
havior.196 Demanding a price means that the behavior is deemed
acceptable so long as the price is paid; imposing a sanction ex
presses that a behavior is unacceptable even for one willing to incur
the sanction. By expressive function of law, I mean that the distinc
tion between prices and sanctions affects behavior: that imposing a
given cost on behavior actually deters more if the law imposing the
cost expresses condemnation of the behavior.191
This claim, however, is vague. How exactly does legal condem
nation affect behavior, other than by threat of sanctions? A good
explanation mus� avoid two overly simple answers: (1) that people
feel an internalized duty to obey the law, whatever its content; or
(2) that people feel guilt violating a law that states an obligation
they have already internalized. The first answer is undoubtedly
true to some degree; some people feel guilt when violating any
law.198 But if that were the only explanation for the law's expres
sive function, it would imply that any law is as successful on that
score as any other law, which is surely false because some people
feel no guilt for failing to obey a law they think is unwise or unjust.
The second answer superficially ties the expressive function to the
195. See, e.g., Johs Andenaes, General Prevention - Illusion or Reality?, 43 J. CruM. L.
POI.ICE So. 176, 179-80 (1952); Nigel Walker & Michael Argyle, Does the
Law Affect Moral Judgments?, 4 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 570, 570 (1963-64).
196. See Kahan, supra note 36, at 593; see also Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Legal Prohibi
CRIMINOLOGY &

tions as More than Prices: The Economic Analysis ofPreference Shaping Policies in the Law,
in LAW AND ECONOMICS: NEW AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 153 (Robin Paul Malloy &

Christopher K Braun eds., 1995).
197. Whether a legal sanction expresses condemnation is a complex matter, but criminal
laws enforced by prison terms generally do. See Kahan, supra note 36, at ti21.
198. See TYLER, supra note 114, at 37.
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content of the law. But if law breaking invoked guilt only when the
individual had already internalized the substantive obligation when she thought the behavior was "wrong" before it was illegal then legal condemnation would have no independent moralizing ef
fect. The law would add nothing but the threat of punishment.
Recently, several theorists have suggested that the expressive
function of law works by affecting norms.199 If law expresses the
community's adherence to a norm, law may affect behavior by
strengthening the nonlegal enforcement of the norm. Perhaps the
law's expression of a norm even induces some individuals to inter
nalize the norm. Thus, these theorists contend, in effect, that legal
expression influences behavior by influencing norms. Paul Robin
son and John Darley make these claims about the criminal law:
when a statute fits sufficiently with existing retributive norms defin
ing who deserves punishment, it is perceived as "just" and then
"nurtures'' those norms.200 Criminal legislation and enforcement
influences "what the social group thinks" by sending "messages"
about the existence and content of the norm.201 Further, when
criminal law speaks with "moral credibility" or legitimacy about is
sues

of right and wrong,

it

influences

"what its

members

internalize. "202
Robinson and Darley provide what is, to date, the most compre

hensive social science account of law as a norm-shaping tool.203 But
they too fail to supply some important details about norm govern
ance. Robinson and Darley are adamant that law cannot create
new norms but only nurture existing ones.204 But if public support
predates the criminal law, which is also generally required by our
political system, then how does legislation add to the public support

199. See Huang & Wu, supra note 40, at 404 ("[T]he route by which laws create and
maintain order is through the creation or alteration of social norms. . . . [O]ur thesis is that
decentralized order is accomplished by internalizing as social norms those laws that are just
and perceived to be fair."); Lessig, supra note 11, at 1012-14; Robinson & Darley, supra note
26, at 471 ("Criminal law in particular can influence the norms that are internalized by the
individual. Criminal law's influence comes from being a societal mechanism . . . by which the
force of internal moral principles is strengthened."); Sunstein, supra note 34, at 2031 (assert
ing that the law's stand for or against a given behavior affects the strength of norms for or
against that behavior, as the prohibition of public smoking and organ selling may strengthen
norms restricting smoking and the uses of money).
200. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 26, at 471-77. Their overall project is to supply a
utilitarian justification for basing the criminal law on the principles of just deserts actually
held by the public.
201. See id. at 471-74.
202. See id. at 471, 474-76.
203. Their account is based on social psychology, not economics.
204. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 26, at 473.
• . .
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for the norm it embodies?2os Without a general theory of societal
norms, it is difficult to say in detail how the law affects such norms.
H the esteem theory is correct, it suggests two specific ways that
statutes create and strengthen norms: (1) lawmaking publicizes a
societal consensus, and (2) law provides the concrete norms that
define compliance with internalized abstract norms.

1. Overcoming the Publicity Barrier: How
Law Signals a Consensus

The esteem model predicts that many in society may remain ig
norant of a consensus. Law can communicate to these individuals
the esteem consequences of their behavior.
The publicity barrier. The determinative obstacle to societal
norm formation is frequently the fact that a consensus is not well
known. Recall that one essential condition for an esteem-based
norm is the publicity of the consensus regarding the esteem worthi
ness of a behavior.206 Absent publicity, individuals will not per
ceive the consensus and it will not create the expected costs or
benefits to behavior necessary to produce a norm. When the group
at issue is very large - for example, the population of an entire
society - the publicity condition can be quite difficult to satisfy.
Obviously most individuals cannot directly poll even a large frac
tion of everyone else in society. Nor can one obtain through gossip
the immense quantity of data such opinions represent. Sometimes
people attempt to infer society's views from the relatively small
group of people they know. H the actual consensus is very strong,
then this technique will probably work. Suppose ninety-five per
cent of society believes that letting one's dog run unleashed or play
ing loud music in public is socially irresponsible behavior deserving
disapproval. No matter what an individual is inclined to believe,
with a consensus so strong, she is likely to realize that she en
counters many people who think such behaviors merit disapproval
for every individual who is indifferent or thinks they are worthy of
esteem.
H the consensus is weak, however, - say, only fifty-five percent
- then casual observation is not likely to detect it. The relatively
few people an individual knows will only rarely be statistically rep205. Robinson and Darley say that public debate "educates" the public and strengthens
the "shared public understanding." See id. at 472, 476. But they remain vague about exactly
how this occurs. One would not expect, for example, that losing the debate causes the oppo·
nents to change their minds.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 101-08.
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If people were no more likely to

underestimate than to overestimate the consensus - if the error
were randomly distributed - then the average belief would still
match the actual consensus . But the error is not random. People
tend to find reinforcement of their own views in the views of their
peers because they associate disproportionately with like-minded
individuals2os or they selectively interpret information to validate
their existing views.209 The result, according to psychologists, is
that people have an exaggerated sense of the typicality of their
views, a bias aptly named the "false consensus" effect.210 Thus, for
issues that closely divide society, it is entirely possible that those in
a large minority can easily believe that they are in a small majority.
When everyone in society can believe they are in the majority on an
issue, the desire for esteem will frequently produce only a weak
norm, if it produces any norm at all.
For example, if fifty-five percent of the population believes re
cycling is commendable and all of this group recycles, there may be
a weak recycling norm. But the norm is not likely to evolve and
strengthen in the ways described in Part II if those who oppose re
cycling believe they are in the majority. This group perceives a
lower esteem gain from recycling than actually exists and might

207. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, 80
PsYCHOL. REv. 237 (1973).
208. See BERNARD R. BEREISON ET AL., VOTING 83 (1954); R. ROBERT HUCKFELDT &
JoHN SPRAGUE, CmZENS, PoLmcs, AND SOCIAL COMMUNICATION: INFORMATION AND IN
FLUENCE IN AN ELECTION CAMPAIGN 46-50 (1995).
209. See THOMAS GILOVICH, How WE KNow WHAT ISN'T So: THE FALLIBILITY OF
HUMAN REASON IN EVERYDAY LIFE 49-72 (1991); DAVID PEARS, MOTIVATED IRRATIONAL
ITY 41-66 (1984); JoHN R. ZALLER, THE NATURE AND ORIGINS OF MAss OPINION (1992).
210. "The false consensus effect refers to the tendency for people's own beliefs, values,
and habits to bias their estimates of how widely such views and habits are shared by others."
GILOVICH, supra note 209, at 113. In one study, for example, university students were asked
if "they would be willing to walk around campus wearing a large sandwich-board sign bearing
the message 'REPENT."' Id. at 114 (describing L. Ross, et al., The False Consensus Effect:
An Egocentric Bias in Social Perception and Attribution Processes, 13 J. EXP. Soc. PSYCH. 279
(1977)). After stating their willingness or unwillingness, they were asked to estimate the
percentage of students who would agree to do the same. On average, "[t]hose who agreed to
wear the sign thought that 60% would do so," but "those who refused thought that only 27%
would agree
Id.
Psychologists attribute the false consensus effect to both cognitive error and motivational
bias. The cognitive error arises when one generalizes from personal experience, which is
based primarily on one's acquaintances and friends - people who tend to be disproportion
ately like oneself. See Steven J. Sherman et al., The False Consensus Effect in Estimates of
Smoking Prevalence, 9 PERSONALITY & Soc. PsYCHOL. BULL. 197, 198 (1983). The motiva
tional factor is that "[b]y distorting consensus in a way that makes one's own judgements and
behaviors appear relatively more common, one can feel that one's choices are valid, appro
priate, and reasonable." Id. See generally GILOVICH, supra note 209, at 112-22 (reviewing
psychology literature); Gary Marks, Thinking One's Abilities Are Unique and One's Opinions
Are Common, 10 PERSONALITY & Soc. PsYCHOL. BuLL. 203 (1984).
•

.
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even perceive that no esteem gain exists because they believe that a
sufficient number of their group regards recycling negatively - for
being a foolish or trendy waste of time - rather than neutrally.
Thus, the weak norm may remain in equilibrium. Even this out
come is optimistic. Imagine that some of the fifty-five percent who
believe recycling is commendable nonetheless fail to recycle - for
them the costs of recycling still outweigh the esteem benefits. Quite
possibly, then, there is no norm at all: most people do not recycle
despite a narrow consensus that such behavior merits esteem.
Given the relative values of esteem and costs of recycling, this re
sult could hold even when a strong norm would have emerged if
there were sufficient publicity of the existing consensus. In sum,
lack of publicity will often be a determinative obstacle to societal
norm formation.

Signaling a Consensus. Law can overcome this barrier.211 In a
democratic society, the process leading up to and including the en
actment of legislation can publicize the existence of a societal con
sensus. In the push for legislative action, an accurate counting of
opinion matters. Legislators care what their constituents think
about the conduct at issue. Their decision to enact or not to enact
legislation, as reported through the media, declares to the public a
winning side, usually consistent with what the electoral majority
wanted.212 Legislative conduct may thus provide unmistakable evi
dence of a consensus. Provided that the other two conditions for
norm formation are present (inherent risk of detection and aware
ness of that risk), publicizing that most people disapprove of a cer
tain behavior will create a new expected cost to acting in violation
of the (previously unknown) consensus.213 In short, legislation is a
211. I do not mean to imply that only law can publicize a consensus. Even in a pluralistic
or fragmented society, public education and mass media - including, at the simplest level,
news reports of polling data - will sometimes work to publicize an underlying consensus. In
a society with little or no written language, a ritualized song may provide the publicity neces
sary to create or enforce norms. See Geoffrey P. Miller, The Song of Deborah: A Legal
Economic Analysis, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2293, 2294 (1996) (claiming that the biblical Song of
Deborah was probably "an oral recordation, in a kind of intertribal account book, of how
different groups complied with a norm of mutual support" in a loose military alliance, and
that its poetic form aided memorization). My claim is only that all mechanisms are imperfect
and that in some contexts, law can significantly and suddenly increase awareness of a societal
consensus.
212.
213.

Caveats are noted below.

See infra text accompanying notes 214-16.

There is evidence that any publicity has this effect. Educational campaigns work to
change behavior even when the only information conveyed is social disapproval. For exam
ple, one study found that an antilittering campaign that sought to evoke shame and embar
rassment increased compliance with antilittering Jaws, though legal sanctions remained the
same. See Harold G. Grasmick et al., Shame and Embarrassment as Deterrents to Noncom·
pliance with the Law: The Case ofan Antilittering Campaign, 23 ENVT. & BEHAv. 233 (1991) .
Another series of studies found that merely reminding an individual of an antilittering norm
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signal of consensus. The signal may provide the missing ingredient
for norm formation.
Of course, legislation often fails to represent a consensus. In a
representative democracy, majority electoral support is neither a
necessary nor sufficient condition for enacting legislation.214 Cer
tainly the public perceives that "special interests" prevail all too
often, particularly in Congress. Further, the public learns of legisla
tive activity primarily through media; if the media does not suffi
ciently cover an enactment, the law will not publicize a consensus.
These complications and others mean that law only sometimes can
create or strengthen a norm. But that is precisely the point. The
expressive function of law does not always work, and the esteem
theory identifies the conditions under which it will When the me
dia widely covers a legislative battle and the public perceives that
the outcome is dictated largely by popularity,215 the resulting enact
ment provides convincing evidence of a societal consensus.216
When the condition of publicity is lacking, but the other norm con
ditions are present, lawmaking provides the jolt necessary to create
a new norm, or strengthen an old one. After signalling a consensus,
.

significantly decreased the amount of littering. See Robert B. Cialdini et al., A Focus Theory
of Normative Conduct, 24 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PsYCHOL. 201 (1991). In one of
these studies, when flyers were placed on cars, subjects were significantly less likely to toss
them on the ground when the flyer contained an antilittering message than when it contained
a pro-museum message. See id. at 216-17. In another study, subjects who saw a person pick
up a piece of refuse that was not her own and dispose of it properly were significantly less
likely to litter than were members of the control group. See id. at 222-23.
214. Given the number of nonvoters, majority electoral support need not represent a
majority consensus of adult Americans.
215. A majority opinion is not essential. See supra note 89. Intensity of preference also
matters to esteem. If only 40% oppose certain conduct, that could produce an esteem norm
if the 40% thought the conduct utterly abominable, while 55% were indifferent, and only 5%
weakly approved it. For this reason, the existence of legislative logrolling - where legisla
tors trade away votes on matters they care less about for votes on matters they care more
about - does not work against the publicity theory of law proposed here. The Jaw's passage
may represent a victory for a minority, but if the law demonstrates the preference intensities
of the sort just described, it could still provide the publicity needed for a new norm.
This point illustrates another reason why legislation serves as a powerful signal. Those in
the minority may dismiss polls if the polls do not measure intensity of belief concerning a
behavior. But when polls do report intensity along some scale, the complexity of the results
makes it difficult to determine the net effect of the behavior on the esteem one would re
ceive. Legislation is sensitive to intensity of opinion, but a legislative ban is not so difficult to
interpret. Legislation translates the complex poll into a simple directive.
216. Indeed, if "special interests" are associated with one side of a legislative struggle, a
victory against them sends a more powerful signal of consensus. Thus, antismoking legisla
tion may signal disapproval of smoking with particular clarity and intensity, because it is
perceived that the tobacco industry would have prevailed absent a strong consensus against
their interests.

404

Michigan Law Review

[Vol.

96:338

esteem competition may produce a norm through the mechanisms
described in Part n.211
Consider, for example, antismoking ordinances.21s The esteem
theory explains how these laws strengthened norms against public
smoking. At one time, American society rewarded cigarette smok
ing with a minor degree of status and tolerated smoking in virtually
any setting. Because smoking was regarded either positively or
neutrally by most Americans, few expressed objections to smoking
in public, and those who did appeared to be rudely insisting on an
idiosyncratic sensitivity. Over time, sentiment about public smok
ing changed, as fewer people smoked219 and more people came to
view smokers as unhappy addicts and to consider second-hand
smoke dangerous.220 At some point, a majority of the population
came to disapprove of smoking in certain public places.221
For antismoking norms to arise, however, individuals had to rec
ognize this shift in attitudes. Quite likely, because the shift was
217. Where cases or statutes are not well suited to publicize a consensus, however, there
is little weight to criticisms or defenses of the Jaw based on what it may mean to people. For
this reason, some arguments about the symbolic effects of Jaw are overstated. The signal sent
by state actors using peremptory challenges based on gender, for example, is more ambigu
ous than claimed in J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 140-142 (1994). In J.E.B., the majority
of the Court, in holding such peremptories unconstitutional, said they would send a
"message" "ratify[ing] and reinforc[ing]" gender stereotypes. Whatever the merits of the
ruling, this particular claim is questionable given that most of the public is never aware of the
details of jury selection and most courtroom observers probably cannot distinguish between
the exercise of for-cause and peremptory challenges. Even if people recognize that a state
lawyer is using a peremptory challenge in this manner, there is no reason to assume that they
will view this individual's conduct as new evidence of a consensus approving gender stereo
types. At least, the basis for such an inference is far weaker than when a legislature acts.
There are arguments in response to each of these claims, and other arguments in support
ofJ.E.B. My point is simply that not all symbolic arguments are equal and the esteem theory
helps to distinguish weak from strong claims. Contrast, for example, the unambiguous sym
bolism reviewed in United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (holding unconstitutional
state support of male-only military school), and Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,
458 U.S. 718 (1982) (holding unconstitutional state support of female-only nursing school).
Excluding one gender from training for a role traditionally occupied by the other is very
likely to publicize gender stereotypes and support related norms because the entry require
ments for public schools are well known.
218.
Cooter,

Smoking norms are much discussed of late. See Bernstein, supra note 26, at
Sunstein, supra note 34, at 2034-35.

supra note 14, at 1674-75;

175-77;

219. The percentage of Americans who smoke fell from 42% in 1955 to 26% in 1991. See
Smoked Out, ECONOMIST, Mar. 26, 1994, at 29, 29.
220. See generally SMOKING PouCY: LAW, PoLmcs, AND CULTURE (Robert L. Rabin &
Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 1993).
221. According to a Bureau of National Affairs Study, the percentage of businesses ban
ning indoor smoking on the job rose from 2% in 1986 to 34% in 1993. See Smoked Out,
supra note 219, at 30. In February 1993, McDonald's began prohibiting smoking at all of its
1400 wholly owned restaurants; by March, one-third of its 7700 franchises and several com
petitors had followed suit. See id. at 29. The proportion of Americans supporting a total ban
on smoking indoors doubled from 1983 to 1993, when the number reached 35%. See id. at
29.
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gradual, smokers did not detect the new consensus when it first
arose. Particularly for those who began the habit when it was
widely accepted, only compelling evidence of attitude change would
convince them of the new consensus.222 Of course, if individuals in
the new majority consistently confronted public smokers with their
complaints, their large numbers would provide the necessary evi
dence. But even nonsmokers who were part of the new consensus
may have remained uncertain of how third parties would perceive
their request that someone stop engaging in a still common, and
commonly tolerated, behavior. Before the new consensus was pub
licized, the first to speak out against the old consensus risked cen
sure. Th.us, even after the consensus changed, absent publicity,
smokers perceived no esteem loss from public smoking and third
parties continued to interpret requests to stop as rude.
With this background, we can understand how antismoking laws
worked.223 Local and state legislative victories - especially against
a well-financed tobacco lobby - signalled a new consensus: that
cigarette smoke is annoying and dangerous, and exposing others to
smoke is offensive and antisocial. Legislation provides the kind of
compelling, if not jarring, evidence of attitude change that is diffi
cult for the smoker to ignore. The next time a person in a public
area asks a smoker to desist, the smoker is far more likely to infer
that strangers around her will disapprove of her refusal and not of
the nonsmoker's request.

Conversely, because nonsmokers are

likely to make the same assessment, they are more likely to make
such requests. Over time, smokers will predict that smoking in pub
lic is so likely to lead to an objection that they do not even test the
issue. Initially, the effect might be limited, but as more smokers
comply with requests to stop smoking and as more smokers comply
without a request, those who persist in smoking receive a greater
share of the disapproval, making it increasingly costly to hold out.
To some degree - I would guess a substantial one - the law is
self-enforcing.224 Or, more precisely, the law strengthens a norm to
the point where most of the enforcement is informal.

222. Smokers would likely interpret the evidence they encountered (complaints) as being
consistent with their current beliefs that complainers are hypersensitive or rude, especially
for those who disproportionately associated with other smokers or with nonsmokers of the
same generation.
223. They do work, largely without legal enforcement. See Robert A. Kagan & Jerome
H. Skolnick, Banning Smoking: Compliance Without Enforcement, in SMOKING POLICY,
supra note 220, at 69, 71-76.
224. Kagan and Skolnick make this point, at least as applied to nonsmokers:
[F]orrnal rules serve an important communication function, overcoming the familiar
problem of pluralistic ignorance and inaction. Even if, in 1983, most nonsmokers (and
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The esteem theory thus explains at least part of the expressive
function of law. Not surprisingly perhaps, other norms scholars, in
cluding Cooter, use the smoking example, also to suggest that antis
moking laws work informally to deter public smoking even without
state enforcement. Yet Cooter's theory does not really explain this
result. He observes:
Officials almost never enforce these rules [against smoking in public
buildings.] The posting of the ordinances, however, apparently causes
citizens to enforce the rules against violators. Knowing this, most
smokers conform to the rules. . . . [E]nactment of the anti-smoking
ordinance lowered the perceived cost of confrontation in complaining
to smokers, which . . . caused the system to tip into a new equilibrium
with a higher level of conformity.225

Even as Cooter describes it, the role of internalization in this
change is unclear or nonexistent. First, there was nothing like a
unanimous consensus of opinion or expression of opinion about
public smoking before or immediately after enactment of the laws
he discusses, so the example does not easily fit within his theory of
the internalization process.226 Even if there had been such consen
sus, it remains unclear in his account why a change in the law is also
necessary, or even helpful, to bring about internalization.227 Fi
nally, Cooter does not answer the fundamental question of why
complaining is a cost, or at least why it is sufficiently costly that,
absent a statute, those who do not wish to be exposed to second
hand smoke would not complain.
many smokers) favored restrictions on smoking in the workplace . . . individual non
smokers may not have realized the extent of support for such rules, and hence may not
have felt emboldened to complain directly to smokers. The enactment of ordinances
and workplace rules told nonsmokers that they had a right to breath air that was free of
smoke.
Id. at 86.
225. Cooter, supra note 14, at 1674-75. His other example concerns a "pooper-scooper"
law requiring dog owners to clean up after their dogs. "Enactment of the law clarified vague
social norms concerning courtesy. After the law's passage, people became more aggressive
about enforcing what common courtesy demands. Apparently it is easier to say 'Obey the
law' than to say 'Don't be so rude."' Id. at 1675. As explained in the text, however, the
crucial change is not merely being able to say "obey the law," but that the change in law
makes it easier to say "don't be so rude."
226. See Cooter, Structural Adjudication, supra note 72, at 224 {claiming that internaliza
tion follows "unanimous endorsement" of a particular bahavior). Perhaps he imagines a uni
versal consensus just among nonsmokers: nonsmokers became more willing to bear costs to
enforce the norm, and with more of them enforcing the norm, the per-person enforcement
costs fell. But there was not a universal consensus even among nonsmokers before the non
smoking ordinances became common. See Kagan & Skolnick, supra note 223, at 82 (report
ing that in 1985, 85% of nonsmokers and 62% of smokers agreed that smokers should
"refrain from smoking in the presence of nonsmokers").
227. Nor is it clear why some statutes seem more effective than others at producing non·
legal enforcement.
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The esteem theory helps to explain Cooter's example. The cost
of complaining is an esteem cost - one cares how the recipient of
the complaint and third parties are likely to react. The lack of a
universal consensus is precisely why the statute is helpful in produc
ing the norm: without an ordinance, the consensus was sufficiently
weak that people were in doubt as to its existence. The change in
law did not immediately cause internalization, but it did immedi
ately reveal the true nature of the consensus, signaling the negative
esteem consequences of public smoking. Because the ordinance in
forms those inclined to complain how most people view the matter,
the esteem costs of complaining are lower.
2.

Using Law to Evoke Guilt: Tapping into Abstract Norms

Publicizing a consensus will not, by itself, cause individuals to
feel guilt from violating the law. Yet Robinson and Darley are
surely right that criminal law sometimes causes people to feel guilt
from violating obligations they had not internalized prior to enact
ment of the law.228 Does the esteem theory explain how law can
produce this motive for compliance? I believe so. If the law pub
licizes a consensus that certain behavior is required in order to com
ply with an abstract internalized norm, then violating the concrete
(legal and esteem-based) obligation will produce guilt.
As an example, consider legislation requiring parents to use
child safety seats when transporting children in automobiles.229
One may reasonably doubt that these laws induce private, informal
enforcement as the smoking bans do. The persons who gain from
parental compliance with the legislation - young children - are
not likely to complain more because the state passes a law.230 The
expressive function can still work, though in a different way. Recall
my claim that violation of noninternalized norms may elicit guilt if
those norms give substantive meaning to abstract, internalized obli
gations.231 One social role many in our society internalize is that of

228. They claim that criminal law, if morally credible, causes individuals to internalize the
law ·•at the borderline of criminal activity, where there may be some ambiguity as to whether
the conduct really is wrong." Robinson & Darley, supra note 26, at 475-76. They give exam
ples such as insider trading, drunk driving, and exceeding the speed limit. See id. at 476. The
claim is that individuals defer to law's judgment that these behaviors are immoral.
229. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 27360 (Deering 1996), amended by Act of July 28, 1997,
ch. 153, 1997 Cal. Legis. Serv. 153 (West); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.613 (West 1996); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 61-9-420 (1995), amendea by Act of April 29, 1997, ch. 431, 1997 Mont. Laws

431.
230. Moreover, whereas public smoking is observable to many third parties, most of
whom also may be adversely affected by the smoke, a significantly fewer number of people
will notice or care much about other parents' compliance with child safety seat legislation.
231. See supra text accompanying note 158.
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"parent"; many feel guilt if they believe they fail to be a "good"
mother or father. Like most abstract norms, the vagueness of these
obligations makes them easily internalized but provides little con
crete behavioral guidance. Yet concrete esteem norms give many
meanings to this obligation: in some communities, the consensus
dictates that a "good parent" reads to his or her children, teaches
them table manners, takes them to church, and provides them with
a "safe environment."

If this account is correct, then the expressive function of law can
work to define further the roles that are enforced by guilt. A law
obligating the use of child safety devices expresses a new consensus
that the absence of such devices exposes a child to unacceptably
high risks contrary to minimally acceptable parental behavior. The
vagueness of the internalized obligation generally allows parents
great flexibility to rationalize their behavior as consistent with their
obligations. �ut when society announces its belief that a concrete
behavior is required of parents, rationalization becomes more diffi
cult.232 If one accepts that being a good parent requires something,
then it is difficult to resist the (apparently) informed judgment of
others about what child safety requires, at least when one is not
independently knowledgeable of the precise risks involved. Thus,
the law expresses a consensus and creates an esteem-based norm
defining good parental behavior. For some parents, complying with
the law is then necessary to avoid guilt.233 Even absent external,
informal enforcement, the law can elicit internal enforcement.234
232. Still, if one believes that the legislature frequently errs or that the manufacturers of
child safety seats simply lobbied effectively against an apathetic and poorly informed major
ity, then one might still rationalize noncompliance with parental obligation. Even so, the law
then has made rationalization more complex and, for many parents, more difficult.
233. Consider a thought experiment: An automobile kills a child who was not wearing a
safety seat in circumstances where the device probably would have prevented death. You
were the parent/driver. You were completely without fault in causing the accident. Would
you not expect your sense of guilt over this event to be greater if a recent law had obligated
you to use a safety seat? Tue enactment of such a Jaw may prompt some parents to consider
the same morbid thought experiment on their own and to decide to comply so that if the
worst of events should occur, they will have some peace of mind that they did what they
could to prevent it.
234. The examples in this section all involve the expressive effect of a new legislative
prohibition or proscription. Legislative tinkering with existing statutes - enactments com
mitting new resources to the investigation of violations, raising sanctions, or expanding the
scope of the prohibition or proscription - may also regulate norms. These changes may
signal that the consensus has strengthened, that the approval or disapproval of the regulated
conduct is broader or deeper than when the legislature originally acted. Reforms of drunk
driving Jaws, for example, might exploit the expressive function; even if higher maximum
penalties do not raise the average prison sentence, they might signal stronger disapproval of
the activity. See Grasmick et al., supra note 114, at 61-62.
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Norm Efficiency and the Problem of Excessive Conformity

Economic theorists explicitly debate the likely efficiency of
norms.235 Robert Ellickson defends the thesis that group norms
tend to maximize the welfare of the group in which they arise.236
Similarly, Cooter claims that norms arise when there is a unani
mous signal of consensus as to the appropriate behavior, which typ
ically occurs only when a behavior benefits the group as a whole.237
Both theorists note several qualifications to their claim - for ex
ample, that group norms may benefit the group by harming those
outside the group - but both are fairly optimistic about norms.238
Other theorists are less sanguine. Russell Hardin, for example,
claims that the most common and powerful group norms are norms
of "exclusion," the very norms that benefit the group at the expense
of those excluded.239 Eric Posner bases his skepticism about norm
efficiency on the pervasive problems of information and strategic
behavior that sometimes cause market failure.240

235. See generally Posner, supra note 102. By efficiency, the literature sometimes means
Pareto Optimality because the norm makes some or all in the group better off and no one
worse off. See PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILUAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 966 (13th ed.
1989). Even though everyone may prefer to be allowed to violate the norm while everyone
else obeys it, no one prefers not having the norm and many prefer having it. But whenever
the norm imposes net costs on some individuals, the efficiency claim is then - explicitly or
implicitly - based on the more controversial Kaldor-Hicks criteria - that those who benefit
from the norm gain sufficiently that they could, although they need not, compensate those
who lose from it, when the benefits and losses are measured by willingness-to-pay. See
Eorrn STOKEY & RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 279-80 (1978).
Obviously, one can use other moral theories to evaluate particular norms. I use Kaldor
Hicks efficiency criteria as a rough measure of utility maximization, but with the caveat that
in some contexts, wealth disparities render willingness-to-pay an inaccurate guide to utility.
236. "[M]embers of a close-knit group develop and maintain norms whose content serves
to maximize the aggregate welfare that members obtain in their workaday affairs with one
another." ELLICKSON, supra note 3, at 167.
237. See Cooter, Structural Adjudication, supra note 72, at 224.
238. James Coleman's thesis is similar. See COLEMAN, supra note 2, at 249-58.
239. See HARDIN, supra note 2, at 107. Exclusionary norms define the boundaries of the
group.
240. See Posner, supra note 102, at 1711-25. See also Michael Klausner, Corporations,
Corporate Law, and Networks ofContracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757 (1995) (using the concept of a
network extemality to show how commercial norms may be suboptimal); Lewis A.
Kornhauser, Are There Cracks in the Foundations of Spontaneous Order?, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV.
647 (1992) (reviewing ROBERT c. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SET
TLE DISPUTES (1991)) (criticizing Ellickson's claim that norms tend to promote group wel
fare). In addition, David Chamy observes that when norms arise from centralized processes
within formal organizations - such as industry-wide trade associations - they are likely to
be plagued by the inefficiencies that public choice theory attributes to legislative rulemaking.
See Chamy, supra note 16, at 1848. In the end, however, Chamy says that he is
skeptical that economic analysis can generate, through notions such as 'efficiency,' a
useful set of social judgments about norms. There are simply too many unobservable
variables, particularly those that bear on the 'noneconomic' motivations and preferences
that must play a role in the start-up and the effectiveness of complex sanctioning
systems.
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Though the esteem model by no means resolves the debate over
norm efficiency, it sheds some light on the subject, providing addi
tional reasons for pessimism. In this section, I briefly summarize
what existing· efficiency analysis predicts about esteem norms and
then identify two reasons that the drive for esteem uniquely pro
duces certain kinds of inefficient norms. At either a group or socie
tal level, esteem competition can produce both unnecessary "nosy"
norms and excessive levels of conformity.
Initially, one might expect esteem norms to exist only when they
benefit the population in which they arise. The first condition for
an esteem-based norm is a consensus that some behavior merits es
teem or disesteem. Section 11.A.2 identified reasons why individu
als would tend to reach a consensus that served their own general
ends: selfish esteem allocation, voice, and exit.241 Selfish esteem al
location means individuals tend to esteem people for acts that bene
fit them more than for acts that harm them. Thus, if a behavior has
either beneficial or harmful externalities, and each individual recog
nizes this fact, the resulting esteem allocation - rewarding behav
ior with positive externalities and punishing behavior with negative
externalities - will produce norms that benefit the whole.242 Voice
merely adds the fact that individuals do not make esteem decisions
in a vacuum but rather discuss the esteem worthiness of behavior
with others. Thus, one individual's recognition of the relevant ex
ternalities may be communicated to others. Finally, exit may favor
efficient norms: if individuals can leave unsuccessful groups or soci
eties, then evolutionary pressures will reward groups or societies
with efficient norms.243
Each of these mechanisms, however, is subject to significant lim
itations. First, selfish esteem allocation will produce efficient norms
only if individuals correctly perceive the external costs or benefits
of a particular behavior. Others have observed that informational
problems will sometimes prevent this understanding and produce
inefficient norms.244 Second, though voice or discussion allows indi
viduals to pool their information and insight, the result could be a
Charny, supra note

16, at 1857-58.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 90-96.
242. See COLEMAN, supra note 2, at 249-58; Pettit, supra note 2, at 744.
243. In evolutionary tenns, groups are hosts for competing nonns. The number of groups

using a nonn and the size of those groups increase as long as the nonn provides the group a
return that exceeds the average for nearby groups. Individuals in groups with below-average
returns exit their group to join groups with above-average returns or to fonn new groups
emulating those with above-average returns. See Axelrod, supra note 2, at 1097-98.

244. See Posner, supra note 102, at 1711-13. Though people need not consciously per
ceive the technical dynamics of a collective action problem, if they fail to recognize the ad-
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worse decision rather than a better one.245 When disagreement
arises, there is no guarantee that the individual with the better
grasp of the situation will be the one whom others find persua
sive.246 Third, evolutionary pressures are subject to a host of
problems, the most significant of which is that they work to achieve
only local and not global maxima.247
vantage of cooperation, they will not produce a norm that solves it. They also may perceive a
problem where none exists and produce an unnecessary and inefficient norm.
245. See, e.g., IRVING L. JANIS, GRoUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF PouCY DE
CISIONS AND FIASCOES 9 (1983) (claiming that the desire for agreement within cohesive
groups can override judgment and cause bad decisions); Posner, supra note 102, at 1713-19
(discussing strategic problems that arise regarding norms when individuals in a group have
different interests in the behavior at issue).
246. There is a political model that addresses the question of whether groups make better
or worse decisions than individuals. Condorcet's Jury Theorem predicts that "under certain
conditions a majority of a group, with limited information about a pair of alternatives, is
more likely to choose the 'better' alternative than any one member of the group." Krishna
K. Ladha, The Condorcet Jury Theorem, Free Speech, and Correlated Votes, 36 AM. J. Poi_
ScI. 617, 617 (1992). Condorcet meant the theorem as a defense of democratic decisionmak
ing; recent work attempts to determine whether the conditions under which it holds apply to
legislatures. One could ask the same question about the processes producing norms.
The theorem's conditions are as follows: Assume that (1) a group is choosing between
two alternatives; (2) one alternative is unambiguously better for every member of the group
than the other; (3) no member knows with certainty which is the better alternative; (4) the
probability of a member voting for the better alternative is statistically independent of the
votes of other members; and (5) for each member, the probability of voting for the correct
alternative is greater than 50%. Under these circumstances, the probability that the majority
picks the correct alternative is larger than the probability that any one member picks the
correct alternative and approaches certainty as the size of the majority gets large. The point
is entirely statistical: If a weighted coin lands heads with a probability of 51 % and is flipped
an odd number of times, then the probability that the majority outcome is heads is greater
than 51 %. Similarly, if the probability that a given individual is correct is 51 %, and the
majority exceeds the minority by 20 votes, the probability the majority is correct is 69%. See
lain McLean & Fiona Hewitt, Introduction, in CONDORCET. FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL
CHOICE AND POUTICAL THEORY 3, 36 (Iain McLean & Fiona Hewitt eds., 1994).
Under an esteem theory, norms arise as the result of many individual decisions to favor a
particular rule. In a sense, individuals (initially) "vote" for a norm. Thus, with imperfect
information, if the average individual has a better-than-even chance of making the correct
choice, the resulting norm is even more likely to be efficient. This result complicates the
claim that imperfect information impedes the creation of efficient norms. Even so, the impli
cations for efficiency are not genuinely optimistic. There are many restrictions on the theo
rem, and these limits explain why norms might be inefficient. For example, the theorem
assumes that the choice is between only two alternatives and that, with perfect knowledge,
everyone would prefer the same alternative. The theorem also assumes that individual votes
are statistically independent. If votes instead are correlated, so that one voter tends to be
correct when the others are correct and wrong when the others are wrong, then the theo
rem's conclusions do not hold. "Votes" regarding norms are likely to be highly correlated,
especially within small groups. Because norm "votes" are public, the esteem theory suggests
that once a particular outcome seems probable, people may vote that way to avoid disap
proval from what they expect will be a majority.
247. If the first steps toward the efficient norm (a "global maximum") cause a decline in
group welfare, then the groups making such a change may be abandoned before they reach
the point of increasing returns. See Cooter, supra note 14, at 1687-88. Similarly, for some
norms, efficiency will depend greatly on how many people in a group or society follow the
norm rule; in such cases, there will be no advantage to incremental adoption of the efficient
norm and no reason to suppose that a decentralized process will induce a sufficient number
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Regardless of the outcome of this analysis, the esteem model
predicts two new and specific ways in which norms will be ineffi
cient. Esteem competition will sometimes produce norms that are
entirely unnecessary and will sometimes produce a level of norm
compliance that is excessive. One of the virtues of the esteem
model of norms is that it predicts some of the inefficient norm
based behaviors that are otherwise difficult to explain.

1.

Unnecessary Norms: The Problem of Needless Conformity

Collective action problems arise because of a gap between the
behavior that maximizes an individual's welfare and the behavior
that maximizes the group's welfare.248 Norms engage rational
choice theorists because they offer potential solutions to such
problems. When the gap occurs, norms may add incentives that
cause individual self interest to align with group interest. Given this
framework, the efficiency debate tends to focus on two issues: (1)
how often norms actually make this alignment occur, given infor
mational and strategic problems, and (2) whether society wants the
group to achieve the alignment, given that group welfare and social
welfare may also not align. Largely omitted from this debate is the
possibility that norms arise when there never was any gap - when
there is no collective action problem to solve, either well or badly.
The existing debate ignores the danger of simply unnecessary
norms.249

If esteem competition is the source of norms, norms will not
arise only because a group "needs" them. People are opinionated.
They tend to think well or badly of others for all sorts of reasons.
All kinds of judgments can produce a norm. When the norm does
not arise to solve a collective action problem, the norms are neces
sarily inefficient because the costs incurred in obeying and enforc
ing such norms produce no social benefit. Two examples will help
make the point.
to adopt the rule all at once. See Klausner, supra note 240, at 774-88; see also Kraus, supra
note 27, at 392408 (explaining how evolutionary pressures create commercial nonns that are
often better than individual learning but still suboptimal); Posner, supra note 102, at 1707-10,
1723-24 (discussing reasons why evolutionary processes may not achieve efficiency).

248. See supra note 25.
249. Coleman's analysis

seems to foreclose completely this possibility, because he de
scribes nonns as arising only when "demanded" by the need to control externalities. Cole
man says nonns arise when the positive or negati"'.e "externalities of an action . . . cannot be
overcome by simple transactions that would put control of the action in the hands of those
experiencing the externalities." COLEMAN, supra note 2, at 251, 249-60 (discussing "The First
Condition: Externalities of Actions and the Demand for a Nonn").

413

Norms

November 1997)

First, an individual will frequently approve of those who obtain
the sort of ends that she seeks. If people who seek material wealth
grant esteem according to how much material wealth others accu
mulate, the resulting norms may be inefficient.250 Imagine a world
where the market works smoothly to supply individuals with opti
mal incentives for behavior; material benefits induce individuals to
work at the efficient level.

A consensus that pecuniary success mer

its esteem may produce norms obligating individuals to reach the
prevailing standard of wealth; the group shames those who fail to
achieve the standard and honors those who earn higher amounts.
Because the market was previously efficient, this norm is needless
and inefficient. To earn honor and avoid shame, individuals now
work more. Their greater sacrifice of leisure is wasted because:

(1)

the material incentives had previously induced the efficient level of
work, and

(2) additional income only raises the average standard of

living, thus ensuring that the esteem benefits for new pecuniary suc
cesses are matched by esteem losses for new pecuniary failures.251

A

more general example involves

other-regarding

preferences.

While a person's preference for her own consumption is self-regard

ing,

a preference is

other-regarding

when it is directed toward the

consumption decisions of another.252 Though economic theorists
frequently discuss only the self-regarding preferences at issue in a
given context, nothing in the efficiency criteria requires discounting
other-regarding preferences.253 Many believe, however, that the
former preferences tend to be stronger than the latter. When this is

250. See generally ROBERT FRANK, CHOOSING TiiE RIGHT PoND (1985); THORSTEIN VEB
OF TiiE LEISURE CLASS (1899).
251. See McAdams, supra note 78, at 48-59. A crucial feature of this example is that the
esteemed trait is valued only in relative terms. There is no esteem given to one who earns a
$50,000 income except according to how that income compares to the average.
252. Of course, another's consumption may interfere with one's own consumption, as
when two children fight over the last cookie. A preference is not other-regarding unless it
necessarily concerns the consumption of others. As I have commented elsewhere:
A person's desire to dnve at high speeds and not to eat broccoli are self-regarding pref
erences because the preference may be satisfied without any other individual engaging
in an act of consumption. Conversely, the preference that others avoid reading Madame
Bovary or that others eat sufficient food to live are necessarily not satisfied unless other
people engage or refrain from engaging in certain consumptive activities.
McAdams, supra note 78, at 7-8; cf. Robert A. Pollak, Interdependent Preferences, 66 AM.
EcoN. REV. 309, 309 (1976) (asserting that "interdependent preferences" are "preferences
which depend on other people's consumption").
253. For example, Calabresi and Melamed imagine that "moralisms" - their term for
certain other-regarding preferences - could justify legal rules of inalienability, like a ban on
selling human kidneys. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liabil
ity Rules, and Inalienability: One View ofthe Cathedra� 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089, 1112 (1972);
see also Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory ofProperty Rights, 85 CoLUM.
L. REV. 931, 937-49, 959-65 (1985).
LEN, THE THEORY
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true, and when self- and other-regarding preferences are mutually
exclusive, satisfying the latter would clearly be inefficient. For this
reason, economists often object to state-enforced prohibitions that
they perceive as nothing more than an electoral majority imposing
its other-regarding preferences on an electoral minority. Examples
include bans on interracial marriage or sodomy. The problem the
esteem model identifies is that, even without state enforcement, ma
jorities may impose their other-regarding preferences on minorities
through norms, even when doing so is not efficient.254
To illustrate, suppose that in a close-knit neighborhood com
posed of 100 adults, each adult has some set of consistent self
regarding and other-regarding preferences. By consistent I mean
that, for some behavior, what they prefer for themselves, they pre
fer for others.255 Thus, eighty neighbors prefer not to date mem
bers of other races and also prefer that others not date members of
a different race; eighty prefer that in their own marriage, or mar
riage-to-be, the woman takes the man's surname and also believe
that married women generally should do so; and eighty prefer not
to eat meat and prefer that others not do so. In each case, the re
maining twenty have contrary preferences: they desire interracial
dates and prefer that others are so inclined; they prefer that the
woman in their marriage keep her surname and that married
women generally do so; they eat meat and prefer that others are
carnivorous. Finally, assume that each person's preference con
cerning her own consumption is so strong compared to her prefer
ences for the consumption of others that the efficient outcome is for
all individuals to "suit themselves." That would be the case, for
example, with the following values:256 (1) each person would pay
$100 to satisfy her self-regarding preference for dating, naming, or
diet; (2) each person would pay one dollar to satisfy her other
regarding preference on these matters, by inducing one neighbor to
behave in accord with it. Thus, if transaction costs were zero, the
254. The mere fact that a norm enforces other-regarding preferences does not mean it
must be inefficient. It is possible that satisfying the majority's strong other-regarding prefer
ences by deterring the minority from satisfying its weak self-regarding preferences produces
an efficiency gain.
255. The point made here does not depend upon everyone having such consistent prefer
ences. Even if only some of the majority who prefer X for themselves also prefer X for
others, they may impose their other-regarding preferences if their population is still larger
than the minority and the other conditions exist. But I make the textual example numerically
simpler with the consistency assumption.
256. Here is a good point to note again that I use Kaldor-Hicks efficiency as a rough
guide to utility, which would probably be accurate in this context if these neighbors have
more or less equal wealth.
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most any person would be offered to refrain from satisfying her self
regarding preference is eighty dollars - the amount the eighty in
the majority would offer to one in the minority - too little to in
duce any of the minority to forego interracial dating or meat, or to
enter a marriage where the woman took the man's surname.
In these situations, there is no need for a norm, yet norms can
arise. Consider interracial dating. Given selfish esteem allocation
and the majority's other-regarding preference, the majority will
likely esteem those who date only their own race over those who
date interracially. There is only a short step between most people
preferring that others behave a certain way and a consensus that
such behavior merits esteem.257 Assume that this consensus is
made public through gossip and that everyone knows it is very
probable that neighbors will, without bearing monitoring costs for
that purpose, detect whether others date interracially. Even though
the eighty-person majority is willing to pay no more than eighty
dollars to change the behavior of any member of the twenty-person
minority, the esteem comp�tition may give the majority greater lev
erage. If each neighbor values the disesteem created by violating
the other-regarding preferences of one neighbor at, say, $1.50, then
losing the esteem of eighty neighbors is a $120 cost, more than
enough to induce a neighbor to forgo satisfying a preference she
values at $100, given a detection risk of over eighty-three percent.
Even if the only sanction is disesteem, the norm may be sufficient
to obligate neighbors to forego interracial dating. The minority
then conforms to the majority's other-regarding preference,
although the minority loses $2,000 and the majority gains only
$1,600.258 Thus, the group is better off without this "nosy" norm
than with it.259
257. But there is a step, because it is possible that a group has norms of tolerance pre
cisely to avoid turning other-regarding preferences into binding norms. See supra text ac
companying note 194.
258. Each of the 80 in the majority gains $20 from having each of the 20 in the minority
comply, while each of the twenty loses $100 from compliance. Thus, the group would benefit
if some obstacle blocked the conditions for creating this norm - including a contrary norm
of tolerance, discussed infra text accompanying note 265. Of course, the minority receives a
$2,400 esteem benefit by complying with the norm, but this comes entirely from avoiding a
threat of disesteem that would not exist in the absence of the norm.
259. Katz provides an entirely different reason to expect needless conformity. See Katz,
supra note 97, at 1750-51. An individual may generally signal how constrained she is by
social norms - in my terms, how much she values esteem - by visibly conforming with any
particular norm. Thus, she may conform to a norm where compliance is highly visible in
order to signal that she is also likely to conform to norms where compliance is less visible. At
Katz puts it, individuals may obey a norm "they do not respect" in order to signal conformity
with norms "they do [respect]." See id. at 1751. One might add that group norms may arise
exactly for this reason, as a test for determining whether each individual sufficiently values

416

Michigan Law Review

[Vol.

96:338

The same dynamic can also produce a nosy naming norm and a
nosy diet norm in this neighborhood. In general, norms may im
pose needless conformity when a majority turns its weak other
regarding preferences into social obligations.260 The majority gains
little from changing the minority behavior and not enough to offset
the minority's loss, but selfish esteem allocation still produces the
norm because esteem provides them a "free" resource for inducing
conformity. The resulting norms are unnecessary and inefficient.
Note that the majorities do not necessarily consist of the same
individuals for each behavior. Thus, with a sufficient number of
overlapping nosy norms, everyone may be in the minority on some
issue and there may be no one in the neighborhood completely free
from such constraints. Indeed, strictly speaking, a majority is not
even necessary to create a norm because of the differing value
placed on the esteem of different individuals.261 The opinion of
those who are highly esteemed tends to be valued more than the
opinion of those who receive low esteem. Thus, high-status individ
uals will have relatively more influence on the creation of new
norms. If wealth is generally respected, for example, the wealthy
will have disproportionate power in creating norms, including nosy
norms. This fact may help explain norms that apply to and burden
women for the benefit of men. Though men do not constitute a
numerical majority, they are a very large minority that possesses
disproportionate wealth and other indicia of status.262
The above examples of nosy norms are controversial ones in the
1990s, but the analysis applies to behaviors that may seem rather
trivial - whether one prefers bowling or chess, short hair or long,
wood :floors or carpet, and so on. If the dynamic identified occurs
over a wide range of behaviors, the accumulation of trivial conthe esteem of fellow group members. See Laurence R. Iannaccone, Sacrifice and Stigma:
Reducing Free-Riding in Cults, Communes, and Other Collectives, 100 J. POL. ECON. 271, 27476 (1992). But it is not clear that this kind of conformity is inefficient. If a visible test reliably
predicts compliance with a norm for which violations are more difficult to detect, and the
latter norm benefits the $roup, then the group may be better off having the former norm.
260. Note that the problem is entirely one of differing interests in the norm and not lack
of information; the norm arises in the above examples even with perfect information.

261. A majority consensus is not strictly necessary for a second reason: differing intensi
ties of disapproval. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
262. Recall that the origin of these norms cannot be explained by Cooter's internalization
model. See supra text accompanying notes 140-43. Of course, the esteem theory does not
explain how men initially acquired greater status. The historical explanation is beyond the
scope of this article, though it undoubtedly includes historic restrictions that prevented
women from acquiring wealth or political power. My point, however, is that once the dispar
ity in status arises, disapproval from men is more costly (to men and women) than disap
proval from women. At this point, selfish esteem allocation is sufficient to produce norms
obligating women to behave in ways that benefit men.
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straints could produce a very restrictive and seriously inefficient set
of nosy norms. This implication explains the complaint that some
societies are too "conformist."263 For example, John Stuart Mill,
though remembered chiefly as a critic of governmental interference
with liberty, recognized an equal threat to liberty from public opin
ion and custom, in other words, from norms:
Like other tyrannies, the tyranny of the majority was at first, and is
still vulgarly, held in dread, chiefly as operating through the acts of
the public authorities. But reflecting persons perceived that when so
ciety is itself the tyrant - society collectively over the separate indi
viduals who compose it - its means of tyrannizing are not restricted
to the acts which it may do by the hands of its political functionaries.
Society can and does execute its own mandates; and if it issues wrong
mandates instead of right, or any mandates at all in things with which
it ought not to meddle, it practices a social tyranny more formidable
than many kinds of political oppression, since, though not usually up
held by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, pene
trating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the
soul itself. Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate
is not enough; there needs protection also against the tyranny of the
prevailing opinion and feeling, against the tendency of society to im
pose, by other mean� than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices
as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them . . . . [That pro
tection] is as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs as
protection against political despotism.264

is not entirely clear what "protection" Mill had in mind, but
he certainly meant to include norms of tolerance. In the United
States, norms of individuality, among other things, advocate toler
ance of individual differences. These norms may be understood as
a check on the tendency of nosy norms to impose needless conIt

263. As John Stuart Mill noted:
In our times, from the highest class of society down to the lowest, everyone lives as
under the eye of a hostile and dreaded censorship. Not only in what concerns others,
but in what concerns only themselves, the individual or the family do not ask themselves,
what do I prefer? or, what would suit my character and disposition? or, what would
allow the best and highest in me to have fair play and enable it to grow and thrive? They
ask themselves, what is suitable to my position? what is usually done by persons of my
station and pecuniary circumstances? or (worse still) what is usually done by persons of
a station and circumstances superior to mine? I do not mean that they choose what is
customary in preference to what suits their own inclination. It does not occur to them to
have any inclination except for what is customary. Thus the mind itself is bowed to the
yoke: even in what people do for pleasure, conformity is the first thing thought of; they
like in crowds; they exercise choice only among things commonly done; peculiarity of
taste, eccentricity of conduct are shunned equally with crimes, until by dint of not fol
lowing their nature they have no nature to follow
JoHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 58 (Hacket Publishing 1978).
264. Id. at 4-5. Thus, when Mill states his principle of liberty - that prevention of harm
to others is the only legitimate reason to interfere with an individual's liberty - he explicitly
includes as interference not only "physical force in the form of legal penalties" but also "the
o
moral coercion of public opinion." Id.
. • . .
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formity.265 Another form of protection is governmental self
restraint. Given the power law has to strengthen norms by expres
sing them through legislation, we can expect majorities to seek leg
islation to bolster nosy norms.266 Even entirely symbolic legislation
- laws with no material enforcement - may significantly affect the
power of such norms. Constitutional restraints on purely symbolic
legislation may be necessary to prevent majorities from using
the state to strengthen nosy norms.267 One example is the "no
endorsement" interpretation of the Establishment Clause.26s Be265. That tolerance nonns serve this function does not mean that they are necessarily
efficient. As explained in the next section, a norm may encourage an initially useful activity
beyond an optimal level; the harm from excessive amounts of the activity could exceed the
harm from insufficient amounts that occur without the norm. A norm could encourage a
form of tolerance to the point where a group or society would be better off without it.
266. Although majorities can enforce nosy norms solely by the allocation of esteem, with
out the need for state assistance, it can surely bind minorities more effectively with such aid.
Joseph Gusfield observes: "Affirmation through law and governmental acts expresses the
public worth of one subculture's norms relative to those of others, demonstrating which cul
tures have legitimacy and public domination. Accordingly, it enhances the social status of
groups carrying the affirmed culture and degrades groups carrying that which is condemned
as deviant." Joseph R. Gusfield, On Legislating Morals: The Symbolic Process ofDesignat
ing Deviance, 56 CAL. L. REv. 54, 58 (1968).
267. In other words, the problem of nosy norms means that it is not sufficient to restrain
the state's tendency to overuse its powers of coercive regulation. If majorities can constrain
minorities through norms, and the state can strengthen norms by the expressive power of
law, then the democratic state will also tend to overuse its powers of expression. Lessig is
correct, in my view, in claiming that government cannot avoid establishing orthodoxy. See
Lessig, supra note 11, at 946-47, 1034-36. My point is simply that constitutional doctrines are
and should be sensitive to majority misuse of this function.
268. Some members of the Supreme Court hold that the Establishment Clause bars the
government from action that "endorses" religion. See Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the
Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96 CoLUM. L. REv. 2083, 2126-28 (1996) (discussing
history of the endorsement test in Supreme Court Establishment Clause opinions in recent
years). I express no opinion on the proper interpretation of the Establishment Clause or the
particular formulation of "endorsement" the Court employs. For criticisms, see Michael W.
McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 127-34 (1992); Steven
D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the 'No
Endorsement' Test, 86 MICH. L. REv. 266 (1987). I only note that the theory presented here
generally supports placing some limits on the expressive power of law and that religion is an
area in which majorities might wish to use that power to create or strengthen nosy norms (as
I define them).
Equal protection law.may also be viewed as limiting the use of the expressive power of
law to enforce nosy nonns regarding race or gender. Some gender cases explicitly ask
whether the statute or governmental action signals approval or disapproval of existing gender
stereotypes. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 140-42 (1994) ("When state actors
exercise peremptory challenges in reliance on gender stereotypes, they ratify and reinforce
prejudicial views of the relative abilities of men and women
The message it sends
is
that certain individuals, for no reason other than gender, are presumed unqualified by state
actors to decide important questions
"); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718, 729-30 (1982) ("By assuring that Mississippi allots more openings in its state-supported
nursing schools to women than it does to men, MUW's admissions policy lends credibility to
the old view that women, not men, should become nurses
"). But see supra note 217
(quibbling with J.E.B.). Obviously, one can also view Brown v. Board ofEducation, 341 U.S.
483 (1954), as condemning Jim Crow segregation because it expressed the superiority of
. . • .

. . . •
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low, I argue for an additional "protection" from nosy norms legal entitlements to privacy.

2.

Zealous Norms: The Problem of Excessive Conformity

Even when a norm arises in response to a collective action prob
lem, the esteem theory predicts a second kind of inefficiency. The
efficiency of a norm depends not only on whether it commands the
efficient kind of behavior, but whether it commands the efficient

level of that behavior.269 Esteem competition may produce too
much individual effort to address a collective-action problem.270
In general, once a norm arises that obligates individuals to en
gage in some level of behavior X, esteem competition can raise the
level of X beyond the optimal point. This point was implicit in sec
tion H.B. In the recycling example, esteem competition raised the
average contribution to recycling. When A, B, and C each knew
that their esteem would depend, in part, on how much they contrib
uted relative to the others, and when each could observe how much

There
is no reason to suppose the equilibrium contribution matches the op-

the others contributed, contributions to recycling escalated.

Whites and thereby supported racial caste norms. See, e.g., Charles L. Black Jr., The Lawful
ness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 424-26 (1960).

269. Elster provides a simple example of a norm causing an inefficiently high level of an
otherwise efficient behavior: "A group of friends who are cleaning up after a party might
actually finish the job faster if some of them relax instead with a drink, but the norm against
free riding might overwhelm considerations of efficiency." ELSTER, supra note 2, at 190. He
concludes: "In situations that lack a coercive institution, the norm of fairness could drive
cooperation beyond the optimal point." Id. at 191. Given Elster's view of norms as not
being "outcome oriented," see id. at 98, he does not attribute the problem to esteem competi
tion or any other individually rational motivation.
270. James Coleman uses a motive like esteem to explain "zeal," that is, to explain why
an individual sometimes contributes more to a group activity than she does to a comparable
individual activity. See COLEMAN, supra note 2, at 273-76. Coleman's example is team
sports, where he observes that despite the incentives for free riding - individuals bear all the
costs of practice and exertion but share the benefits of victory - "team members often work
harder than do participants in individual sports activities." Id. at 274. Coleman explains zeal
as arising because team members offer each other "encouragement" or "gratitude," which
provides a new incentive for working harder. See id. at 277.
To some degree, this subsection uses Coleman's idea to explain Elster's observation, see
Encouragement and gratitude are obviously expres
sions of what I call esteem. But where Coleman begins by saying they cost the bestower
"very little," id., I begin with the claim that these expressions - along with expressions and
inferences of disapproval - are sometimes costless. In addition, though Coleman says zeal
may produce an "excess" of contributions, see id. at 277, he does not link this point to his
discussion of norm inefficiency. See id. at 260-64. Insteap, he thinks pure "conjoint" norms
- in which each group member potentially benefits from and is obligated to follow the norm
- are efficient. See id. at 247 (defining conjoint norm); id. at 260 (suggesting efficiency of all
pure conjoint norms). To the contrary, however, my textual examples suggest that such
norms can be inefficient. See infra text accompanying notes 274-84.

supra note 269, about inefficient norms.
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timal contribution.271 In the example, A, B, and C each contributed
slightly less than four dollars to recycling; in equilibrium, anything
less would cause them to lose four dollars in status. Yet this four
dollars bears no relationship to the optimal contribution. It could
be more or less.
One may ask why individuals correctly perceive the optimal
kind of behavior, but do not also correctly perceive and enforce the
optimal level of that behavior? Ex ante, the answer is information
costs. Although individuals may know enough to perceive that
some behavior is efficient - a realization that eventually produces
a norm - they could easily lack sufficient information to determine
either how much behavior is optimal or how much behavior esteem
allocation will ultimately produce. Given that the initial problem is
too little of the activity, this ignorance can cause individuals to es
teem others strictly according to their level of the activity - for
example, the amount they clean up or the amount they recycle. In
equilibrium, this esteem allocation may then produce excessive in
vestment in the activity.
Now an ex post question arises: Once the norm becomes harm
ful, why do individuals not recognize as much and scale down the
norm? Here, the problem is strategic. Once the norm exists, there
is a price to norm criticism. For strong norms, secondary enforce
ment norms will typically require punishing anyone who challenges
the primary norm.272 Thus, esteem competition can make very
costly any individual behavior designed to "brake" the escalation of
norm enforcement.273 Inefficiently high norm activity levels may
therefore be an equilibrium.
Return to the recycling example. Suppose the optimal contribu
tion is $3 per person. Not recognizing this fact or not knowing what
271. See Posner, supra note 123, at 589. For the group, the optimal contribution to re·
cycling is the point at which any further contributions create more total social costs than total
social benefits. But escalation ends, and an equilibrium is achieved, only when the private
cost of further recycling is greater than the private benefits of the esteem it would produce or
the disesteem it would avoid.
272. See supra notes 103, 192 and accompanying text. It might be possible for a group to
avoid this problem by enforcing "tolerance" or free speech norms that permit some dissent.
See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
273. Despite the potentfal for excess, norm enforcement frequently reaches equilibrium
before the actual contribution equals the optimal contribution. In this case, the group is
better off with the esteem competition than without it, though the group will be better off still
if it can elicit further contributions. Even when the equilibrium standard exceeds the optimal
standard, the norm may improve group welfare. The norm becomes harmful to the group
only if the cost of excessive contributions - "overshooting" the optimum - is greater than
the cost of insufficient contributions falling below the optimum. But the esteem model of
norms predicts that this form of inefficiency will sometimes occur.
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contribution aggregate esteem production will elicit, individuals al
locate esteem in the manner described, and the average contribu
tion to recycling rises to $3.50. At this point, some community
members may first realize that this level is excessive. But this rec
ognition will not necessarily correct the norm, nor even slow a fur
ther rise in average contributions. Secondary enforcement norms
may deter individuals from criticizing the excessiveness of the
norm. Even if one individual recognizes that $3.50 is too high a
contribution, she may be unwilling to say so because unless her crit
icism is instantly persuasive, she will be sanctioned for failing to
condemn - indeed for implicitly praising - those who contribute
less than the present, average amount. Those who advocate· "mod
eration" of escalating norm compliance sometimes succeed only in
providing the norm's most zealous advocates further opportunity to
raise the level of norm compliance by condemning those who advo
cate moderation.274 Without effective criticism, everyone may con
tinue to contribute the $3.50 even if the group would be better off
without any recycling norm and even if many in the group recog
nize as much.275
Consider two further examples. One is a code of silence, such as
the one forbidding police officers from disclosing the misdeeds of
other officers.276 Obviously, some code of silence serves the inter274. Michael Klarman describes this phenomenon on a much larger scale. See Michael J.
Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REv. 7, 97-129
(1994). He recounts how, in the wake of Brown, white Southern politicians condemned mod
eration and "struggled against one another to occupy the most extreme position on the racial
spectrum." Id. at 98. Yet this backlash, he claims, produced the federal civil rights legislation
entirely contrary to the interests of those politicians' constituents. See id. at 129-49.
275. There is a second way excessive conformity may be an equilibrium, though only in
the weaker sense that the group would gain from less conformity but is still better off with the
norm than without it. Discontinuities in the activity the norm governs may force the group to
choose between too little and too much of the activity. Assume, for example, that people can
recycle only in units of $2, the average cost for holding one collection container for the rele
vant time and then properly disposing of its contents. If the optimal level is an average of $3
per person per time period, it is unlikely that decentralized esteem decisions can produce the
precise esteem differential between $2 contributors and $4 contributors to maintain an equal
number of each.
The most promising solution would be to "take turns," where everyone alternates be
tween $2 and $4 contributions. But such norms only sometimes solve the problem. When
the group switches to tum taking, the risk of detecting a norm violation falls because detec
tion requires keeping track of another's behavior in the prior as well as the current time
period. Especially in a large group, the difference will sometimes be decisive, as the expected
sanction falls below the benefit of the violation. In these cases, the group must choose
among norms requiring the same behavior of every person in every time period. But because
of the discontinuity, there is no such behavior that leads to the optimal outcome. Thus, if the
group gains more from above-optimal than below-optimal contributions, the inefficient norm
will remain an equilibrium. In general, when the optimal norm is too complex to enforce
effectively, under- or overinclusiveness is inevitable.
276. See supra note 42 (discussing police and doctor codes of silence).
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ests of the group. Up to a point, the members of a group will bene
fit by secrecy norms that protect members from being sanctioned
for harming nonmembers. But this is true only up to a point, be
cause nonmembers may eventually respond to cooperative silence
in ways that harm the group as a whole. For example, the Mollen
Commission, which investigated police corruption in New York, re
ported that "most honest cops will not report serious corruption"
even though "they despise corrupt cops and silently hope that they
will be removed from the ranks. "277 The Report continues: "It is
not surprising that the honest cop wants corrupt cops off the job.
The consequences of corruption for honest cops are grave: it taints
their reputations, destroys their morale, and, most important, jeop
ardizes their safety."278 In other words, serious corruption among
police officers damages the reputation of all police officers; officers
who have internalized societal or professional obligations to avoid
serious criminality are demoralized by working alongside criminals;
and citizens who are victimized by some police are more likely to be
hostile and violent toward all police.219
Esteem competition helps to explain how this excessive norm
arises. Assume that, initially, most but not all individuals who join
a police force have internalized norms against serious crime. Even
a generally law-abiding police officer might forgive and expect
others to forgive minor crimes by police officers: minor assaults
that are not legally justified, for example, when an officer "loses"
his temper and punches a suspect who ran away and caused the
officer chasing him to injure himself; or when an officer accepts mi
nor gifts intended to curry favor with the police, such as a single
free beer at a neighborhood tavern. If the law-abiding officers es
teem those who conceal information to protect officers in these
cases, a silence norm will likely arise. Moreover, informing on fel
low officers is a public activity; the consensus and risk of detection
are likely to be well-known within a police precinct and because
police interact intensely in sinall groups, they tend to value highly

277. Mallen Commission Report, supra note 42, at 56-57 ("[T]he most devastating conse
quence of the code of silence is that it prevents the vast majority of honest officers from
doing what they inwardly want to do: help keep their Department corruption free.").
278. Id. at 57. The report quotes one Internal Affairs report stating that the code "does
not always reflect solely tolerance for corruption or a misplaced group loyalty. In many
instances it is motivated purely by self-interest and self-protection: a fear of the consequence
of breaking the norms of loyalty and silence." Id. at 56.
279. See id. at 57 (quoting one officer's representative explanation that "I wouldn't want
to run across a drug dealer who's been ripped off [by cops] one time too many.").
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the esteem of fellow officers. Initially, the code of silence serves the
group interest, though it is contrary to society's interests.
One can easily imagine that police officers do not anticipate
what the optimal level of silence is in advance, nor what level of
silence the norm

will

produce. Thus, they allocate esteem accord

ing to a simple rule: do not "rat" on fellow officers. Once some
norm arises, esteem competition may require a code of silence for
increasing levels of criminality.280 Once enforcement reaches an
excessive level, it may be too late to correct the problem informally.
Anyone who advocates informing risks being suspected as an in
former and treated accordingly. In the end, the norm may prevent
officers from revealing even the most serious wrongdoing by other
officers - such as taking bribes, stealing from criminals, or seri
ously assaulting suspects - even though the ultimate effect on the
group from such corruption is negative.
The once-common practice of dueling provides a second exam
ple of how competitive norm compliance causes inefficiency. Other
norms theorists note that, in Europe and the United States, dueling
provided benefits to the aristocrats and upper classes in which the
custom arose.281 Dueling resolved disputes in a way that preserved
the honor of both parties. Given rules that minimized the risk of
death, dueling frequently allowed parties to avoid either a more
deadly fight or the acceptance of an insult that would undermine
their social status. Most importantly, dueling ostentatiously distin
guished the elite classes from the classes that did not and were not
permitted to duel. Nonetheless, in the decades before dueling was
abolished, in various places, the costs of dueling grew very high as
the level of insult necessary to trigger a duel fell over time. Ulti
mately, dueling reached a point where even the most trivial and
unintentional slight could compel one to choose between unbear
able social disgrace and potentially lethal combat. At that point, it
appears that the costs of the dueling norm exceeded its benefits,
that the incremental distinction the upper classes gained was no
longer worth the mortal peril they suffered.2s2
280. The code itself produces a rise in criminality, particularly by those who have not
internalized norms against crime, by lowering the risk that corruption is punished.
281. See HARDIN, supra note 2, at 91-100; Elster, supra note 42, at 868; Lessig, supra note
11, at 968-72; Posner, supra note 102, at 1736-40; Schwartz et al., supra note 20, at 321-25.
282. See HARDIN, supra note 2, at 93, 101-02 (discussing how dueling norms escalated so
that frivolous affronts were sufficient to cause a duel); Posner, supra note 102, at 1737-39
(claiming that the practice of dueling outlasted its usefulness, which ended when the state
acquired a monopoly on the legitimate use of force).
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As the esteem model explains, though the system initially
benefitted the group, zealous competition for esteem produced ex
cessive levels of sacrifice for the norm. The dueling norm arose
because a certain level of insult among elite men required resolu
tion. Esteem competition lowered the level of insult needed to trig
ger the duel. If the optimal trigger for the upper class was t, A
could credibly claim to have a greater sense of honor by challenging
others to a duel for insults less than t, or by claiming that those who
accepted insults less than t lacked honor. In a society that values
esteem highly, the potential gain to an individual from this strategy
may, for a time, be quite high, while to criticize escalation of the
norm may be prohibitively costly.283 Thus, there was no reason for
the equilibrium duel trigger to match the optimal trigger. Hence,
the level of insult that triggered a duel fell so low that the group as
a whole was made worse off because of the norm.284
In sum, although esteem norms can be efficient, there is no rea

son to think, on average, that they are. One must evaluate the effi
ciency of particular norms. The remainder of this Part suggests one
way that law can impede inefficient norms.
D.

Impeding Inefficient Norms with Privacy Rights

Some group and societal norms are undesirable, judged by effi
ciency, the morality of the behavior they compel or forbid, or some
other normative criteria. When confronted with undesirable norms,
the state might respond quite directly by prohibiting the behavior
the norm requires or requiring behavior the norm prohibits.285 But
the state may also attack norms in less obvious ways, one of which I
283. As Lessig notes, once one is challenged to a duel, criticizing the nonn by refusing the
challenge is obviously very costly. See id. at 970. Before one is challenged, the costs are less,
but then so is the incentive to criticize.
284. Adolescent behavior provides a final example of nonn escalation. Teens often have
a very rigid sense of appropriate clothing, music, free-time activity, attitude, and so on. One
may be tempted to say that the nonns that enforce these (broadly speaking) fashion choices
are "needless" and for this reason inefficient. But that is not necessarily true. Teenagers may
gain by having nonns that distinguish them from the adult culture that accords them a lower
status. By working together in creating teen nonns, including music or clothing norms that
ostentatiously reject adult standards, teenagers achieve more independence as a group than
they could individually. Coleman makes exactly this point, see COLEMAN, supra note 2, at
257-58, though he does not link it to his discussion of "zealotry," see id. at 490-95. Yet even
though these norms might bring some benefit to the group in which they arise, the level at
which they are enforced is probably inefficient. When social commentators decry the "peer
pressure" that induces teenagers to take up smoking or refuse to work hard in school, they
are identifying a norm that requires "excessive" conformity. The norms that reward these
behaviors might have initially advanced the welfare of teenagers, but esteem competition
leads to norms that "excessively" reject adult norms, to the net detriment of the group.
285. See, e.g., McAdams, supra note 10, at 1081-82 (suggesting this rational for Title VII).
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will explore here. The state might attempt to deprive· individuals of
the information necessary to norm enforcement - that is, informa
tion that a consensus exists or that it has been violated in a particu
lar case. In other words, the law might employ rights of privacy.
1.

The Economics of Privacy and Norms

Economic theorists are generally skeptical of privacy claims.286
Unlike protection against defamatory falsehoods, the right to con
ceal true facts about oneself appears to facilitate fraud - broadly
understood to include any economic or social deception. Judge
Richard Posner's view is illustrative.287 He asserts that law should
protect the privacy of "embarrassing" but not "discrediting" facts.
Discrediting facts are those that impair reputation in a way that
"reduces one's opportunities for favorable transactions;" embar
rassing facts are those that are not discrediting but still "are not part
of one's constructed public self."288 Because he means "transac
tions" quite broadly, including all social as well as business transac
tions, he ultimately favors only a very limited privacy right. For
example, discrediting information includes the fact that an individ
ual had a sex-change operation, is a bisexual, or was once a prosti
tute, for these are "facts about a person that may cause others to
shun him, whether rightly or wrongly."289

The esteem theory of norms implies a more complex view of
privacy. Whether enforced by law or norms, privacy directly affects
two conditions of norm formation: (1) the publicity of the behav
ioral consensus, and

(2) the risk that violating such a consensus will

be detected. If most people consider certain realms private, they
may not discuss them sufficiently to determine whether any consen
sus exists about what behavior within those realms deserves esteem.
In other words, privacy may facilitate the false consensus effect290
286. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Right to Privacy, 12 GA. L. REv. 393 (1978);
George J. Stigler, An Introduction to Privacy in Economics and Politics, 9 J. LEGAL STUD.
623, 640 (1980) (claiming that "support for the privacy laws remains opaque"). See generally
Symposium, The Law and Economics ofPrivacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 621 (1980). But see Rich
ard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of Privacy,
84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2396-2402 (1996).
287. Judge Posner has written extensively about privacy. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner,
The Economics of Privacy, AM. ECON. REv., May 1981, at 405; Posner, supra note 286; see
also Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1229-35 (7th Cir. 1993) (Posner, C.J.). I
focus on his most recent writings in RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 531-51 (1995).
288. POSNER, supra note 287, at 539.
289. Id. at 539 (stating the sex change and bisexuality examples); see also id. at541 (dis
approving of Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91 (Cal. App. 1931), which allowed damages for re
vealing, among other things, that a woman had previously been a prostitute).
290. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
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that impedes norm formation. More obviously, when a consensus is
known, privacy reduces the risk that an offending act will be de
tected and thereby makes norm enforcement against such acts more
difficult. Thus, privacy is a means of norm regulation. When pri
vacy rights impede an undesirable norm, this effect can provide an
economic justification for those rights.291 If facts are discrediting in
Posner's sense because they would cause others to "shun" one who
violated an inefficient norm, their concealment would likely be
efficient.292
At a general level, the probable efficiency of privacy depends on
the probable inefficiency of norms. The esteem model predicts the
widespread existence of unnecessary nosy norms by which majori
ties enforce their other-regarding preferences on minorities.293 Pri
vacy rights cannot prevent many of these conformity pressures
because privacy is impractical when the behavior at issue is inher
ently public. One cannot expect to keep secret facts like one's hair
style, the exterior of one's home in an urban area, or the nature of
the clothes one wears when shopping.294 But privacy rights may
prevent acquisition or dissemination of information that is not nec
essarily public - as, for example, one's religion or sexuality. In
these cases, norm formation and enforcement depends on the circu
lation of information about a consensus and cooperative disclosure
and gossip by those who acquire evidence of its violation. Privacy
rights in such areas may impede both discovery of the consensus
and of its violation, seriously impeding norm formation and en
forcement. At a general level, then, a complete economic analysis
of privacy rights must include the possibilities (1) that the area pro
tected would, without privacy rights, be inefficiently regulated by
nosy norms;295 and (2) that the area subject to privacy already is
291. When such rights block an efficient norm, the costs of privacy are even higher than
previous analyses suggest.
292. As I indicate below, one would have to weigh the advantage from diminished norm
enforcement against the disadvantage of losing information for other valuable purposes.
293. Norms may impose such needless conformity on matters great (for example, reli
gion), and small (for example, hair style). Conformity on even trivial matters may, by ac
cumulation, still produce substantial rigidity in behavior, a conformity "penetrating much
more deeply into the details of life" than can the state. MILL, supra note 263, at 4.
294. One should therefore expect nosy norms to arise in such contexts. But norms them
selves provide a possible solution to the problem of inefficient norms. Previously, I discussed
norms for tolerating norm criticism. See supra note 194 and accompanying text. In some
groups, a similar tolerance norm recognizes the right to be different in certain respects.
Whenever someone says something like, "That's his business," they express a norm against
enforcing one's other-regarding preferences. This norm curtails the problem of unnecessary
norms, though it may also block desirable norms.
295. See Murphy, supra note 286, at 2397-98 ("Given anonymity, people will do what they
want.").
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regulated by nosy norms, but that inefficient enforcement of the
norms would increase absent privacy rights.
There is, however, one other connection between privacy and
norms, a substantial complication caused by the feedback effect dis
cussed above.296 Once most individuals in a population believe a
consensus exists, privacy conceals any changes in the consensus.
This effect can be quite important. But I defer discussing it in detail
until the next subsection, where I address all these points in the
context of a particular example.

2. An Illustration: Privacy, "Outing, " and Norms of
Sexual Behavior
One obvious set of privacy issues concerns sexuality.297 Many
people harbor significant other-regarding preferences on the sub
ject of sex - including but not limited to the sex of the partner one
seeks. In Sex and Reason, Richard Posner characterizes many of
the arguments for restricting sexual freedom, or at least much of the
emotion behind such restrictions, as based on these other-regarding
preferences.298 Expressing skepticism of government regulation
based on such preferences, he advocates a libertarian approach to
sexual matters, and rejects, for example, the criminal prohibition of
prostitution, homosexual acts between consenting adults, and abor
tion during the early months of pregnancy.299 At least for homo
sexuality, he also explicitly rejects nonlegal forms of social
intolerance - that is, societal and group norms against homosexu
ality.3o0 These are controversial issues, but I will assume the valid
ity of Posner's argument for sexual freedom in order to criticize his
efficiency argument against privacy. Given the potential for nosy
norms that restrict sexual freedom, it would appear that sexual pri
vacy might undermine the very norms Posner thinks are inefficient.
To understand my claim, consider Posner's privacy argument in
more detail. Posner recognizes that many people argue for privacy,
including sexual privacy, by assuming that those who acquire secret
information will use it unfairly or unwisely. Thus, he concludes that
the judges in Melvin v. Reid30l
a case in which the defendants
-

296. See supra text accompanying notes 111-18.
297. Sexual behavior is not inherently public, so nosy sexual norms cannot be enforced
without cooperative disclosure and gossip.
298. See RICHARD A. PosNER, SEX AND REASON 201-04 (1992) (stating that disgust is
often the only basis for sex regulation).
299. Id. at 441.
300. Id. at 307-09 (advocating social tolerance of homosexuality).
301. 297 P. 91 (Cal. App. 1931).

428

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 96:338

had publicized; among other things, that the plaintiff had once been
a prostitute - "may have felt that people would give too much
weight to the plaintiff's past in predicting her future behavior."302
But he rejects this point as "just the kind of paternalistic, and in the
circumstances none too plausible, attitude toward market behavior
. . . that the economist generally thinks an inappropriate basis for
government regulation."303 In other words, Posner and others have
confidence that, in equilibrium, the market will "count" past prosti
tution, and other information, efficiently. If, for example, an em
ployer wishes to use past prostitution as a proxy to predict the
future productivity of potential employees, then the market will re
ward those who weigh the evidence rationally and punish those who
give it more or less weight than it deserves.304 As for private shun
ning, Posner implies that if most people treat the information as
irrelevant, then the "market" in "personal relationships" will pun
ish an idiosyncratic neighbor or friend who decides to shun the for
mer prostitute. On the other hand, if most people do shun her,
Posner condemns as paternalistic a governmental decision to sec
ond guess this reaction.
Judge Posner's privacy argument either completely ignores the
existence of norms or assumes an implausibly strong claim about
their efficiency.305 In either case, it overlooks the problem of nosy
norms identified in section IV.C. The shunning he identifies is a
visible manifestation of denying someone esteem, an enforcement
mechanism of esteem-based norms. If the norm produced is ineffi
cient, if it is nosy, there is a straightforward economic argument for
protecting the privacy of information necessary for norm enforce
ment. Indeed, individuals are most willing and able to enforce their
other-regarding preferences precisely within what Posner calls the
personal relationship "market" - between friends, neighbors, and
other social acquaintances. This fact is hardly a basis for assuming
that the use of discrediting information in such markets is efficient.
302. POSNER, supra note 287, at 541. Another fact the defendant revealed was that the
plaintiff had been charged with murder but acquitted. I read Posner's rejection of the argu
ment to apply to both the murder charge and the prostitution.
303. Id. at 541-42.
304. As Richard Murphy observes, this analysis is exactly parallel to the economic claim
that the market will punish employers who discriminate irrationally on the basis of race. See
Murphy, supra note 286, at 2400; see also GARY s. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMI·
NATION {1957); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST DISCRIM·
!NATION LAws (1992).
305. Not that Judge Posner has actually ignored norms. See Posner, supra note 29. In
that recent article he specifically notes that privacy impedes norm enforcement, though he
does not discuss how that may bear on his prior writings on privacy. See id. at 368.
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Much of Posner's Sex and Reason argues, for example, that soci
ety would be better off if people did not shun gays and lesbians.306
Under this analysis, norms obligating heterosexuality are

nosy,

and

people use information about other people's sexual orientation in
efficiently. If Sex and Reason is correct, the same is true of prostitu
tion and abortion - the economic argument for allowing parties to
choose these activities implicitly criticizes norms that deter them.
Posner may be wrong in his defense of prostitution and abortion,
but if he is right, and if some communities shun prostitutes, their
customers, abortion providers, and women who obtain abortions,
then the resulting nosy norms deter efficient conduct. Government
might respond to these norms by forbidding discrimination (in em
ployment, housing, etc.) against those involved in these unpopular
activities. Posner expresses skepticism of this approach as a means
of protecting gays and lesbians from discriminatory norms.307 But
he does not consider that expanded legal rights to privacy might
serve as a legal substitute. Tue ability of gays and lesbians to con
trol discrediting information, information that leads t.o shunning,
would substantially undermine the nosy norms they face. Tue same
holds true for those involved in prostitution or abortion.
A thorough efficiency analysis must also consider the cost of pri
vacy:

Secrecy means that information necessary to satisfy

sel/

regarding preferences does not freely circulate. Thus, as Posner
points out, secrecy makes it more difficult for gay men and lesbians
to find suitable partners. For abortion, secrecy means women do
not fully share information about abortion providers, a fact that un
doubtedly diminishes the competitive pressures that typically bene
fit

customers.308

One must weigh the

benefits

of

denying

information to those who might use it to enforce a nosy norm
against the costs of denying information to those who would use it
to satisfy their self-regarding preferences in violation of the norm.
There are, however, several reasons to think that the benefits of
privacy predominate. First, the reason for suspecting that a norm
based on other-regarding preferences is inefficient is the intuition
306. See POSNER, supra note 298, at 307. He does not attribute all this intolerance to
state action. Although (largely unenforced) laws against homosexual acts express and
strengthen norms of heterosexuality, Posner does not think they are necessary to sustain
them. He notes, for example, that in the Netherlands, a nation much more tolerant of homo
sexuality than the United States, "decades of official tolerance have not eliminated social
intolerance." Id. at 307.
307. See id. at 323.
308. The same would be true if prostitution were legal: secrecy would deny men informa
tion about places of prostitution.
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that self-regarding preferences are much stronger. If so, gays and
lesbians should bear more search costs to satisfy their self-regarding
preferences than their adversaries will bear to satisfy their other
regarding preferences and enforce the prohibitory norm. A small
increment of additional information costs may severely damage the
norm while only marginally affecting the market for sexual part
ners. Second, privacy rights may be waived. Thus, if an individual
decides the costs of privacy exceed the benefits in a particular con
text, she can forgo privacy and disclose the information necessary
to satisfy her self-regarding preference.309 In sum, the case for pri
vacy rights remains quite plausible.310
There is, however, a final and important wrinkle, one that un
derlies the debate over "outing" of gays and lesbians.311 The es
teem model suggests one circumstance in which the effect of privacy
could strengthen a norm. Privacy rights may preserve a norm by
concealing from public view a rising number of norm violations
that, if known, would weaken the norm. . This point follows from
the feedback effect discussed in Part II.312 Because esteem is de
sired in a relative sense, the disapproval one feels as one of the two
percent who acts against the consensus is stronger than what one
feels as one of the twenty percent who acts against the consensus,
all else being equal. Thus, information about a consensus creates
feedback: when more conform, the esteem cost for violators in
creases, potentially causing cycles where still more comply and the
cost rises further. When compliance drops, the disesteem a violator
receives is less intense, potentially causing cycles in which fewer
comply and the cost of violation decreases further. Privacy rights
may influence this feedback effect by depriving the public of infor
mation about the extent of norm violations.313 It is not possible to
309. The reverse is not true: If infonnation about gays and lesbians circulates freely, they
cannot erase the infonnation from public awareness.
310. If one thinks legal privacy protections are nonetheless inefficient, one must explain
why privacy norms are not also inefficient, though I doubt that many people would want to
live without them. Although unevenly enforced, group and societal nonns discourage (1)
asking strangers, casual acquaintances, and even friends about their sexual preferences,
predilections, and experiences; (2) eavesdropping or "spying" to learn such facts; and (3)
publicizing intimate facts - or photographs - acquired through sexual encounters with an
individual. The question whether a privacy right is efficient is similar to asking whether such
privacy norms are efficient. The legal right may be viewed as strengthening privacy nonns.
311. See, e.g., LARRY GROSS, CoNTESTED CLOSETS: THE POLITICS AND Ennes OF OUT·
ING (1993); WARREN JoHANSSON, OUTING: SHATIERING THE CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE
(1994); John P. Elwood, Note, Outing, Privacy, and the First Amendment, 102 YALE L.J. 747
(1992).
312. See supra text accompanying notes 111-18.
313. Similarly, imagine that the number of violations remains constant but that privacy
requires the public to guess at the number of violations. If the public underestimates nonn
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say in the abstract how this would affect a particular norm. When
the number of violators is growing and privacy prevents the public
from recognizing that the consensus is weakening, privacy rights
work to preserve the norm. Conversely, when violations are falling
and privacy prevents the public from recognizing that the consensus
is growing, privacy rights prevent the norm from strengthening.
Thus, if one believes that heterosexuals who enforce norms
against gays and lesbians ("homophobes") tend to underestimate
the prevalence of homosexuality, one strategy for attacking the
norm is to reveal how frequently it is violated. The call to come
"out of the closet" is one means of revealing the higher frequency
of violations; involuntarily "outing" gays and lesbians is another.
Both strategies arguably serve to disprove common stereotypes
about gays and lesbians. Many homophobes are able to preserve
their distorted and negative images of gays and lesbians by the fact
that they rarely or never encounter a contradicting image: someone
they know is homosexual but who does not conform to the stereo
type. Some hope that outing will provide evidence that forces the
homophobe to abandon the stereotype, and with it, abandon the
disapproval of homosexuality. This line of thinking strikes me as
optimistic; certainly many people are able to hold negative stereo
types of women and African Americans despite their never having
been in the closet. But there is a second point about stereotypes:
even if outing only causes homophobes to replace extreme stereo
types with more subtle ones, falsifying the extreme stereotype
forces the homophobe to realize that there may be far more gays
and lesbians than was previously thought possible - because stran
gers who do not manifest the extreme stereotype could still be gay
or lesbian. The changed stereotype thus may create a feedback ef
fect, in which the increased frequency of perceived violations weak
ens the norm.
Outing and privacy are always two possible alternative strate
gies for attacking an existing norm.314 Privacy tries to drive down
the risk of detection to the point where the norm is unenforceable.
Outing tries to raise the risk of detection to the point where the
consensus is revealed to be far weaker than previously believed.315
violations - assuming, for example, that most or all norm violators are detected when very
few actually are - then abandoning privacy will reveal more violations and lower the inten
sity of disapproval for each violator. But if the public overestimates norm violations, aban
doning privacy will reveal more norm compliance and strengthen the norm.
314. Privacy is also a strategy to prevent a norm from arising.
315. A person who exits the closet both implicitly criticizes the norm and proclaims it to
be weak.
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Viewed in this way, the effectiveness of a strategy depends greatly
on how strong the consensus really is. If the consensus is suffi
ciently strong, the revelation of violators will produce a flood of
new sanctioning, and while each individual may be punished less,
the norm may still reach a new equilibrium at a high level of pun
ishment. Moreover, outing is risky because it may provide the
norm enforcers with new information that raises the risk of detec
tion for those who did not leave the closet.316 Whatever one thinks
of outing as a strategy for gays and lesbians in the 1990s, I assume
few would or did advocate the strategy in the 1950s, when the con
sensus was probably strong enough to withstand such an attack.
Greater tolerance in the 1990s makes the strategy now plausible.
On the other hand, while privacy is the superior strategy when the
nosy consensus is strong - or before it arises or is well known privacy may perpetuate a norm long after the consensus starts to
dissipate. A noisy minority may continue to enforce the norm
against the occasional individual whose privacy is accidentally lost
and give the appearance of a consensus. A low probability of pun
ishment combined with privacy rights may keep most violators in
the closet at a time when mass exit would destroy the norm.
*

*

In sum, the existence of esteem-based norms matters greatly to
privacy regulation. A complete analysis of privacy must ask
whether the information restrained might otherwise be used to cre
ate or enforce a norm and, if so, whether the norm is efficient.
When inefficient, the benefits of privacy - weakening a norm that
impedes satisfaction of self-regarding preferences - may exceed its
costs - the increase in search costs necessary to satisfy those pref
erences. Finally, the privacy strategy should be compared to a pos
sible outing strategy: if individuals are willing to use the latter and
if the norm is already weak, privacy may only perpetuate the norm.
But where the norm is genuinely powerful, or where private outing
behavior is unlikely, privacy may be the superior means of weaken
ing the norm.

316. Judge Posner says, for example, that the extreme stereotypes make homosexuals
invisible to homophobes, when additional tolerance may make detection easier. See PosNER,
supra note 298, at 292.
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CONCLUSION
This article has two goals. One is to clarify and unify the dispa
rate scholarship on norms: group and societal norms, broad and
narrow norms, externally and internally enforced norms. The sec
ond is to identify new connections between law and norms, particu
larly the use of law to regulate norms. For each goal, my strategy
has been to identify a particular theory of norm origin. Given the
assumption that people seek esteem as an end, I argue that norms
are inevitable. Sometimes many people grant esteem or withhold
esteem from the same behavior, while there is a risk that acts con
trary to this consensus will be detected, and the consensus and risk
are well known. When these conditions hold, even a weak concern
for esteem from any one individual can create significant costs to
acting against the consensus. When the private costs exceed the
private benefits of violating the consensus, a norm emerges. Over
time, competition for relative esteem may strengthen the norm,
produce secondary enforcement norms - sometimes backed by
material sanctions - and even cause the norm to be internalized.
The esteem theory is not the only plausible theory of norm ori
gin. But it serves the two goals of this article. First, the esteem
model resolves certain ambiguities and contradictions in the litera
ture. It explains the origin of both group and societal norms, as
well as the occasional conflict between them, and identifies a crucial
relationship between narrow and broad norms: concrete esteem
based norms often define the meaning of abstract internalized
norms. While preserving a place for internalization, the esteem
model can explain phenomena internalization models cannot: the
existence of norms that arose without unanimous consensus and the
ability of criticism to produce rapid norm change. Thus, by provid
ing a common theory of origin, the esteem model helps to unify the
disparate parts of the new norms literature.
Second, the esteem model has immediate implications for norm
regulation. The desire for esteem predicts certain kinds of ineffi
cient norms - unnecessary and excessive - omitted from the ex
isting debate. The model also identifies several ways in which
information is crucial to norm origin. Thus, law can manipulate
norms by manipulating information, as when law creates or
strengthens a norm by publicizing the existence of a consensus or
when law blocks or weakens a norm by facilitating the concealment
of information necessary to norm enforcement. Privacy turns out to
be highly relevant to regulating norms; in some situations, the use
of privacy rights may usefully restrict norm enforcement.

